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Written by Sebastian Clapp
Facts and figuresThe EU’s defence industry is at a pivotal moment, shaped by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the United States’ shifting priorities, and a renewed drive for strategic autonomy. After years of underinvestment and persistent fragmentation, the EU is now seeking to rebuild military capability and strengthen its defence industrial base. The European defence industry comprises a number of large prime contractors, mid-caps and a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). According to Aerospace, Security and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) data, and the author’s calculations for the EU-27, the EU-based defence industry’s turnover is estimated at around €148 billion in 2024, an increase of more than 60 % since 2021 in nominal terms. Exports amounted to roughly €48 billion in 2024 and direct employment in the EU defence industry amounted to around 500 000 people.
Table 1 – Top EU defence companies by revenue
CompanyCountryRevenue*Global rankingThalesFrance15 900#10LeonardoItaly13 822#13AirbusEuropean12 705#14RheinmetallGerman8 245#18SaabSweden5 542#26MBDAEuropean5 305#27SafranFrance5 198#29Naval GroupFrance4 716#33Source: DefenseNews, 2024. *Revenue from defence in US$ million (2024).
Table 2 – EU defence industry revenue, 2021-2024
Source: ASD data, 2025 and author’s calculations.The EU’s defence industry remains largely concentrated in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden. However, a report shows that prime producers of the 46 most critical defence items are located across 23 Member States. Thales of France ranked as the largest defence company in the EU by defence revenue in 2024, followed by Italy’s Leonardo. That year, 20 companies headquartered in the EU featured among the world’s top 100 defence firms, including five based in France and four in Germany, together generating defence revenues of approximately US$112 billion, or about €104 billion. By contrast, 48 of the top 100 defence companies were based in the United States, accounting for roughly US$334 billion in defence revenue. Lockheed Martin alone, the leading global defence firm, reported defence revenues of US$68.39 billion. Five of the top 100 were based in China, together accounting for US$355 billion in revenue. The ownership structure of Europe’s leading defence firms underscores the strategic character of the sector.
In many instances, national authorities maintain blocking or controlling shares, which helps safeguard alignment with national priorities and allows for direct public oversight. Across continental Europe, ownership is commonly concentrated either within the state or among family-controlled enterprises. Prominent examples include Dassault (almost 70 % of shares held by the Dassault family’s Groupe Industriel Marcel Dassault), Naval Group (over 60 % of shares are held by the French state), Fincantieri (70 % of shares held by the state-owned Italian sovereign wealth fund, CDP Equity S.p.A.), and Liebherr Group (entirely owned by the Liebherr family). State participation can narrow the scope for cross-border cooperation and industrial consolidation. While mergers between defence firms may deliver economic benefits through economies of scale, they are often treated as strategically sensitive due to their implications for national security and sovereignty. Family-owned firms similarly pursue nationally anchored corporate strategies, reducing their openness to deeper EU-level integration. Golden power rules and the veto capacity of dominant family shareholders further reinforce this structural rigidity. Researchers found that the combined effect is a European defence industrial base that remains fragmented and less competitive than more consolidated markets.
The European defence industry produces a broad range of military equipment and technologies and therefore provides an extensive industrial offering. Its production spans: military aeronautics, including combat, transport and mission aircraft, and helicopters; land capabilities, such as main battle tanks, armoured vehicles across multiple classes, logistics and tactical transport assets, artillery and ammunition of different calibres, alongside individual combat equipment; naval platforms from submarines to surface combatants; space-related defence capabilities; missile systems at both tactical and strategic levels; and defence-specific electronics, information and communication technologies, cyber capabilities and autonomous systems – notably drones, which have experienced a particular boom in production. Despite this breadth, the EU industry does not currently provide domestic solutions in several critical segments, including medium altitude long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles, tactical ballistic missiles and long-range artillery rockets. These gaps reflect long-term underinvestment and sustained dependence on the United States security guarantee.
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the rapid availability of military equipment became a key priority for EU governments and armed forces. Firms based outside Europe – benefiting either from larger domestic markets as in the United States or from higher baseline levels of defence readiness as in South Korea – were better positioned to maintain higher production capacity and to deliver or pledge substantial quantities of equipment at speed. By contrast, many European manufacturers were limited by long periods of industrial contraction and underinvestment. This context has evolved markedly since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion. EU ammunition production capacity, for example, rose from around 300 000 rounds per year in 2022 to an estimated 2 million by the end of 2025, reflecting a pace of industrial expansion that, according to the Financial Times, exceeds peacetime growth rates by a factor of three.
EU and Member States’ support for the defence industryEU Member States’ defence expenditure has risen sharply since 2021, reflecting a sustained shift towards higher investment in defence. Defence spending reached an estimated €381 billion in 2025, representing a rise of almost 63 % compared to 2020. Expenditure grew from 1.6 % of GDP in 2023 to 1.9 % in 2024 and is expected to reach approximately 2.1 % in 2025. Growth has been driven primarily by investment, which approached €130 billion in 2025. Investment accounted for 31 % of total defence expenditure in 2024, with equipment procurement dominating and exceeding €88 billion. Defence research and development spending also expanded significantly, reaching €13 billion in 2024 and a projected €17 billion in 2025. The EU has introduced several measures to complement and amplify national efforts. These include financial support instruments such as the SAFE loan facility, budgetary flexibility via the national escape clause, and cooperation through the European Peace Facility. In parallel, EU budget instruments such as the European Defence Fund, military mobility funding, the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) and the European defence industry programme (EDIP) aim to reduce fragmentation and strengthen the competitiveness of Europe’s defence industrial base.
European Parliament positionParliament has consistently called for an increase in defence spending and for boosting the EU defence industry. Members welcome rising national defence spending but urge deeper European cooperation to prevent market fragmentation and call for expanded industrial output and greater interoperability.
Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘European defence industry‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
By CIVICUS
Feb 9 2026 (IPS)
CIVICUS discusses the genocide case against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) with Mohammed Nowkhim of the Arakan Rohingya Society for Peace & Human Rights (ARSPHR), a civil society organisation led by Rohingya people born out of refugee camps in Bangladesh to document atrocities, preserve survivor testimony and advocate for accountability and justice.
Mohammed Nowkhim
On 12 January, the ICJ began hearings in the genocide case brought by The Gambia against Myanmar over the military’s treatment of the Rohingya Muslim minority. The Gambia, representing the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation’s 57 members, accuses Myanmar of breaching the Genocide Convention. The Gambia’s justice minister presented evidence of mass killings, sexual violence and village destruction during a government crackdown in 2017 that forced over 700,000 Rohingya people to flee to Bangladesh. Rohingya survivors testified in closed sessions. Myanmar denies genocidal intent, characterising its actions as counterterrorism. A final judgment is expected before the end of the year.What atrocities were committed against Rohingya people and what is being examined in court?
During what were called ‘clearance operations’ in 2017, Myanmar security forces burned entire villages, raped women, killed children and threw them into fires and wells. According to documented reports, over 10,000 people were killed and around 700,000, including me, were forced to flee Myanmar. These were not random acts of violence; they were systematic and targeted attacks aimed at erasing our community.
In 2019, The Gambia, supported by 11 other states, filed a case against Myanmar at the ICJ, accusing it of genocide. Judges are now examining evidence of mass killings, sexual violence, village destruction and forced displacement. They are also reviewing official policies and actions that show intent to destroy Rohingya people as a group, including patterns of violence, coordination by state forces and the systematic denial of basic rights.
This case shows that genocide claims can be examined through law rather than dismissed for political convenience. But for the Rohingya, this is not just a legal process. It represents acknowledgment and a source of hope for present and future generations. After decades of denial and silence, our suffering is being heard at the world’s highest court and recognised in a legal space where truth matters. The hearings can’t erase our wounds, but they can offer some solace and a path towards justice.
What evidence supports the case against Myanmar?
The case was built on years of evidence-gathering. The Gambia relied on extensive material from the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar and United Nations (UN) fact-finding missions, as well as documentation collected over many years by human rights organisations, including Fortify Rights, Human Rights Watch and Rohingya-led groups.
Civil society played a key role when states failed to act. Even when the world looked away, organisations continued to document the truth and refused to let these crimes be erased or rewritten. Long before any court agreed to listen, groups including the ARSPHR were collecting survivor testimonies, documenting violations and carefully preserving evidence, knowing it might one day be used in court. Without that work, much of what happened would have been lost and perpetrators couldn’t have been challenged.
In a way, civil society became the memory of the Rohingya people. Today, this evidence forms part of the case before the ICJ.
Why is accountability so difficult?
Politics often protects perpetrators. Those with power choose stability over justice and shield those responsible for crimes. Myanmar’s authorities continue to deny wrongdoing and refuse to cooperate, which delays justice.
International law also has its limits. Justice moves slowly because ICJ rulings do not automatically lead to consequences. International courts can establish the truth, but they can’t force states to act. Enforcement depends on political will, often through the UN Security Council, where countries such as China and Russia can block action, even when crimes are clear and well documented.
What must happen to ensure justice?
There must be real action. Perpetrators must be held accountable, Rohingya citizenship must be restored and discriminatory laws that enabled genocide must be removed. Any return of refugees must be voluntary, safe and dignified. It can’t happen without international monitoring and guarantees of protection. People can’t be sent back to the same conditions that forced them to flee.
Ultimately, justice is not only about the past, but also about ensuring that future generations of Rohingya can live with rights, safety and dignity. This case is only the beginning. What happens after the judgment will decide whether justice is real or only symbolic.
CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.
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Myanmar’s junta tightens its grip CIVICUS Lens 12.Dec.2025
International Court of Justice offers hope of rules-based order CIVICUS Lens 19.May.2025
Myanmar at a crossroads CIVICUS Lens 28.Oct.2024
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Bonn, 9. Februar 2026. Am 12. Februar 2026 wählt Bangladesch ein neues Parlament. Der Ausgang der Wahl ist entscheidend für die demokratische Legitimität und Stabilität der Institutionen des Landes, sowie für das Vertrauen der Öffentlichkeit in sein Regierungssystem.
Seit Mitte 2024, als Studierendenproteste zum Sturz von Premierministerin Sheikh Hasina führten, lebt die Bevölkerung Bangladeschs in politischer Unsicherheit. Aktuell führt eine Übergangsregierung in Bangladesch die Geschäfte, doch Frieden und Stabilität lassen weiterhin auf sich warten. In den letzten 18 Monaten haben Unruhen den Alltag stark beeinträchtigt. Proteste, Angriffe auf Medienorganisationen und Störungen der Wirtschaftstätigkeit halten an. Durch die Verschärfung der Sicherheitslage ist es zudem schwerer geworden, Täter*innen strafrechtlich zu verfolgen und zu verurteilen.
Auch die diplomatischen Beziehungen zu den Nachbarstaaten haben sich spürbar verändert. Das Verhältnis zu Indien, dem größten Nachbarn, ist angespannt, insbesondere seit Sheikh Hasina nach ihrem Sturz dort Zuflucht fand und die Übergangsregierung sich an Pakistan annäherte. Parallel dazu wurden die Beziehungen zu China intensiviert. Dies hat das Verhältnis zu Indien weiter belastet, zugleich aber dringend benötigte ausländische Investitionen ins Land gebracht. Eine demokratisch legitimierte Regierung ist nun entscheidend, um das Wirtschaftswachstum zu sichern und die komplexen Beziehungen zu den Nachbarländern zu steuern. Entsprechend groß ist das nationale wie internationale Interesse an den bevorstehenden Wahlen.
Herausforderungen für freie und faire WahlenMehrere Faktoren mindern die Chance auf freie und faire Wahlen. Unklar ist weiterhin, ob die Behörden überhaupt über die Fähigkeiten verfügen, solche Wahlen durchzuführen. Zudem haben die Wähler*innen nur eingeschränkte Auswahlmöglichkeiten. Rund 30–35 % der Wählerschaft, die zuvor die Awami-Liga (AL) unterstützt hatten, haben derzeit keine politische Vertretung mehr, da die Partei von der Wahl ausgeschlossen ist. Sheikh Hasina floh auf dem Höhepunkt der Proteste nach Indien und wurde in Abwesenheit wegen Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit zum Tode verurteilt. Dies verhindert auf unbestimmte Zeit ihre Rückkehr.
Die Wahlmöglichkeiten werden zusätzlich durch Bündnisse und Koalitionen zwischen den verbleibenden Parteien eingeschränkt. Umfragen deuten auf ein enges Rennen zwischen zwei Koalitionen hin, die von der Bangladesh National Party (BNP) und der Jamaat-e-Islami angeführt werden. Die von der BNP geführte Koalition vereint demokratische Parteien der politischen Mitte. Jamaat hingegen ist eine rechtsgerichtete islamistische Partei mit einer ausgeprägt religiösen Ideologie. Erstere betont Nationalismus, Wirtschaftsliberalismus, demokratische Regierungsführung und Reformen zur Korruptionsbekämpfung. Letztere stellt Steuersenkungen, den Ausbau der sozialen Infrastruktur, niedrigere Lebenshaltungskosten sowie bessere Gesundheitsversorgung, Bildung und Beschäftigung in den Mittelpunkt. Viele Studierendenführer*innen, die eine zentrale Rolle bei den Protesten gegen Sheikh Hasina spielten, haben sich mit ihrer neu gegründeten National Citizen Party (NCP) der Jamaat-geführten Koalition angeschlossen. Durch dieses Bündnis hoffen sie, ihre reformorientierten Ideale mit Jamaats Reichweite zu verbinden und schwer erreichbare und nicht-urbane Wählergruppen zu mobilisieren. Die Koalition mit Jamaat legt nahe, dass sich innerhalb der NCP derzeit die islamistischen Strömungen durchgesetzt haben.
Sowohl Jamaat als auch die BNP haben eine problematische Vergangenheit. Die BNP ist für politische Gewalt und Korruption während ihrer Regierungszeit bekannt, und jüngste Auseinandersetzungen zwischen Parteimitgliedern haben erneut Zweifel an der innerparteilichen Disziplin geweckt. Jamaat wiederum steht trotz organisatorischer Geschlossenheit in der Kritik wegen ihrer früheren Unterstützung strenger islamischer Gesetze, ihrer konservativen Politik, kultureller Einschränkungen, problematischer Positionen zur Geschlechtergleichstellung sowie ihrer Ablehnung des Befreiungskrieges von Bangladesch 1971. All dies untergräbt ihre Glaubwürdigkeit bei Liberalen, Linksgerichteten und Minderheiten.
Unvorhersehbarkeit und WechselwählerFür viele der rund 40 Millionen Erstwähler*innen und ehemaligen Anhänger*innen der Awami-Liga stellt die aktuelle Lage ein Dilemma dar. Ihre Entscheidungen dürften sich eher an den verfügbaren Kandidat*innen als an politischen Überzeugungen orientieren. Das nährt die Sorge, dass die Wahl bloß ein demokratisches Verfahren ohne repräsentative Substanz sein könnte. Selbst bei formaler Einhaltung demokratischer Standards kann der Ausschluss einer großen politischen Partei zu einem erheblichen Repräsentationsdefizit führen. Mangels politischer Identifikation mit den Kandidat*innen oder glaubwürdiger Zusicherungen zu Transparenz und Sicherheit nach der Wahl könnten viele unentschlossene Wähler*innen die Abstimmung boykottieren.
Der Ausschluss politischer Parteien und eine niedrige Wahlbeteiligung können den politischen Wettbewerb in informelle und konfrontative Bahnen lenken. Das erhöht das Risiko von Unruhen, verstärkt die Logik der Nullsummenpolitik und schwächt das Vertrauen der Öffentlichkeit in demokratische Institutionen. Zugleich kann eine geringe Beteiligung internationale Zweifel an der Legitimität der künftigen Regierung nähren. Dies wiederum könnte zu einem zurückhaltenderen Engagement globaler Akteure führen, den diplomatischen Einfluss Bangladeschs schwächen und Reformen für den sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Aufschwung bremsen.
A B M Hasanuzzaman ist Fellow des Internationalen Klimaschutzstipendiums der Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung 2025 und Gastwissenschaftler am IDOS.
Dr. Aparajita Banerjee ist Soziologin und wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin in der Abteilung „Umwelt-Governance“ des German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS).
By the SDG Report
UNITED NATIONS, Feb 9 2026 (IPS)
Eradicating extreme poverty for all people everywhere by 2030 is a pivotal aim of the Sustainable Development Goals. Extreme poverty, defined as surviving on less than US$3.00 per person per day at 2021 purchasing power parity, has witnessed remarkable declines over recent decades.
However, in 2025, 808 million people – or 1 in 10 people worldwide – were living in extreme poverty, an upward revision from earlier estimates because of the updated poverty line. If current trends continue, 8.9 per cent of the world’s population will still live in extreme poverty by 2030.
A shocking revelation is the resurgence of hunger levels to those last observed in 2005. Equally concerning is the persistent increase in food prices across a larger number of countries compared to the period from 2015 to 2019. This dual challenge of poverty and food security poses a critical global concern.
Credit: UN
Why is there so much poverty
Poverty has many dimensions, but its causes include unemployment, social exclusion, and high vulnerability of certain populations to disasters, diseases and other phenomena which prevent them from being productive.
Why should I care about other people’s economic situation?
There are many reasons, but in short, because as human beings, our well- being is linked to each other. Growing inequality is detrimental to economic growth and undermines social cohesion, increasing political and social tensions and, in some circumstances, driving instability and conflicts.
Why is social protection so important?
Strong social protection systems are essential for mitigating the effects and preventing many people from falling into poverty. The COVID-19 pandemic had both immediate and long-term economic consequences for people across the globe – and despite the expansion of social protection during the COVID-19 crisis, 47.6 per cent of the world’s population – about 3.8 billion people – are entirely unprotected, including 1.4 billion children in 2023.
In response to the cost-of-living crisis, 105 countries and territories announced almost 350 social protection measures between February 2022 and February 2023. Yet 80 per cent of these were short-term in nature, and to achieve the Goals, countries will need to implement nationally appropriate universal and sustainable social protection systems for all.
What can I do about it?
Your active engagement in policymaking can make a difference in addressing poverty. It ensures that your rights are promoted and that your voice is heard, that inter-generational knowledge is shared, and that innovation and critical thinking are encouraged at all ages to support transformational change in people’s lives and communities.
Governments can help create an enabling environment to generate pro- productive employment and job opportunities for the poor and the marginalized.
The private sector has a major role to play in determining whether the growth it creates is inclusive and contributes to poverty reduction. It can promote economic opportunities for the poor.
The contribution of science to end poverty has been significant. For example, it has enabled access to safe drinking water, reduced deaths caused by water-borne diseases, and improved hygiene to reduce health risks related to unsafe drinking water and lack of sanitation.
The updated international poverty line of $3.00 resulted in a revision in the number of people living in extreme poverty from 713 to 838 million in 2022. (World Bank)
Source: The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2025
IPS UN Bureau
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A woman in a remote hamlet in Kashmir, India, migrates to a safer location with her child as floodwater inundates her hometown. Credit: Umar Manzoor Shah/IPS
By Umar Manzoor Shah
SRINAGAR & NEW DELHI, Feb 9 2026 (IPS)
When the rain begins in Kashmir’s capital Srinagar, Ghulam Nabi Bhat does not watch the clouds with relief anymore. He watches them with calculation. How much can the gutters take? How fast will the river rise? Which corner of the house will leak first? Where should the children sleep if the floor turns damp?
“Earlier, rain meant comfort,” said Bhat, a resident of a low-lying neighbourhood close to the city’s waterways. “Now it feels like a warning.”
On many days, the rain does not need to become a flood to change life. Streets fill up within hours. Shops shut early. The school van turns back. A phone call spreads across families, asking the same question, “How is your area?”
For millions across India and the wider region of emerging Asia (a group of rapidly developing countries in the region, including China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam), this is the new normal. Disasters no longer arrive as rare, once-in-a-generation ruptures. They come as repeated shocks, each one leaving behind repair bills, lost wages, and a deeper sense that recovery has become a permanent routine.
A recent analysis from the OECD Development Centre shows that emerging Asia has been facing an average of around 100 disasters a year over the past decade, affecting roughly 80 million people annually. The rising trend is powered by floods, storms, and droughts. The report estimates that natural disasters have cost India an average of 0.4 percent of GDP every year between 1990 and 2024.
Behind the national figure lies a quieter, more poignant story. It is the story of how repeated climate and weather shocks get absorbed by households and not just spreadsheets. By the savings a family built for a daughter’s education. By a shopkeeper’s stock bought on credit. By a farmer’s seed money saved from the last season.
In the north Indian state of Bihar’s flood-prone belt, Sunita Devi, a mother of three, says she has stopped storing anything valuable on the floor. Clothes sit on higher shelves. The grain container has moved to a safer corner. The family’s documents stay wrapped in plastic.
Local residents in Kashmir’s capital, Srinagar, stack sandbags to safeguard their homes from floods in 2025. Credit: Umar Manzoor Shah/IPS
“When water comes, you run with children,” she said. “The rest is left to fate. You can rebuild a wall. You cannot bring back the days you lost.”
Her village has lived with floods for decades, but she says what has changed is frequency, uncertainty, and cost. It is not only about big river floods that make headlines. It is also about sudden waterlogging, damaged roads, broken embankments, and illnesses that rise after the water recedes.
“Earlier we could predict. Now we cannot. Sometimes the water comes fast. Sometimes it stays. Sometimes it leaves and then comes again,” Devi told IPS.
Professor Kaveh Madani, director of the United Nations University’s Institute for Water, Environment, and Health, told IPS that water bankruptcy in Asia should be treated as a national security issue, not a sector issue.
“The priority is shifting from crisis response to bankruptcy management: honest accounting, enforceable limits, protection of natural capital, and a just transition that protects farmers and vulnerable communities,” said Madani.
Across emerging Asia, floods have emerged as one of the strongest rising trends since the early 2000s, the OECD Development Centre report notes. The reasons vary from place to place, but the result looks familiar: disrupted lives, damaged homes, and a cycle of repair that drains communities.
In Kashmir’s capital Srinagar, small shop owner Bashir Ahmad keeps an old wooden rack near the entrance. It is not for display. It is for emergencies. When rain intensifies, he quickly moves cartons of goods off the floor.
“My shop is small; my margin is smaller. One day of water is enough to destroy many things. Customers do not come. Deliveries stop. You just wait and watch,” Ahmad said.
He says the biggest loss is not always the damaged stock. It is the days without work. For families that live week to week, even a short shutdown becomes a long crisis. Rent does not pause. School fees do not pause. Loans do not pause.
The OECD analysis, while regional in scope, points to a hard truth that communities already know. It claims that disasters have economic aftershocks that last long after television cameras leave. When repeated losses occur every year, they reduce growth and reshape choices. Families postpone building stronger houses. They avoid investing in small businesses. They spend more time recovering than progressing.
“Disasters are no longer exceptional events. They have become recurring economic shocks. The problem is not only the immediate damage. It is the repetition. Repetition breaks household resilience,” Dr Ritu Sharma, a climate risk researcher based in Delhi, said.
Sharma says India’s disaster losses should not be viewed as a headline percentage alone.
They should be viewed as accumulated pressure on ordinary life.
“A flood does not only damage a bridge. It delays healthcare visits. It interrupts immunisation drives. It breaks supply chains for food and medicines. It can push vulnerable families into debt traps. What looks like a climate event becomes a social event. It becomes a health event. It becomes an education event.”
In the report’s regional comparisons, the burden is uneven. Some countries face higher average annual losses as a share of GDP, especially those exposed to cyclones and floods. India’s size allows it to absorb shocks on paper, but that size also means more people remain exposed. From Himalayan slopes vulnerable to landslides to coastal districts bracing for cyclones to plains dealing with floods and heat, risk is spread across geography and across livelihoods.
Prof. Nasar Ali, an economist who studies climate impacts, says the real damage is often hidden in the informal economy.
“A formal sector company can claim insurance, borrow on better terms, and restart faster. A vegetable vendor cannot. A small grocery shop cannot. A family with a single daily wage earner cannot. Their loss is immediate and personal. They also take the longest to recover,” Ali said.
He believes disaster impacts also deepen inequality because the poorest households lose what they cannot replace.
“A damaged roof for a rich family is a renovation problem. A damaged roof for a poor family can mean sleeping in damp rooms for weeks, infections, missed work and children dropping out temporarily.”
The report also turns attention toward a policy question that has become urgent across Asia: how should governments pay for disasters in a way that does not repeatedly divert development funds?
The analysis highlights disaster risk finance, tools that help governments prepare money in advance rather than relying mainly on post-disaster relief. This includes dedicated disaster funds, insurance mechanisms, and rapid financing that can be triggered quickly after a shock.
For communities, the debate may sound distant. But the outcomes are visible in the speed of recovery and the dignity of response.
“When a disaster happens, help should come fast,” said Meena Devi, who runs a small grocery shop in Jammu’s RS Pura area and has seen repeated waterlogging during intense rains. “We close our shop. Milk spoils. People cannot buy things. Then we borrow money to restart. If support is slow, we fall behind.”
She said her biggest fear is not a single disaster but the feeling that another one is always near.
“If it happens once, you survive. If it happens again and again, you get tired from inside,” she said.
For Sharma, preparedness must be more than emergency drills. It must include planning that reduces exposure in the first place.
“Some risks are unavoidable, but many are amplified by where and how we build,” she said. “If cities expand without drainage capacity, or if construction spreads into floodplains, then disasters become predictable. That is not nature alone. That is policy.”
In Srinagar, Bhat says residents often feel they fight the same battle every year. Cleaning drains. Stacking sandbags. Moving belongings. Calling relatives. Watching the river level updates. The work looks small, but it is exhausting because it never ends.
He pointed to marks on a wall that show where water once reached.
“We always think, maybe this year it will be better,” he said. “Then rain comes, and your heart starts beating faster.”
Asked what would make him feel safe, he did not talk about big promises. He spoke about basics. A drain that works. A road that does not collapse. A warning that comes early. Help that comes on time.
For Sunita Devi in Bihar, the dream is even simpler: a season where the family can plan without fear.
“We want to live like normal people. We want to save money, not spend it on repairing what the water broke,” she said.
IPS UN Bureau Report
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Excerpt:
A recent report reveals that Asia faces about 100 natural disasters every year, affecting 80 million people. Beyond the statistics are the disrupted lives, damaged homes, and a cycle of repair that drains communities.