Défense

Faire « populaire » : voilà le mot d'ordre de nombreuses communes françaises dont les politiques culturelles projettent clairement leur idée de ce que serait le peuple : des consommateurs dociles d'images qui bougent. La Ville de Metz a ainsi récemment fait surgir dans l'une des artères principales de son centre historique une longue sculpture métallique ondulante, conçue par l'agence BKBS.

- Contrebande / France, Culture, Ville, Commerce

La gestion de patrimoine ne se résume plus aujourd’hui à choisir quelques placements financiers ou à investir dans l’immobilier. Elle implique une réflexion globale, structurée et évolutive, qui doit tenir compte à la fois de votre situation personnelle, de vos objectifs de vie et des contraintes économiques, fiscales et juridiques. Dans ce contexte, Prosper Conseil se […]

A little more than a year into the Trump 2.0 era, it has become apparent that the “post–Cold War” international order is in its death throes. For three decades, global affairs have been shaped by a system dominated by the United States as the world’s only genuinely global power. American power was embedded in a “rules-based” international order founded on respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, alongside liberal-democratic norms such as “free” global economic exchange and institutionalised governance. Led by the United States and its Western allies, this order was considered by some in the early 1990s to be the “end of history”, a supposedly final stage in human ideological, political and economic evolution (Fukuyama, 1989). While the order was never without its practical and moral failings, and although many countries did not benefit from its protection, it was widely considered an improvement over past systems for organising international interdependence. Today, however, the liberal inter­nationalist project faces a profound crisis and is being challenged by geopolitical competition and a hollowing out from within (Ikenberry, 2024).

Caught between weak employment opportunities and widespread informal employment, Egypt’s manufacturing sector faces a dual challenge. Existing incentives in the labour market encourage both firms and workers to engage in informal employment arrangements. Firms benefit from lower labour costs and greater flexibility, while workers often seek higher take-home pay, driven by limited confidence in the benefits associated with formal employment. Many workers perceive tax and social insurance deductions as offering few tangible benefits or effective safety nets that would compensate for the reduction in current income. At the same time, policies aimed at promoting formal job creation that rely exclusively on stricter enforcement may backfire by increasing hiring costs, thereby creating an additional obstacle for job creation as well as for policymakers. 

The changing global order is reshaping the domestic politics of foreign aid. As many OECD governments shift their focus towards defence spending and narrower national interests, contributions to global public goods and development are declining. Development budgets, in particular, are traditionally among the first casualties of public spending cuts. Germany is no exception. Its core development budget has fallen from €12.4 billion in 2021 to €9.9 billion in 2026 – a decline of around 20 per cent. This decrease is driven by overall pressure on public spending and a decisive shift towards defence. A recent study projects a contested but illustrative estimate, suggesting that aid cuts could lead to an additional 9.4 million deaths by 2030 (da Silva et al., 2026). In January 2026, Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) presented a reform strategy that directly addresses these pressures. The strategy advocates a shift towards a more targeted approach, shaped in part by these budget cuts. However, it also addresses long-standing reform needs that predate them. Three aspects are particularly noteworthy: a clear focus on least developed countries (LDCs), where aid can have relatively high impact; explicit thematic prioritisation that recognises over-fragmentation as a key problem; and a stronger commitment to evidence and results, anchored in the statement that “effectiveness and evidence are central principles for steering German development cooperation” (BMZ, 2026). Possible concrete steps towards achieving these goals can be found in a joint CGD–IDOS policy paper on prioritisation (Hughes, Janus, Mitchell, & Röthel, 2025). However, questions remain about the strategy, most notably the apparent tensions between the focus on LDCs and ambitions to promote German business interests, the vague implementation plans and the fundamental question of political viability: Can these reforms generate meaningful change within the German development cooperation system and its wider political authorising environment?

The changing global order presents a complex set of challenges for Europe and is shaping the context in which its development policy operates. Successive global crises, growing geopolitical uncertainty and a volatile international environment have placed the EU in a near-permanent “crisis mode”, forcing it to react to events as they arise and often challenging its usual decision-making processes. For many years, the EU has often been compared to a slow-moving tanker in world politics, capable of significant influence but limited in terms of rapid decision-making and strategic agility. In recent months, however, the EU has become a think tank in international politics: passively commenting rather than actively shaping. Instead of influencing and steering global agendas through its strong rules-based institutions, the EU is plagued by a defensive siege mentality (de Wilde, 2025). Although the European Green Deal was once described as Europe’s “man on the moon moment” in 2019, it turned out the spaceship never actually made it beyond Earth’s orbit. Instead, the EU has rolled back aspects of its Green Deal ambition to reduce dependence on external inputs, including fossil fuels – a reversal that was already looking short-sighted long before Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz in March 2026.

Since Donald Trump’s return to the US presidency, the UN system has come under unprecedented pressure. UN Secretary-General António Guterres and the UN Secretariat were already struggling with a protracted liquidity crisis (caused by recurrent delayed or incomplete payment of assessed contributions from major contributors such as the United States and China), looming reductions in major donors’ voluntary contributions and rising geopolitical tensions among UN member states (Camelli & Patz, 2026; Haug, 2024). But the Trump administration’s disdain for multilateralism in general, and the UN in particular, poses an even more fundamental and pressing challenge to the UN, both financially and (geo)politically. Since the establishment of the UN in 1945, the United States has played a key role as the host for the UN headquarters in New York and the largest contributor to UN budgets. Although relations between the UN and the US government have long been complex – with influential anti-UN voices persistently present in US domestic politics (Browne & Nakamura, 2009; Mingst, 2003) – it had never reached a point at which broader US support for the organisation appeared to be under threat. This has changed, as exemplified by the formal or de facto withdrawal of the United States from many parts of the UN system, including withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 2025, as well as disengaging from 31 other UN entities in 2026 (The White House, 2026). With the faltering hegemonic position of the United States, a general turn to overt geopolitics (Haug, 2026) and “my-country-first” policies, as well as long-standing criticism about the organisation’s inefficiencies, duplication and fragmentation – driven by donors’ chronic uncoordinated funding behaviour – the UN’s position as the centre of an imperfectly functioning multilateral system is at stake. Other major powers and blocs – from China and the BRICS grouping to the EU and a diverse group of medium-sized states from across the globe – have been unable to put forward a joint response to the fickle and often adversarial posture of the United States. Many have instead exhibited more transactional and self-focused behaviour, such as advocating for UN staff relocations to their own countries. So far, there is no shared vision of what the future of multilateral cooperation through the UN system – including its development, humanitarian and global regulatory agencies – ought to look like. Against this backdrop, we first outline why recent reform attempts under the so-called UN80 Initiative – triggered primarily by the shift in US policy towards multilateral organisations – have missed several opportunities to strategically reform and strengthen the UN system. We then argue that UN multilateralism is still needed – maybe more than ever before. Finally, we turn to recommendations on what stakeholders should do in order to make the UN fit for purpose in an increasingly challenging global environment.

Credit: United Nations

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, May 8 2026 (IPS)

The 10-month-old Middle East conflict—which has triggered a rise in the cost of living worldwide, and an increase in the prices of food, groceries and gasoline—is likely to impose burdens on hundreds of UN staffers, delegates, journalists and civil society representatives– and thousands more, during the General Assembly sessions beginning September.

The proposed increases are mostly due to the naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, and the battle between the US and Iran, specifically targeting ships entering or departing– and halting oil exports and trade.

The UN’s Department of Operational Support (DOS) has decided “as mitigating cost savings measure to increase café prices by approximately 5% in general, any up to 20% for items, including sodas, cakes, oatmeal, pastries and soups”.

“This cost savings measure is meant to reduce the organization subsidy amount from $2.1M to $1M. The measures also include reduction in the hours of café operations to lower labor cost”.

The UN Staff Union (UNSU), responding to the price hike, said early this week, it “strongly objected to the proposed cafeteria price increases, which places an undue financial burden on staff already facing rising living costs and limited on-site alternatives”.

This concern is amplified by the fact that the cafeteria (run by an outside contractor) “benefits from substantial organizational subsidized support, and bears no overhead cost such as rent, utilities, and maintenance expenses”, says a message from UNSU released early this week.

Moreover, says UNSU, current economic data does not support increases of this magnitude. With year-over-year inflation between January 2025 and January 2026 at approximately 2.3–2.4%, even accounting for higher food and labor costs, there is no credible basis for price hikes in the range of 5–20%.

Fluctuations in oil prices further fail to justify such increases, given their limited impact on overall cafeteria operations. Taken together, these facts point to “disproportionate and unjustified measures passed on the staff, who have not received comparable salary increases”, says Narda Cupidore, President of the UNSU Staff Council.

In this context, shifting additional costs to staff is neither transparent nor justified, particularly in the absence of meaningful prior consultation as required under the Terms of Reference of the Headquarters Catering Advisory Committee.

Speaking on condition of anonymity, one UN staffer told Inter Press Service: “At a time when there are reports of proposed salary cuts, as part of UN reforms, this hits us where it hurts us most –in our stomachs”.

Moreover, says UNSU, current economic data does not support increases of this magnitude. With year-over-year inflation between January 2025 and January 2026 at approximately 2.3–2.4%, even accounting for higher food and labor costs, there is no credible basis for price hikes in the range of 5–20%.

Fluctuations in oil prices further fail to justify such increases, given their limited impact on overall cafeteria operations.

Taken together, these facts point to disproportionate and unjustified measures passed on the staff, who have not received comparable salary increases.

The Staff Union calls for a suspension of the proposed price hikes at the Café and encourages the DOS to evaluate alternative financial strategies that could avoid passing on such a significant cost burden to staff.

“We remain committed to constructive engagement and continue to seek opportunities for open dialogue and clear answers from management. UNSU believes it is essential to be a partner in both the discussion and the solution, working collaboratively we can reach an outcome that is fair and minimizes the impact on staff. We will keep you informed of any developments.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Le ministre français de l’Intérieur, Laurent Nuñez, est revenu dans La Grande Interview Europe1-CNews ce jeudi 7 mai, sur l’état des relations entre la France […]

L’article Après sa visite à Alger, Laurent Nuñez affirme avoir obtenu plus de 140 laissez-passer est apparu en premier sur .

Les préparatifs du baccalauréat 2026 entrent dans une nouvelle phase. Alors que des milliers de candidats libres attendent encore des clarifications sur leur situation administrative, […]

L’article BAC 2026 : communiqué important pour les candidats libres est apparu en premier sur .

Après un débat sur le site Hors-série avec Jean-Luc Mélenchon, la réflexion se poursuit ici, et notamment l'anticipation de ce que serait un pouvoir insoumis. Non pas, certes, pour célébrer prématurément, mais pour creuser plus profondément une indispensable expérience de pensée. Au cas où.

- La pompe à phynance / Élections, Mouvement de contestation, Parti politique, Politique

2026. 5. 6.

Egy Citroën 46 éves sofőrje a D1-es autópályán, Trencsén felől Nagyszombat irányába haladt. Nem tartotta be a biztonságos követési távolságot és nekihajtott az előtte haladó járműnek, aminek következtében autója irányíthatatlanná vált, felborult, majd több tíz méteren keresztül csúszott, végül az autópálya közepén állt meg. A sofőrnek óriási szerencséje volt, nem sérült meg. (tasr)

Az SaS szerdán (5. 6.) aláírásgyűjtést indított a jövedéki adó csökkentése érdekében. A petíciót a kormánynak adja át. A pártnak meggyőződése: ha olcsóbb lenne nálunk a benzin, mint a környező országokban, a megnövekedő forgalomból az adócsökkentés miatt kieső összeget is pótolni lehetne, és még az államháztartás is jól járna.

2026. 5. 6. Az SaS sajtótájékoztatója a pozsonyi kormányhivatal előtt

TASR: Május 8-tól eltörli a kormány, hogy a jármű üzemanyag-tartályán kívül kannába csak tíz liter gázolajat lehet tankolni, és szintén törli a külföldi és a hazai járművek számára bevezetett kettős árazást – jelentette be Denisa Saková (Hlas) gazdasági miniszter a kormány szerdai ülése után.

On 5 May 2026, European Council President António Costa attended the EU-Armenia summit in Yerevan, Armenia. In his opening remarks, he emphasised the EU’s commitment to deepen its engagement with Armenia, and to strengthen sectorial cooperation across new areas.

Die 51 Armeepferde kosten den Bund jährlich Millionen, Tendenz steigend. Das führt im Parlament immer wieder zu Diskussionen. Eine Reduktion beim Bestand steht im Raum. Die Community ist gespalten.

Lundi 27 avril 2026, sa famille, ses amis et ses anciens collègues se sont réunis au Père-Lachaise à Paris pour un ultime adieu à Marc Laimé, décédé le vendredi 17 avril. À sa famille et ses proches, toute l'équipe du Monde diplomatique adresse ses condoléances les plus attristées.

- Carnets d'eau

Der Rat der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) hat heute beschlossen, die Leitzinssätze unverändert zu belassen. Dazu eine Einschätzung von Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Die EZB befindet sich in einem klassischen geldpolitischen Dilemma: Die Inflation steigt deutlich, vor allem bei Energie, während sich die Konjunktur eintrübt. Die Unsicherheit ist wegen des Iran-Kriegs enorm hoch, die Risiken einer weiter steigenden Inflation sind erheblich. Daher ist es klug, dass die EZB nun zunächst vorsichtig agiert und abwartet, ob es Grund zur Entwarnung gibt oder die geopolitischen Konflikte erneut eskalieren.

Die größte Gefahr für die EZB ist eine Abkopplung der Inflationserwartungen von der tatsächlichen Inflation. Einige Indikatoren, insbesondere bei den Konsumentinnen und Konsumenten, deuten auf einen zu starken Anstieg der Inflationserwartungen hin. Daher war es notwendig, dass EZB-Präsidentin Lagarde mit ihrer Kommunikation den Weg für eine erste Zinserhöhung im Juni geebnet hat.

Die EZB ist jedoch gut beraten, Vorsicht walten zu lassen und den Bogen bei den Zinserhöhungen nicht zu überspannen. Die Wirtschaft im Euroraum hat sich bereits erheblich abgeschwächt. Die Finanzierungsbedingungen haben sich verschlechtert, sodass diese Entwicklungen bereits einen Teil des Drucks von der Preisentwicklung nehmen. Zudem gibt es zunehmende Sorgen um die Staatsfinanzen mancher Mitgliedsländer und deren Implikationen für Risikoaufschläge und Finanzstabilität.