Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

• The Middle East is on Europe’s security agenda, not yet in its new strategy. On 28 September 2026, the High Representative grouped Hormuz, the Bab el-Mandeb and the Black Sea as “critical maritime choke points”; the EEAS scoping paper of March 2026 on the new strategy named no southern region.
• European exposure to the region is direct. Migration, organised crime, energy and connectivity tie European economies and domestic politics to the region.
• Europe is present across the region but codifies downwards and ex post. Its missions and frameworks each draw their own map of the region, and southern shocks are answered with what 27 governments can agree upon. Over Hormuz, the EU produced sanctions and an energy letter; the naval response came from a coalition outside the EU.C
• European divergences make improvisation costly. ASPIDES has relied on a handful of contributors, and past naval operations saw member states suspend or withdraw their participation; the response must be agreed in advance.
• The two theatres are one contest, and the method allowing earlier action already exists. A strategy that files the South under energy costs and migration weakens its own eastern priority. The integrated approach, defined by the Council in 2018, prescribes regional and preventive action; the EU should apply it to the Middle East.
• Five recommendations for the strategy. Name the Middle East and the Gulf as the southern dimension of the eastern priority. Set regional objectives to 2030 and place the existing frameworks under them. Make anticipation a principle and give every task its means. Operationalise Article 44 TEU so that willing member states act inside the EU framework rather than beside it. Make solidarity and partnership direction-neutral, from the Emergency Security Protocol and EU-NATO cooperation to a standing EU-GCC security mechanism, to be launched at the rescheduled EU-GCC summit.

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by Andreas C. Hatzidiakos, Research Fellow, ELIAMEP and Constantine Capsaskis, Research Fellow, ELIAMEP.

 

Drei Wochen nach Einführung des Tankrabatts zieht Wettbewerbsexperte Tomaso Duso, Leiter der Abteilung Unternehmen und Märkte im Deutschen Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), Zwischenbilanz. Täglich verfolgt der Tankrabatt-Monitor des DIW Berlin die Preisentwicklung für Benzin und Diesel ...

Over the past two decades, energy subsidy reforms have increasingly gained importance as mitigation measures to fight climate change. Still, many countries subsidize fossil energy consumption, and reforms are often short-lived. This paper presents harmonized cross-country data on the design of energy subsidy reforms, obtained from a structured literature review of both implemented and failed consumption subsidy reforms between 1978 and 2021. This standardized data enables the identification and validation of key design characteristics, including the motivation for reform, the use of gradual approaches, communication strategies, pricing mechanisms, and social protection measures, as well as their use in implementing reforms. The data highlight significant regional heterogeneity and emphasize the importance of context-specificity in shaping reform designs. The study also demonstrates the connection between key aspects of reform design and reform implementation, as well as associations with subsidy levels. It offers lessons for middle-income countries, especially those planning to implement carbon pricing policies. Lastly, this paper lays the groundwork for future research to explore these factors in greater detail; one avenue is to link design characteristics and political economy factors.

Over the past two decades, energy subsidy reforms have increasingly gained importance as mitigation measures to fight climate change. Still, many countries subsidize fossil energy consumption, and reforms are often short-lived. This paper presents harmonized cross-country data on the design of energy subsidy reforms, obtained from a structured literature review of both implemented and failed consumption subsidy reforms between 1978 and 2021. This standardized data enables the identification and validation of key design characteristics, including the motivation for reform, the use of gradual approaches, communication strategies, pricing mechanisms, and social protection measures, as well as their use in implementing reforms. The data highlight significant regional heterogeneity and emphasize the importance of context-specificity in shaping reform designs. The study also demonstrates the connection between key aspects of reform design and reform implementation, as well as associations with subsidy levels. It offers lessons for middle-income countries, especially those planning to implement carbon pricing policies. Lastly, this paper lays the groundwork for future research to explore these factors in greater detail; one avenue is to link design characteristics and political economy factors.

Over the past two decades, energy subsidy reforms have increasingly gained importance as mitigation measures to fight climate change. Still, many countries subsidize fossil energy consumption, and reforms are often short-lived. This paper presents harmonized cross-country data on the design of energy subsidy reforms, obtained from a structured literature review of both implemented and failed consumption subsidy reforms between 1978 and 2021. This standardized data enables the identification and validation of key design characteristics, including the motivation for reform, the use of gradual approaches, communication strategies, pricing mechanisms, and social protection measures, as well as their use in implementing reforms. The data highlight significant regional heterogeneity and emphasize the importance of context-specificity in shaping reform designs. The study also demonstrates the connection between key aspects of reform design and reform implementation, as well as associations with subsidy levels. It offers lessons for middle-income countries, especially those planning to implement carbon pricing policies. Lastly, this paper lays the groundwork for future research to explore these factors in greater detail; one avenue is to link design characteristics and political economy factors.

Hoher Baubedarf erfordert mehr Kapazitäten in der Bauwirtschaft – Arbeitskräftemangel macht Erhöhung der Arbeitsproduktivität erforderlich – Bauleistung könnte ohne Mehrbeschäftigung um rund zwölf Prozent höher liegen – Moderne Produktionsmethoden müssten dazu schneller und flächendeckender ...

Die BVB-Profis verschwinden nach dem Champions-League-Spiel in Baku schnell im Mannschaftsbus – ungeduscht. Was hat es mit dem Blitz-Abgang auf sich?

Wie lassen sich gesellschaftlicher Wandel, soziale Ungleichheiten und individuelle Lebensverläufe über die Zeit hinweg verstehen? Mit dieser Frage beschäftigt sich die 11. ÖAW-STAT Lecture am 21. Oktober 2026 in Wien. Zu Gast ist Sabine Zinn, Direktorin des Sozio-oekonomischen Panels (SOEP) am ...

The transition to a new United Nations (UN) Secretary-General (SG) comes at a challenging moment, both for the organisation and its member states. It raises questions about how the next SG can guide the UN through volatile times and what they should prioritise amid mounting agendas and tightening budgets. It also gives member states an opportunity to reassess what they need from the UN and how they engage with it. Drawing on dis¬cussions at a convening of thinkers from across Europe, part of the Guidance and Regional Intelli¬gence for the Transition of UN Leadership project, this brief identifies key trends in Europe’s engage¬ment with the UN and lays out how the next SG can set priorities that matter to Europe and use the tools of their office to keep Europe engaged.

The challenge:
• Despite Europe’s significant financial contribu-tion, there is a perception that its influence at the UN is declining as global power shifts. Ear-marked funding still gives it consi¬der¬able say over the UN system, but its influence in formal settings is weakened by its own inconsistencies and by limited outreach to other regions.
• Europe’s interest in the UN may also be fading. Domestic pressures and competing crises push the organisation down the political agenda, as priori¬ties shift towards security, defence and competitiveness.

Priorities for the next SG, as seen from Europe:
• Among numerous agendas, two criteria for prioritisation emerged: (i) relevance to member states’ concerns; (ii) whether the UN can play a distinctive and valuable role.
• For Europe, this points to three areas: (i) peace and security, with the UN contributing to a future peace process and post-war reconstruction in Ukraine; (ii) migration, for which the UN offers a multilateral framework to tackle root causes such as conflict, climate change and global inequality over the long term; (iii) AI governance, where the UN can bring fragmented initiatives together and ensure they complement rather than compete with or duplicate one another.
Recommendations:
• Delivering on these priorities depends not on new mandates or processes – these should be avoided – but on the SG making better use of existing tools, such as their good offices function, their convening power and agenda-setting and their willingness to take political risks. It also depends on adequate financing by member states and on their political support.
• For Europe, the SG should lead with a strategy linked to issues salient to European audiences, act as a bridge-builder between Europe and other regions, and work with Europe’s interests at the UN, including demonstrating how sharing power and supporting a more equitable UN could serve both Europe and other regions in the long term.
 

The transition to a new United Nations (UN) Secretary-General (SG) comes at a challenging moment, both for the organisation and its member states. It raises questions about how the next SG can guide the UN through volatile times and what they should prioritise amid mounting agendas and tightening budgets. It also gives member states an opportunity to reassess what they need from the UN and how they engage with it. Drawing on dis¬cussions at a convening of thinkers from across Europe, part of the Guidance and Regional Intelli¬gence for the Transition of UN Leadership project, this brief identifies key trends in Europe’s engage¬ment with the UN and lays out how the next SG can set priorities that matter to Europe and use the tools of their office to keep Europe engaged.

The challenge:
• Despite Europe’s significant financial contribu-tion, there is a perception that its influence at the UN is declining as global power shifts. Ear-marked funding still gives it consi¬der¬able say over the UN system, but its influence in formal settings is weakened by its own inconsistencies and by limited outreach to other regions.
• Europe’s interest in the UN may also be fading. Domestic pressures and competing crises push the organisation down the political agenda, as priori¬ties shift towards security, defence and competitiveness.

Priorities for the next SG, as seen from Europe:
• Among numerous agendas, two criteria for prioritisation emerged: (i) relevance to member states’ concerns; (ii) whether the UN can play a distinctive and valuable role.
• For Europe, this points to three areas: (i) peace and security, with the UN contributing to a future peace process and post-war reconstruction in Ukraine; (ii) migration, for which the UN offers a multilateral framework to tackle root causes such as conflict, climate change and global inequality over the long term; (iii) AI governance, where the UN can bring fragmented initiatives together and ensure they complement rather than compete with or duplicate one another.
Recommendations:
• Delivering on these priorities depends not on new mandates or processes – these should be avoided – but on the SG making better use of existing tools, such as their good offices function, their convening power and agenda-setting and their willingness to take political risks. It also depends on adequate financing by member states and on their political support.
• For Europe, the SG should lead with a strategy linked to issues salient to European audiences, act as a bridge-builder between Europe and other regions, and work with Europe’s interests at the UN, including demonstrating how sharing power and supporting a more equitable UN could serve both Europe and other regions in the long term.
 

The transition to a new United Nations (UN) Secretary-General (SG) comes at a challenging moment, both for the organisation and its member states. It raises questions about how the next SG can guide the UN through volatile times and what they should prioritise amid mounting agendas and tightening budgets. It also gives member states an opportunity to reassess what they need from the UN and how they engage with it. Drawing on dis¬cussions at a convening of thinkers from across Europe, part of the Guidance and Regional Intelli¬gence for the Transition of UN Leadership project, this brief identifies key trends in Europe’s engage¬ment with the UN and lays out how the next SG can set priorities that matter to Europe and use the tools of their office to keep Europe engaged.

The challenge:
• Despite Europe’s significant financial contribu-tion, there is a perception that its influence at the UN is declining as global power shifts. Ear-marked funding still gives it consi¬der¬able say over the UN system, but its influence in formal settings is weakened by its own inconsistencies and by limited outreach to other regions.
• Europe’s interest in the UN may also be fading. Domestic pressures and competing crises push the organisation down the political agenda, as priori¬ties shift towards security, defence and competitiveness.

Priorities for the next SG, as seen from Europe:
• Among numerous agendas, two criteria for prioritisation emerged: (i) relevance to member states’ concerns; (ii) whether the UN can play a distinctive and valuable role.
• For Europe, this points to three areas: (i) peace and security, with the UN contributing to a future peace process and post-war reconstruction in Ukraine; (ii) migration, for which the UN offers a multilateral framework to tackle root causes such as conflict, climate change and global inequality over the long term; (iii) AI governance, where the UN can bring fragmented initiatives together and ensure they complement rather than compete with or duplicate one another.
Recommendations:
• Delivering on these priorities depends not on new mandates or processes – these should be avoided – but on the SG making better use of existing tools, such as their good offices function, their convening power and agenda-setting and their willingness to take political risks. It also depends on adequate financing by member states and on their political support.
• For Europe, the SG should lead with a strategy linked to issues salient to European audiences, act as a bridge-builder between Europe and other regions, and work with Europe’s interests at the UN, including demonstrating how sharing power and supporting a more equitable UN could serve both Europe and other regions in the long term.
 

The European Union (EU) conditions access to its market on compliance with human rights, labour standards, and environmental policy and regulation. Its trade-related legislation falls into two categories: measures addressing partner governments and measures targeting the private sector. Within these two groups, only the first includes an instrument that specifically mentions democracy, namely the essential elements clause, which appears frequently in EU trade agreements yet has been invoked only once since 2014.
The EU is under domestic political pressure to deregulate in order to strengthen its competitiveness. The competitiveness agenda is cutting into the instruments the EU already has, especially amid geopolitical competition with China, making suspensionled conditionality against partner governments harder to enact. Our recommendations are as follows:

• Democracy protection stakeholders should shift their attention from suspension-led demo¬cracy support and conditionality aimed at partner governments towards the rules and incentives that run through the private sector. Even after the Omnibus reform’s narrowing scope, firm-facing rules remain in place. They are default-on and run through existing regulatory arrangements, and their potential geopolitical repercussions are smaller in comparison.
• Tender processes are one particular set of firm-facing rules. With the momentum behind the European Commission’s legislative proposal to revise the public procurement directive, corruption-based exclusion rules should be applied against operators linked to state capture in partner countries, as democratic backsliders often use public procurement to consolidate patronage networks.
• Firm-facing regulations also permit a different case to be made: stronger due diligence carries no measurable competitiveness penalty. Companies are not just subjects of regulation. They are also stakeholders with their own interest in transparent procurement and predictable rules. To bolster such a narrative, development cooperation should invest in developing compliance capacity, especially in autocratising states.
 

The European Union (EU) conditions access to its market on compliance with human rights, labour standards, and environmental policy and regulation. Its trade-related legislation falls into two categories: measures addressing partner governments and measures targeting the private sector. Within these two groups, only the first includes an instrument that specifically mentions democracy, namely the essential elements clause, which appears frequently in EU trade agreements yet has been invoked only once since 2014.
The EU is under domestic political pressure to deregulate in order to strengthen its competitiveness. The competitiveness agenda is cutting into the instruments the EU already has, especially amid geopolitical competition with China, making suspensionled conditionality against partner governments harder to enact. Our recommendations are as follows:

• Democracy protection stakeholders should shift their attention from suspension-led demo¬cracy support and conditionality aimed at partner governments towards the rules and incentives that run through the private sector. Even after the Omnibus reform’s narrowing scope, firm-facing rules remain in place. They are default-on and run through existing regulatory arrangements, and their potential geopolitical repercussions are smaller in comparison.
• Tender processes are one particular set of firm-facing rules. With the momentum behind the European Commission’s legislative proposal to revise the public procurement directive, corruption-based exclusion rules should be applied against operators linked to state capture in partner countries, as democratic backsliders often use public procurement to consolidate patronage networks.
• Firm-facing regulations also permit a different case to be made: stronger due diligence carries no measurable competitiveness penalty. Companies are not just subjects of regulation. They are also stakeholders with their own interest in transparent procurement and predictable rules. To bolster such a narrative, development cooperation should invest in developing compliance capacity, especially in autocratising states.
 

The European Union (EU) conditions access to its market on compliance with human rights, labour standards, and environmental policy and regulation. Its trade-related legislation falls into two categories: measures addressing partner governments and measures targeting the private sector. Within these two groups, only the first includes an instrument that specifically mentions democracy, namely the essential elements clause, which appears frequently in EU trade agreements yet has been invoked only once since 2014.
The EU is under domestic political pressure to deregulate in order to strengthen its competitiveness. The competitiveness agenda is cutting into the instruments the EU already has, especially amid geopolitical competition with China, making suspensionled conditionality against partner governments harder to enact. Our recommendations are as follows:

• Democracy protection stakeholders should shift their attention from suspension-led demo¬cracy support and conditionality aimed at partner governments towards the rules and incentives that run through the private sector. Even after the Omnibus reform’s narrowing scope, firm-facing rules remain in place. They are default-on and run through existing regulatory arrangements, and their potential geopolitical repercussions are smaller in comparison.
• Tender processes are one particular set of firm-facing rules. With the momentum behind the European Commission’s legislative proposal to revise the public procurement directive, corruption-based exclusion rules should be applied against operators linked to state capture in partner countries, as democratic backsliders often use public procurement to consolidate patronage networks.
• Firm-facing regulations also permit a different case to be made: stronger due diligence carries no measurable competitiveness penalty. Companies are not just subjects of regulation. They are also stakeholders with their own interest in transparent procurement and predictable rules. To bolster such a narrative, development cooperation should invest in developing compliance capacity, especially in autocratising states.