Africa

Kenya's president William Nato hails the country's successful bid to host the 2029 World Athletics Championship in Nairobi.

The mother of two young children was kidnapped in the middle of the day in the main city, Blantyre.

BBC Sport Africa's Celestine Karoney explains why the 2029 World Athletics Championships was given to Nairobi in Kenya, as the tournament will take place in Africa for the very first time.

Kenya's athletics-loving population and improved infrastructure helped Nairobi secure the rights to host the 2029 World Championships, but challenges remain to ensure a successful event.

Kenya's athletics-loving population and improved infrastructure helped Nairobi secure the rights to host the 2029 World Championships, but challenges remain to ensure a successful event.

Kenya's athletics-loving population and improved infrastructure helped Nairobi secure the rights to host the 2029 World Championships, but challenges remain to ensure a successful event.

When host governments negotiate with investors, they typically suffer from the fact that investors know more about the value of the minerals than governments do. Credit: Shutterstock

By Karl P. Sauvant and Louis T. Wells
Sep 15 2026 (IPS)

“Critical minerals” are critical in the eyes of firms and governments in industrialized countries because they are indispensable for products such as modern automobiles, AI, computers, drones, and many other consumer and defense products.

Mining, and especially processing, of many critical minerals are today concentrated in China; withholding access to them provides China with a powerful bargaining tool when tensions arise with the West. Consequently, governments and firms of industrialized countries are scrambling to develop new mines and processing facilities outside China to secure their supplies.

Many deposits are in developing countries, but most of the countries must turn to foreign firms for the capital and know how needed to extract rare earths and other critical minerals. Exploration and development contracts determine the rights and responsibilities of both investors and host governments for, often, decades. Because most investors are protected by investment treaties, host countries need to get the contracts “right” at the outset.

Technologies are changing rapidly: what is in demand today for, say, batteries, might be different in a few years. Hence, “use-it-or-lose-it” clauses in contracts are essential: if investors fail to develop mines by an agreed date or meet output requirements, contracts must provide that the investors’ rights end so that government are then free to seek other investors

The bargaining power of developing countries is often greater for critical minerals than for other minerals. This is due to the eagerness of private firms from industrialized countries as well as their home governments for access to critical minerals and their desire to keep them out of the hands of competitors.

When investors are eager, host countries can insist on gaining beneficial financial terms (taxes, royalties), avoiding broad stabilization provisions, including programs to develop local suppliers, ensuring proper mine-closure arrangements, etc. Sometimes, host countries can insist on investors processing ores locally.

Another opportunity is the chance to exploit the strong interest of investors’ home governments to ensure that their investors control critical minerals. Host countries can insist that these governments provide benefits such as finance for projects or increased aid for infrastructure projects even beyond those needed for the mine.

Obtaining real benefits from home governments is more likely if host governments have in-depth knowledge about the investors and their home countries’ policies, as well as information about mining agreements concluded elsewhere. Special to critical minerals are multilateral and bilateral arrangements that are being built to develop and stabilize critical mineral supplies. They include FORGE and stockpiling attempts such as Project Vault.

Exploiting these emerging opportunities to obtain benefits from investors’ home governments may require that host governments involve their foreign affairs ministries as well as the usual ministries concerned with mining. This adds to the common problem of coordination within governments.

Host countries also face certain risks. Particularly important is the risk that investors conclude agreements, but never actually invest. Or they stop short of producing expected levels of output. Or companies may sign agreements only to keep deposits out of the hands of other firms or as backup, “just in case.

Also, technologies are changing rapidly: what is in demand today for, say, batteries, might be different in a few years. Hence, “use-it-or-lose-it” clauses in contracts are essential: if investors fail to develop mines by an agreed date or meet output requirements, contracts must provide that the investors’ rights end so that government are then free to seek other investors.

When host governments negotiate with investors, they typically suffer from the fact that investors know more about the value of the minerals than governments do. And governments often lack the legal, financial and technical expertise required to negotiate successfully with well-resourced international investors.

Even when they have negotiated mining contracts in the past, the expertise acquired can be lodged in the heads of officials who have moved on to other positions, in government or in the private sector. The imbalance may be even greater when it comes to the complexities and special opportunities posed for negotiating agreements covering critical minerals.

Thus, exploiting the opportunities developing countries have is not an easy task. Outside expertise can help governments to optimize mining agreements. But the poorest developing countries typically lack the financial resources to hire international expertise such as lawyers, geologists, engineers, financial analysts, market specialists, and environmental experts.

Multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation can help in developing policies and laws for foreign investment and mining, but they drop out when it comes to actual negotiations with individual firms.

However, there are sources of pro bono advisors that provide help in the negotiation stage. The International Senior Lawyers Project and the African Legal Support Facility offer legal support. The CONNEX Support Unit provides not only legal support, but also other expertise required for specific projects.

Governments should consider calling on such external support when they are negotiating contracts for critical minerals. But they should work closely with the providing organization to select advisors who meet their specific needs and with whom they are comfortable.

The chosen advisors should have the necessary technical knowledge, but also the consulting skills that are required to bring together the ministries and agencies that have an interest in proposed mines—often a challenging task. In the end, advisors, or teams of advisors with different skills, can only advise. The governments of countries with minerals make the decisions.

One word of caution, though. Governments need to be careful not to overplay their hand. They need to aim for contracts that reflect, in a balanced manner, the long-term interests of all parties involved. Only then will they stand the test of time.

Karl P. Sauvant is Senior Fellow, CCSI, Columbia University, and former Director of UNCTAD’s Investment Division; Louis Wells is the Herbert F. Johnson Professor of International Management, Emeritus, Harvard Business School. The authors are members of the CONNEX Advisory Committee.

Former Tottenham midfielder Yves Bissouma is on the verge of joining Ajax on an initial deal that runs until the end of the season.

Amid the increasing urgency to address climate change, the European Union (EU) has assumed a leading role in establishing regulatory measures aimed at decarbonization through the implementation of a series of stringent measures. This policy paper analyzes the implications of the EU’s maritime decarbonization framework, with particular emphasis on the expansion of the EU Emissions Trading System to maritime transport (EU ETS Maritime) and the adoption of the Regulation on the Use of Renewable and Low-Carbon Fuels in Maritime Transport (FuelEU Maritime). While these initiatives are intended to reduce GHG emissions, promote cleaner fuels, and extend the EU’s climate policies to the shipping sector –positioning the EU at the forefront of decarbonization– they also trigger complex economic and geopolitical effects that transcend environmental considerations. Specifically, the paper argues that the extraterritorial scope of these regulations may elevate compliance costs for shipping companies, ports, and exporters, thereby incentivizing route diversion, carbon leakage, and the relocation of transshipment activities to nearby non-EEA ports. To address these challenges, the paper proposes targeted policy measures and concludes that the success of the EU’s maritime climate framework will rely on its ability to harmonize decarbonization objectives with competitiveness, market access, and geopolitical resilience.

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by George Dikaios, Senior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP; Marie Skłodowska-Curie Postdoctoral Fellow, Leiden University; Dimitris Gavalas, Senior Research Associate, ELIAMEP; Associate Professor, Department of Port Management and Shipping National and Kapodistrian University of Athens and Marianna Terezaki, Junior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP.

Introduction

…within Europe, shipping serves as a fundamental pillar of the European economy.

Global shipping accounts for 80% of the world’s trade, underscoring the significance of maritime transport to seaborne commerce and economic development. Similarly, within Europe, shipping serves as a fundamental pillar of the European economy. In recent years, it has experienced robust and steady growth, playing a crucial role in sustaining trade, economic advancement, connectivity, and access, with 74% of EU imports and exports relying on shipping.[1] In particular, the European shipping industry has seen a significant increase since the pandemic, as measured by total turnover, i.e., the direct and indirect impact of the shipping industry, recording an added value of approximately €241.4 billion in 2023, in line with robust demand for maritime transport services. This underscores the pivotal role of shipping in supporting European trade and supply chain activities during the post-pandemic recovery period. Simultaneously, the maritime sector of the EU assumes a crucial function within the broader global fleet, with the scope of the European-controlled fleet surpassing European waters and operating on a global scale, facilitating international trade across various regions and reinforcing Europe’s prominent position in global trade.[2]

Furthermore, in addition to economic growth and ongoing trade activities, the European shipping sector holds a strategically significant position. Notably, European shipowners possess nearly 50% of the world’s container ship capacity, 34% of oil tankers, 32% of LNG carriers, 28% of bulk carriers, and 28% of vehicle carriers, thereby facilitating the movement of the EU’s energy imports, transporting raw materials essential for the energy transition, and lastly linking European exporters to international markets.[3] Nonetheless, as the importance of the maritime sector continues to increase, so does the demand for its services, accompanied by additional environmental impacts.[4]

To mitigate the environmental impact of shipping, the EU has developed one of the most comprehensive climate policy frameworks, including measures targeting the maritime sector.

To mitigate the environmental impact of shipping, particularly greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, which account for approximately 3% of global GHG emissions, the EU has developed one of the most comprehensive climate policy frameworks, including measures targeting the maritime sector.[5] Efforts to approach maritime decarbonization more systematically began as early as March 2011, when the European Commission released a white paper on transportation, proposing a 50% reduction in carbon emissions from maritime transport by 2050 compared to 2008 levels.[6] Moreover, four years later, the EU issued the regulation referred to as the “MRV Regulation” for the purpose of monitoring, reporting, and verifying GHG emissions from shipping. This regulation mandated annual reporting for shipping companies and independent verification of CO2 emissions from large ships calling at EEA ports.[7] These efforts reached a peak in 2019 with the European Green Deal and its interim plan, the Fit for 55 package, adopted in 2021 to achieve a 55% reduction in emissions by 2030. Important steps in maritime decarbonization include expanding the EU Emissions Trading System to maritime sector, hereafter referred to as EU ETS Maritime, and implementing Regulation 2023/1805, which promotes the use of renewable and low-carbon fuels, hereafter referred to as FuelEU Maritime.[8]

…shipping is a latecomer sector to be included within the framework of EU climate policy.

This policy paper aims to explore the impact of the newly introduced policy developments for the shipping sector by the EU that are directly connected to the broader European efforts to decarbonize the economy. It has to be noted, as already implied, that these efforts have been in place for over 20 years, and shipping is a latecomer sector to be included within the framework of EU climate policy.[9] The policy paper will focus on how stringent emissions standards and enhanced mitigation requirements are likely to affect the shipping industry and trade activities, with particular emphasis on the geopolitical and economic ripple effects. In the following section, a brief presentation of such standards and requirements will be provided, followed by a discussion of the potential geopolitical ramifications for different aspects of the maritime transport economy. The examples of China and Greece are also discussed, as they can shed light on the implementation of the said policies. Subsequently, several policy proposals for addressing the potential implications of such geopolitical/geoeconomic changes are sketched, while a concluding section summarizes the main points of the paper.

EU ETS, EU ETS Maritime, FuelEU Maritime

The EU ETS, established in 2005, constitutes the world’s first carbon market. This system mandates that polluters compensate for their GHG emissions, thereby reducing overall EU emissions and generating revenue to support the transition to cleaner energy sources. It operates on the principle of “cap and trade”: the “cap” limits the total GHG emissions, which are progressively decreased each year to align with the EU’s climate objectives, ensuring a consistent decline in emissions over time. The cap is structured through emission allowances, each authorizing the emission of one tonne of CO2; these allowances are auctioned and exchangeable, hence the designation “cap and trade”. As the cap is progressively tightened, the supply of allowances within the EU carbon market correspondingly diminishes (European Union, 2026). Since January 2024, the EU ETS has been expanded to encompass the maritime transport sector. This expansion involves the progressive inclusion of emissions from all large ships, i.e., exceeding 5,000 gross tons (GT), entering EEA ports, irrespective of their flag, with full implementation anticipated by 2027. At that point, the EU ETS Maritime will be fully operational, requiring shipping companies to surrender 100% of allowances corresponding to their reported emissions. At the same time, the scope will be extended to incorporate methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions, alongside CO2.[10]

While the EU ETS Maritime aims to limit emissions from the shipping sector and financially support the transition to cleaner energy, the FuelEU Maritime also operates as a complementary measure towards this objective. 

While the EU ETS Maritime aims to limit emissions from the shipping sector and financially support the transition to cleaner energy, the FuelEU Maritime also operates as a complementary measure towards this objective. Specifically, the latter is a pivotal initiative for EU maritime decarbonization, aiming to promote the consistent use of renewable and low-carbon fuels in the maritime sector across the EU. In particular, FuelEU Maritime, fully enforced since 2025, mandates progressively stringent GHG intensity targets for marine fuels, commencing with a 2% reduction by 2025 and escalating to 80% by 2050. These targets encompass not only CO₂ but also CH4 and N2O emissions.[11] In essence, it establishes a maximum allowable GHG content in the energy used by ships that arrive at, stay in, or depart from ports under a Member State’s jurisdiction and it also encourages the adoption of on-shore power supply (OPS) or zero-emission technologies in these ports.[12] Complementarily, to ensure its effective application, the enforcement mechanism outlined in the regulation entails severe consequences for non-compliance, including financial penalties and potential refusal of port entry or detention of the vessel for persistent violators.[13] Thus, the FuelEU Maritime Regulation aims to incentivize the maritime industry to transition gradually from fossil fuels to sustainable alternatives.[14]

Both measures serve the same overarching objective but employ different approaches to accomplish it. Notably, the EU ETS Maritime utilizes financial incentives and disincentives through a “cap and trade” system, whereas FuelEU Maritime establishes a maximum permissible limit on the annual GHG intensity of energy used by ships and promotes the adoption of cleaner fuels and energy sources.[15] Moreover, apart from their shared purpose, both measures are applicable to large vessels, regardless of their flag, and their mandates encompass not only voyages between Member States but also voyages between the EEA and third countries.[16]

…the implementation of the EU’s maritime decarbonization policies includes voyages between the EEA and third countries, thereby exemplifying the expansion of the EU’s influence beyond its borders. 

Overall, the implementation of the EU’s maritime decarbonization policies seeks to diminish emissions from the maritime sector and encourage the adoption of cleaner energy sources. At the same time, the scope of this framework includes voyages between the EEA and third countries, thereby exemplifying the expansion of the EU’s influence beyond its borders. Considering their extraterritorial scope and the fact that the EU is the largest economy and trading bloc globally,[17] these measures are likely to exert pressure on non-EU shipping companies and third countries to adhere to European climate standards to maintain market access, while also increasing costs for shipping companies and ports in their efforts to achieve decarbonization. Nevertheless, the increasing costs faced by shipping companies and ports in their decarbonization initiatives may prompt a search for ports in third countries not governed by these regulations.[18] This could potentially result in a reconfiguration of trade routes, which might be disadvantageous to European ports or could encourage additional non-EU investments in competing trade hubs, such as Chinese investments in strategic ports.

Geoeconomic ramifications Market Access and Compliance as a Trade Barrier

Given the importance of the EU’s external trade, accounting for approximately 77%, and the introduction of increasingly stringent maritime climate regulations, participation in EU-linked maritime trade has become more closely associated with compliance with European environmental standards.[19] Nonetheless, the linkage between EU market access and environmental compliance can exert asymmetric pressures on third countries and shipping companies.

More specifically, a notable implication stemming from the EU’s climate framework for shipping concerns the financial repercussions of compliance, influencing trading partners and transshipment hubs. In particular, direct trading partners of the EU may face escalating carbon costs embedded in their maritime supply chains, with shipping companies operating between non-EU ports and EU destinations bearing 50% of voyage emissions costs. In turn, these costs are systematically passed through as surcharges; Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd, and CMA CGM have announced substantial increases to their environmental surcharges, grouping EU ETS and FuelEU Maritime compliance costs under combined surcharges that will rise by approximately 45% in 2026.[20] Simultaneously, this also effectively raises the cost of trade with the EU, potentially distorting competitive dynamics between exporters and creating inflationary pressures on European consumers.[21]

Transshipment hubs are particularly vulnerable to severe consequences, as well. As Kotzampasakis has argued,[22] the implications extend beyond direct EU traders to countries that rely on EEA ports as transshipment hubs, a category that includes numerous developing economies dependent on European connectivity for global trade integration. Notably, the EU ETS incorporates anti-evasion measures that exclude stops at “neighboring container transshipment ports” located within less than 300 nautical miles of an EU port, provided that these ports have a transshipment share exceeding 65% of total container traffic, and have been in effect since January 2025. Tangier Med in Morocco and East Port Said in Egypt have already been designated under this provision, meaning calls at these ports are not treated as the start or end of a voyage for EU ETS Maritime calculation purposes.[23]

This market access conditionality has been further institutionalized through the adoption of the Global Gateway Green Shipping Corridors (GGGSC) initiative, launched by the European Commission to facilitate the transition towards green shipping. According to the report of the Joint Research Centre (JRC), eight overarching criteria for port inclusion in the GGGSC are identified, including “port interdependencies” and “safeguarding a level playing field for port operators in the EU and partner countries”.[24] Specifically, the report identified 30 ports classified as highly relevant across all three EU industry competitiveness scenarios, forming a “core network” that can ensure critical mass and availability along international shipping networks of interest to the EU. This core network can be complemented by ports important for the development aspect of the GGGSC, balancing competitiveness with sustainable development objectives. Case studies already underway include the Port of Antwerp-Bruges’ support for developing a hydrogen ecosystem in the Port of Walvis Bay (Namibia) through GGGSC funding.[25] Consequently, this creates a tiered system of market access whereby ports and countries aligning with EU standards receive preferential support and connectivity.

The EU’s climate framework has significantly pressured its direct trading partners and key transshipment hubs, strategically enhancing its influence via the GGGSC initiative. Nevertheless, this market-access conditionality, as observed, also introduces cost pressures and market impacts, which may lead to changes in trade routes and competition.

Trade Route Shifts

…increasing costs for shipping companies and ports might drive investments in ports in non-EU countries not subject to these regulations, potentially resulting in what is known as carbon leakage, as well as route diversion.

The compliance costs linked to EU maritime decarbonization initiatives are substantial and experiencing an upward trajectory. In particular, for the EU ETS Maritime alone, the European Community Shipowners’ Associations estimates that this measure generates revenue of approximately €7.65 to €9 billion annually at current carbon pricing levels.[26] Moreover, compliance costs per tonne of fuel have escalated markedly, i.e., from approximately $220 per tonne in 2025 to about $315 per tonne in 2026, representing a 45% increase. These costs are systematically transferred through the global trade network, resulting in notable increases in freight rates on European routes.[27] When considering the comprehensive scope of decarbonization measures, including fuel switching, OPS infrastructure, and alternative fuel adoption, the total cost burden is projected to reach up to €130 billion by 2027, and between €100 billion and €300 billion by 2035.[28]  As a result, increasing costs for shipping companies and ports might drive investments in ports in non-EU countries not subject to these regulations, potentially resulting in what is known as carbon leakage, as well as route diversion.

Carbon Leakage and Route Diversion

The financial costs imposed by the EU ETS are already prompting shipping operators to reconfigure their networks to minimize exposure to carbon expenses, a phenomenon termed carbon leakage. According to the cost-benefit analysis conducted by Lagouvardou and Psaraftis,[29] which examines the risk of container vessels substituting EEA transshipment hubs with nearby non-EEA competitors, their case studies concentrated on the Piraeus-Izmir and Algeciras-Tangier Med scenarios. Specifically for Greece, the Piraeus-Izmir comparison is particularly revealing; with a distance of 210 nautical miles between these ports, their analysis demonstrated that for carbon prices beyond 15-23 EUR/CO₂, there is a clear motive for cargo ships to redesign their networks to evade the EU ETS Maritime. Current carbon prices significantly exceed this threshold, suggesting that route diversion is not merely a theoretical possibility but an emerging reality. The hub switch, while reducing the operator’s EU ETS liability, paradoxically results in a rise in overall carbon emissions attributed to the service, as ships may take longer routes or use less efficient operational patterns.[30]

Evidence from European Commission indicates that the full implementation of the EU ETS in 2026 has transformed environmental surcharges from a marginal cost into a “structural cost of maritime transport.” Shipping lines are now reporting that the combined impact of EU ETS and FuelEU Maritime surcharges will increase “substantially” compared to 2025, with one major carrier noting that the rising cost of biofuels and falling cost of fossil fuels make the transition to lower-emission alternatives only more expensive.[31]

It is important to note that there is no observed evidence of carbon leakage attributable to the adoption of the EU’s maritime climate measures. This lack of evidence can primarily be ascribed to the fact that, until approximately 2030, these maritime climate measures will not be fully implemented. Therefore, the actual impact on carbon leakage across shipping routes is more likely to become fully evident in the coming years, as shipping companies consider multiple factors when designing their logistics chains.[32] Nevertheless, a recent economic study conducted by the European Commission et al.[33] assessing the potential for carbon leakage due to maritime mitigation measures, identified the relocation of transshipment operations to nearby non-EEA hubs as the most significant risk of carbon leakage, underscoring the existence of this risk.

Competitive Dynamics and Chinese Investment

…non-EU ports have increasingly gained transshipment traffic that EU ports have not been able to capture; this change is mainly attributed to the implementation of the EU ETS Maritime.

The potential shift of shipping activities from EU ports to competitors outside the EU is already manifesting, supported by evidence indicating that existing regulations have caused a considerable transition of transshipment operations from EU ports to non-EU ports, e.g., Morocco, Egypt, and Jordan.[34] Of particular note concerning the Eastern Mediterranean region is the loss of direct connectivity by EU ports, as the number of deep-sea services directly linking to their facilities diminishes. Concurrently, non-EU ports have increasingly gained transshipment traffic that EU ports have not been able to capture; this change is mainly attributed to the implementation of the EU ETS Maritime. Namely, 76% of route adjustments can be attributed to the EU ETS Maritime, which significantly influences route reconfigurations.[35] This situation not only results in employment reductions at EU ports but also diminishes the EU’s influence over international supply chains. Moreover, Chinese investments in strategic ports via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) further intensify this competitive dynamic.

According to the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), China’s influence on global ports has experienced a net reduction in the number of ports it either owns outright or operates in 2024. Notable instances include a Chinese state-owned enterprise divesting its share in the Port of Melbourne to interests from the United States, and Hong Kong-based Hutchison Port Holdings failing to secure renewal of the contract for King Abdul Aziz Port in Saudi Arabia. However, this slight decline should not distract from the fact that China’s port network remains largely coordinated from Beijing. Furthermore, the MERICS analysis emphasizes that most identified Chinese companies are state-owned enterprises (SOEs) directly under Beijing’s control, often required to meet non-commercial strategic goals set at the center of the party-state. As one analyst notes, “Chinese container shipper COSCO might be smaller than European giants MSC or Maersk, but it is more usefully viewed as part of a network of SOEs coordinated by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), which is itself directly under the supervision of the State Council, China’s cabinet”.[36]

The growing concern about China’s influence in countries with Chinese-run ports appears to be an important factor in Beijing’s changing fortunes. Chinese investments are becoming increasingly controversial amid some Chinese-led projects that have gone awry, efforts to “de-risk” economies from overt dependence on China, and growing fears about national security risks. However, Beijing’s first-mover advantage means its influence on global shipping remains secure for now. In the coming years, Beijing is expected to shift its focus from creating demand in traditional industrial sectors to green and digital projects, as these are expected not only to increase Beijing’s influence but also to create demand for China’s key high-tech companies and technology.[37]

China’s port investments, despite experiencing some recent setbacks and facing growing international resistance, remain strategically important. 

Thus, EU’s climate policy for shipping is observed to contribute in certain instances to a shift of transshipment activities from EU ports to nearby non-EU competitors, thereby undermining EU port connectivity, employment, and influence within supply chains. At the same time, China’s port investments, despite experiencing some recent setbacks and facing growing international resistance, remain strategically important due to their coordination through state-linked enterprises and their increasing alignment with Beijing’s broader ambitions.

Aside from route reconfigurations and investments in competing trade hubs, it is also crucial to examine specific case studies and the following implications of the EU’s maritime climate measures. In particular, the next section will analyze Greece as an EU Member State with substantial maritime reliance, where increased compliance and infrastructure costs could cause economic disruptions and shift competitive dynamics.

Implications for Greece

The Greek government has articulated significant concerns regarding the practicality of certain decarbonization initiatives.

Greece has long held a central position in global shipping industry. A 2024 McKinsey & Company study reports that the Greek merchant fleet comprises more than 5,000 vessels, making Greece the largest ship-owning country, with approximately 20% of global seagoing cargo capacity. Greece also controls the world’s largest tanker and liquefied natural gas fleets by capacity, as well as the second-largest dry bulk and liquefied petroleum gas fleets. In economic terms, the Greek shipping sector contributes approximately $14 billion and supports around 150,000 jibs, reinforcing Greece’s importance to global trade and economic stability.[38] Against this background, Greece as an EU Member State heavily reliant on maritime activities is especially exposed to disproportionately adverse effects from the EU ETS Maritime and its associated measures. The Greek government has articulated significant concerns regarding the practicality of certain decarbonization initiatives, with Minister of Maritime Affairs and Insular Policy, Vassilis Kikilias, cautioning that:

Many of these measures are not feasible. Europe is already being tested by rising costs, conflicts, and the energy crisis. Such an additional burden cannot be placed on societies.[39]

What is practically emphasized is the necessity of balancing ambition with realism.

What is practically emphasized is the necessity of balancing ambition with realism; imposing broad-based taxation to attain zero emissions entails substantial risks to the economy, with the resultant costs ultimately transferred to charterers and subsequently to the broader economy, thereby elevating prices and exacerbating inflationary pressures.

Specific vulnerabilities for Greece include:

• Piraeus Port’s particular vulnerability: The analysis by Lagouvardou & Psaraftis[40] demonstrates the potential transshipment diversion to Izmir, threatening the port’s economic activity and development.
• Greek Shipping Cluster’s Strategic Positioning: As a major global shipping nation, Greece must balance the EU’s climate ambition with the commercial interests of its shipowners. This tension has manifested in Greece’s recent abstention at the International Maritime Organization (IMO) on the Net-Zero Framework, joining Cyprus in breaking ranks with the EU position. The Union of Greek Shipowners has explicitly called on the EU to scrap the EU ETS Maritime and FuelEU Maritime as soon as a global carbon tax takes effect, arguing that “measures at regional levels undermine shipping’s competitiveness and disrupt global trade”.[41]
• Geopolitical Alignment Concerns: Greece has been accused of aligning with the US and Saudi Arabia to undermine the EU’s climate laws, with Lloyd’s List[42] warning that Greece risks becoming Trump’s Trojan horse in the fight to decarbonize shipping. The Greek Minister for Environment and Energy, Stavros Papastavrou, has defended this position, emphasizing that Greece is “a voice of realism in Europe, when it comes to energy”.[43]
• Regional Disparities: Higher compliance and infrastructure costs may alter competitive dynamics within the Mediterranean, potentially benefiting non-EU ports at the expense of Greek and other European ports. The GGGSC initiative’s focus on ensuring a level playing field for ship and port operators suggests recognition of this risk,[44] but the EU’s ongoing designation of additional transshipment ports under the anti-evasion provisions will be crucial for Greek ports’ competitiveness.[45]

Therefore, the implications of EU’s maritime decarbonization policy framework are particularly significant given the country’s central position in global shipping and its dependence on maritime activity for economic growth and trade. While decarbonization represents a necessary long-term objective, the Greek case illustrates that climate measures ought to be designed with careful attention to competitiveness, port diversion risks, and geopolitical realities. For Greece, the challenge lies not in whether maritime decarbonization should advance, but in how it can be implemented in a manner that sustains the viability of the shipping sector, safeguards strategic ports such as Piraeus, and ensures that the transition toward zero emissions is both environmentally ambitious and economically sustainable. In this context, Greece publicly maintains a particularly cautious stance on the efforts being made, as well as strongly criticizing the EU for its lack of flexibility and promotion of a climate agenda that does not take into account reality.[46] This stance, of course, seems to contradict the European Climate Law and its broader implications, as well as all European climate policies and to contribute to an increasing effort to water down climate targets.

Essential Steps to Address Implications

Although the European Commission works closely with Member States to identify industries at high risk of carbon leakage,[47] further action is needed to ensure effective mitigation.

The extension of EU regulatory authority via the EU ETS and FuelEU Maritime positions the EU as a global standard-setter, compelling third countries and shipping operators to adopt European standards to preserve market access. Nevertheless, this projection of regulatory power engenders asymmetric pressures on other countries and shipping companies, potential carbon leakage through route diversion, while conferring competitive advantages upon ports and shipping operators equipped with advanced infrastructure. Simultaneously, these implications may also be transmitted, significantly impacting Member States heavily engaged in maritime activities, as exemplified by Greece. To address these geoeconomic ramifications, several key initiatives are proposed to be undertaken:

1. Avoiding increased costs and loss of EEA’s ports: As identified above, the primary concern is the potential transfer of increased costs via the global trade network, which may result in EEA’s transshipment hub relocation to nearby non-EEA hubs, posing a risk of carbon leakage and loss of competitiveness of EEA ports. Although the European Commission works closely with Member States to identify industries at high risk of carbon leakage,[47] further action is needed to ensure effective mitigation. In particular, the EU can utilize the revenues from the EU ETS to offset additional costs associated with this transition by formulating transparent allocation strategies that support green technologies and the energy transition for shipping companies, ports, and other stakeholders across the logistics chain.[48]

 

2. Mitigating carbon leakage: Introducing a specific “Carbon Leakage Factor” for deep-sea routes, as suggested in Puertos del Estado’s Report,[49] could be an effective step in reducing the risk of carbon leakage and route diversion. This mechanism would reduce incentives for route splitting by adjusting the volume of emissions subject to the surrender of allowances for each container-vessel voyage. The factor should be calibrated according to voyage distance, ensuring that longer routes are regulated in a way that discourages avoidance strategies while maintaining the environmental integrity of the EU ETS Maritime.

 

3. Preventing reconfigurations of transshipment activities outside the EEA: While the current framework seeks to prevent the relocation of transshipment activities outside the EEA, important gaps remain, especially where neighboring container transshipment ports compete directly with European ports without formally meeting the existing anti-evasion measures, introduced by the EU’s maritime climate framework, i.e., FuelEU & EU ETS Maritime. Evidence suggests that European maritime trade may continue to be affected despite these provisions, potentially weakening EEA port competitiveness and increasing the influence of external actors, including China, over global supply chains. Therefore, there is an imperative need to revise the criteria for identifying neighboring container transshipment ports by broadening the scope to include ports that, despite not presently meeting the 65% transshipment threshold or being more than 300 nautical miles from a European port, might serve as direct competitors, e.g. ports in Africa, the eastern Mediterranean, and the United Kingdom.[50]

 

4. Ensuring port competitiveness: To accelerate maritime decarbonization whilst maintaining the competitiveness of EEA ports, the EU is utilizing the GGGSC initiative as a strategic policy tool. In particular, by linking EU ports with key international partners, the GGGSC can improve access to sustainable, renewable, and low-carbon maritime fuels, expand fuel import capacity, and strengthen the resilience of EU maritime transport.[51] However, the EU must ensure that these partnerships remain inclusive and do not create a hierarchy in which only EU-aligned ports benefit from preferential connectivity, investment, and market access. To prevent market distortion and geopolitical fragmentation, particularly for Member States reliant on the maritime partnerships, such as Greece, the GGGSC should be accompanied by transparent participation criteria, targeted support for third-country partners, and safeguards that ensure equitable access to maritime trade.

 

5. Addressing the interconnected ramifications: Οur analysis indicates that compliance costs increase the cost of trade with the EU, and these costs are then transmitted through the global trade network. This contributes to the relocation of transshipment operations, heightens the risk of carbon leakage, and accelerates route reconfigurations. Consistent with Adjei et al.,[52] who identify the structural and institutional barriers of maritime transport governance as interconnected, policy measures should not address these changes in isolation. Instead, targeted action on one barrier can generate positive spillover effects across others. In this context, effective management of carbon leakage could also help reduce incentives for route reconfigurations and support a more coherent transition toward sustainable maritime transport.

Conclusions and the way forward(?)

Overall, the EU’s maritime decarbonization framework represents a transformative regulatory initiative with implications extending beyond the EU’s borders. By linking access to European maritime trade with compliance with European climate standards, it introduces significant geoeconomic implications. Namely, as identified from our research, this entails increased compliance costs for shipping companies, ports, exporters, and consumers, while also incentivizing route diversion, the relocation of transshipment activities from EU ports to nearby non-EEA competitors, and carbon leakage. These are all interconnected barriers which can potentially emerge from the implementation of the EU’s maritime climate framework.

Particular attention is drawn to EU (Eastern) Mediterranean ports, which are especially vulnerable; non-EU hubs such as ports in North Africa, Turkey, Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan could potentially gain a competitive advantage as shipping operators seek to avoid EU carbon costs. Simultaneously, declining competitiveness among EU ports may create opportunities for Chinese investment in strategic port markets. The case of Greece, as an EU Member State highly dependent on shipping, illustrates the broader tension between EU climate ambition and maritime competitiveness.

To address these challenges, this policy paper suggests several measures, i.e., improving the measurement of carbon leakage, strengthening existing anti-investment policies, strategically reallocating revenues from the EU ETS Maritime, and leveraging the GGGSC initiative to promote both decarbonization and competitiveness.

…the European Commission introduced two strategic initiatives in 2026: the EU Industrial Maritime Strategy and the EU Ports Strategy. Together, these signify a shift away from addressing the competitive effects of individual climate measures in isolation.

Looking ahead, the European Commission introduced two strategic initiatives in 2026: the EU Industrial Maritime Strategy and the EU Ports Strategy. Together, these signify a shift away from addressing the competitive effects of individual climate measures in isolation and towards integrating maritime decarbonization within a broader industrial, energy, and infrastructure policy framework.[53] Specifically, the EU Industrial Maritime Strategy, if successfully implemented, may serve as a solution to several challenges, including the energy transition, competitiveness, and Europe’s reliance on non-EU supplies. For instance, it proposes support for the adoption of renewable and low-carbon fuels through the Renewable and Low Carbon Fuel Alliance, which will convene shipowners, sustainable fuel producers, and financial institutions to enhance production capacity and supply chains.[54]

The EU Ports Strategy complements these targets by focusing more directly on port competitiveness and resilience. Its objectives include (a) providing greater regulatory clarity, (b) fostering fairer competition, and (c) ensuring investment certainty across EEA ports, while acknowledging the strategic role of ports as facilitators of energy. To achieve these goals, the Commission has proposed leveraging the opportunities offered by the Trans-Mediterranean Renewable Energy and Clean Tech Cooperation (T-MED) to strengthen sustainable energy connectivity among Mediterranean ports and to promote closer cooperation among ports, energy companies, grid operators, and local authorities. In addition, the Strategy envisions more consistent emissions measurement and reporting protocols within port areas to improve the availability of sustainable fuels. Lastly, the European Commission encourages Member States to allocate a portion of their revenues from the EU ETS to investments in maritime decarbonization across the maritime spectrum of the EEA.[55]

The effectiveness of the EU’s maritime climate framework will depend on its ability to balance decarbonization, competitiveness, market access, and geopolitical resilience without jeopardizing the EU’s trade power.

Although these strategies collectively lay the foundation for addressing several existing gaps and provide a significant framework for aligning decarbonization, infrastructure development, and competitiveness, their practical impact remains uncertain. Currently, both strategies, i.e., the EU Industrial Maritime Strategy and the EU Ports Strategy, function primarily as policy roadmaps rather than instruments that create legally binding obligations, thereby leaving some critical issues unresolved and necessitating further attention. Notably, the anticipated rise in compliance costs may continue to influence the competitiveness of EEA ports, especially those situated near non-EEA alternatives, where shipping operators may seek to mitigate exposure to EU carbon pricing. This could further incentivize the reorganization of transshipment activities outside the EEA, potentially undermining the competitiveness of European ports within regional and global maritime networks. Towards a similar direction acts the 2026 ETS Revision Proposal for maritime transport, with its provisions attempting to alleviate (some of) the criticized aspects of today’s system. For example, it suggests a change to the transshipment threshold from 65% to 50%, it promotes specific requirements for the use of sustainable maritime fuels and incentivizes the use of green shipping corridors. The critique of that, which can also explain the stance of Member States like Greece, is that the above revision favors liner over bulk/tramp trade, leading to an increase of the already existing distributional consequences that would assist the decarbonization of shipping segments that can be decarbonized more easily, instead of developing a policy framework that would cover the entire maritime sector in a (more) equal manner.

The effectiveness of the EU’s maritime climate framework will depend on its ability to balance decarbonization, competitiveness, market access, and geopolitical resilience without jeopardizing the EU’s trade power.

[1] European Environmental Agency-European Maritime Safety Agency Joint Report. (2025). “European Maritime Transport Environmental Report 2025”. https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/publications/maritime-transport-2025 (20/08/2026).

[2] European Community Shipowners’ Association (2026). “The economic value of European shipping”.  https://ecsa.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/2026_05_04-ES-ECSA-The-economic-value-of-European-Shipping-FINAL.pdf (3/09/2026).

[3] Ibid.; Fratila, A., Gavril, I. A., Nita, S. C., and Hrebenciuc, A. (2021). “The Importance of Maritime Transport for Economic Growth in the European Union: A Panel Data Analysis”. Sustainability, 13(14), no. 7961.

[4] European Environmental Agency-European Maritime Safety Agency Joint Report. (2025), op. cit.

[5] Dikaios, G., Terezaki, M., and Gavalas, D. (2026). “Geopolitical Upheaval Through Climate Measures: IMO and EU Decisions for International Shipping”. Ocean and Society, 3, no 11894. https://www.cogitatiopress.com/oceanandsociety/article/view/11894/5168 (3/09/2026); UN Trade and Development (2023). “Review of maritime transport 2023”. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4042151?ln=en&v=pdf (20/08/2026).

[6] Dong J., Zeng J., Yang Y. and Wang H. (2022). “A review of law and policy on decarbonization of shipping”. Frontiers Marine Science, 9, no 1076352.

[7] European Maritime Safety Agency (2026). “EU ETS Extension to maritime”. https://www.emsa.europa.eu/reducing-emissions/extension-ets.html (20/08/2026); Wang, S., Zhen, L., Psaraftis, N.H. and Yan, R. (2021). “Implications of the EU’s Inclusion of Maritime Transport in the Emissions Trading System for Shipping Companies”. Engineering, 7(5), 554-557.

[8] Regulation (EU) 2023/1805 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 on the use of renewable and low‐carbon fuels in maritime transport (2023). Official Journal of the European Union, L 234; European Commission (2026). Questions and answers on the EU Industrial Maritime and Ports Strategies. Brussels, 4 March. https://transport.ec.europa.eu/document/download/90cd648d-4a76-4f1e-9123-6bd6fb6d913a_en?filename=Questions_and_answers_on_the_EU_Industrial_Maritime_and_Ports_Strategies.pdf (25/08/2026).

[9] E.g., Dikaios, G. (2024). EU Climate Diplomacy towards the IMO and ICAO (Palgrave Macmillan). https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-031-51123-3 (3/09/2026).

[10] European Maritime Safety Agency (2026). “EU ETS Extension to maritime”. https://www.emsa.europa.eu/reducing-emissions/extension-ets.html (20/08/2026); European Union (2026). “About the EU ETS”. https://climate.ec.europa.eu/areas-action/carbon-markets/about-eu-ets_en (20/08/2026).

[11] European Commission (2025). “Decarbonising maritime transport – FuelEU Maritime”. https://transport.ec.europa.eu/transport-modes/maritime/decarbonising-maritime-transport-fueleu-maritime_en (27/07/2026).

[12] Regulation (EU) 2023/1805 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 on the use of renewable and low‐carbon fuels in maritime transport (2023). Official Journal of the European Union, L 234, Article 1.

[13] European Maritime Safety Agency (2025). “FuelEU Maritime: full application 1 January 2025”. https://www.emsa.europa.eu/newsroom/latest-news/item/5385-fueleu-maritime-full-application-1-january-2025.html (28/07/2026).

[14] Solakivi, T., Paimander, A., and Ojala, L. (2022). “Cost competitiveness of alternative maritime fuels in the new regulatory framework”. Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment, 113, no 103500.

[15] European Maritime Safety Agency (2026). “FuelEU Maritime Regulation”. https://www.emsa.europa.eu/reducing-emissions/fuel-eu-maritime-regulation.html (20/08/2026).

[16] European Maritime Safety Agency (2026). “EU ETS Extension to maritime”. https://www.emsa.europa.eu/reducing-emissions/extension-ets.html(20/08/2026); Kotzampasakis, M. (2023). “Intercontinental shipping in the European Union Emissions Trading System: A ‘fifty–fifty’ alignment with the law of the sea and international climate law?”. RECIEL, 32(1), 29-43; Regulation (EU) 2023/1805 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 on the use of renewable and low‐carbon fuels in maritime transport (2023). Official Journal of the European Union, L 234.

[17] European Union (2026). “EU position in world trade”. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/eu-position-world-trade_en (20/08/2026).

[18] Vaca-Cabrero, J., González-Cancelas, N., Camarero-Orive, A., Corral, M. M. E.-I., and Ricci, S. (2024). “Economic Impact of the Application of the ETS to European Ports: Analysis of Different Scenarios”. Sustainability, 16(23), no 10433.

[19] European Commission (2024). “EU trade policy and maritime transport”. https://trade.ec.europa.eu (18/07/2026).

[20] Journal of Commerce (2025). “Ocean carriers unveil hefty increases in Europe emissions surcharges”. https://www.joc.com/article/ocean-carriers-unveil-hefty-increases-in-europe-emissions-surcharges-6126958 (2/08/2026).

[21] Financial Times (2026). “Ships to pay higher EU carbon fees as Brussels seeks to close loophole”. 8 July. https://www.ft.com/content/9f2dafd6-a628-4d8d-9b84-b926f1f152b3?syn-25a6b1a6=1 (29/07/2026).

[22] Kotzampasakis, M. (2025). “Maritime emissions trading in the EU: Systematic literature review and policy assessment”. Transport Policy, 165, 28-41.

[23] Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1127 of 6 June 2025 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) 2023/1805 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards of identifying neighbouring container transshipment ports. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1127 (22/07/2026); Regulation (EU) 2023/1805 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 on the use of renewable and low‐carbon fuels in maritime transport (2023). Official Journal of the European Union, L 234, Article 2.

[24] Christidis, P., Mendoza Villafuerte, P., Oliete Josa, S., Jimenez Espadafor Sardon, E., Hidalgo Gonzalez, I., Dolci, F., Grosso, M., Suarez Bertoa, R., Fontaras, G., Krause, J., Grigoriadis, A., Bellos, A., and Olariaga Guardiola, M. (2024). “Global gateway green shipping corridors: Scoping study for port identification. European Commission”. https://hellenicaid.mfa.gr/wp‐contentuploads/2025/01/Global‐Gateway‐Green‐Shipping‐Corridors.pdf (20/08/2026); European Commission, Joint Research Centre (2024). “Energy and Industry Geography Lab”. https://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu/scientific-tools-and-databases/energy-and-industry-geography-lab-0_en (16/07/2026).

[25] European Commission (2024). “Global Gateway: building sustainable and trusted connections that work for people and the planet”. https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway_en (15/07/2026).

[26] Financial Times (2026), op. cit.

[27] Journal of Commerce (2025), op. cit.

[28] Financial Times (2026), op. cit.

[29] Lagouvardou, S., and Psaraftis, H.N. (2022). Implications of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) on European container routes: A carbon leakage case study. Maritime Transport Research, 3, no 100059.

[30] Ibid.

[31] European Commission (2025). “Commission adopts two new reports on the implementation of EU ETS in maritime transport and the maritime Monitoring, Reporting and Verification review”. https://climate.ec.europa.eu/news-other-reads/news/commission-adopts-two-new-reports-implementation-eu-ets-maritime-transport-and-maritime-monitoring-2025-03-19_en (25/07/2026).

[32] Vaca-Cabrero, J. et al., op. cit.

[33] European Commission: Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport, TISPT, Panteia, Oeko-Institut and Würzburg University (2026). “Economic study for an assessment of potential carbon leakage in the aviation and maritime sectors and mitigating measures: maritime sector: final report”. Publications Office of the European Union. https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2832/3480829 (20/08/2026).

[34] Financial Times (2026), op. cit.; Vaca-Cabrero, J. et al., op. cit.

[35] Puertos del Estado’s Report (2026). “ETS Observatory Report 2”. https://www.puertos.es/system/files/2026-07/ETS%20OBSERVATORY%20REPORT%20MAR-2026%20EN.pdf (20/08/2026).

[36] Mercator Institute for China Studies (2024). Mapping China’s global port network: on the backfoot in 2024, but still well entrenched. https://merics.org/en/comment/mapping-chinas-global-port-network-backfoot-2024-still-well-entrenched (12/07/2026).

[37] Ibid.

[38] Koundouri, P., Alamanos, A., Deranian, C., Garcia, J., and Ni, O. (2025). “Too hard to decarbonize: insights from a decision support tool for the Greek maritime operations”. Environmental Research Letters, 20; McKinsey & Company (2024). “Greek shipping: Success factors and opportunities”. 30 July. https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/logistics/our-insights/greek-shipping-success-factors-and-opportunities#/ (28/08/2026).

[39] Delphi Economic Forum (2026). Delphi Economic Forum 2026: Minister Vassilis Kikilias speech on maritime decarbonisation. https://www.delphiforum.gr (10/07/2026).

[40] Lagouvardou, S., and Psaraftis, H.N. (2022), op. cit.

[41] Union of Greek Shipowners (2025). “UGS Annual Report 2024-2025”. https://ugs.gr/en/press-releases/2025/press-release-20250801/ (30/07/2026).

[42] Lloyd’s List (2025). “Furious officials consider legal action after Greece and Cyprus break EU unity at IMO”. Lloyd’s List, 23 October. https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1155198/Furious-officials-consider-legal-action-after-Greece-and-Cyprus-break-EU-unity-at-IMO (16/07/2026).

[43] Devaux, F. (2026). “Greece risks becoming Trump’s Trojan horse in the fight to decarbonise shipping”. Transport and Environment, 18 February. https://www.transportenvironment.org/articles/greece-risks-becoming-trumps-trojan-horse-in-the-fight-to-decarbonise-shipping (25/08/2026).

[44] Christidis, P. et al., op. cit.

[45] Financial Times (2026), op. cit.

[46] iefimerida (2026). “Kikilias: Concern about the European stance ahead of IMO negotiations on the decarbonization of shipping”. 1 September. https://www.iefimerida.gr/politiki/kikilias-anisyhia-diapragmateyseis-apanthrakopoiisi-naytilias (1/09/2026).

[47] European Union (2026). “Carbon leakage”. https://climate.ec.europa.eu/areas-action/carbon-markets/eu-emissions-trading-system-eu-ets/free-allocation/carbon-leakage_en (20/08/2026).

[48] Vaca-Cabrero, J. et al., op. cit.

[49] Puertos del Estado’s Report (2026), op. cit.

[50] Financial Times (2026), op. cit.; Mercator Institute for China Studies (2024), op. cit.; Vaca-Cabrero, J. et al., op. cit.

[51] Christidis, P. et al., op. cit.; European Commission (2024). “Global Gateway: building sustainable and trusted connections that work for people and the planet”. https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway_en (15/07/2026).

[52] Adjei, M., Van Leeuwen, J. and Pereira, H. (2026). “Towards decarbonising shipping: Governance challenges and barriers to the implementation of EU emission trading system (ETS)”. Maritime Studies, 25, no 23.

[53] European Commission (2026). Questions and answers on the EU Industrial Maritime and Ports Strategies. Brussels, 4 March. https://transport.ec.europa.eu/document/download/90cd648d-4a76-4f1e-9123-6bd6fb6d913a_en?filename=Questions_and_answers_on_the_EU_Industrial_Maritime_and_Ports_Strategies.pdf (25/08/2026).

[54] European Commission (2026). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the EU Industrial Maritime Strategy, COM (2026)111 final.

[55] European Commission (2026). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: EU Ports Strategy, COM (2026)112 final.

Kenya will become the first African nation to host the World Athletics Championships after Nairobi beats London, Munich and Rome in bidding for the 2029 event.

London has lost to Nairobi in Kenya in its bid to host the World Athletics Championships in 2029, while the 2031 event will be held in Munich.

Members of the Uyghur delegation pose with the director of their host organisation, CADAL, during their visit to Buenos Aires, Argentina, 23 August 2026. The sky flag is strictly banned by the Chinese government under anti-separatism laws. Credit: CADAL.

By Inés M. Pousadela
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Sep 15 2026 (IPS)

On 24 August, I took part in a human rights conference in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Days before it opened, the city legislature cancelled the intended venue after the Chinese ambassador complained to the Argentine government about the participation of prominent Uyghur human rights defenders, including Dolkun Isa, an activist exiled in Germany. Beijing has waged a campaign of mass detention and forced assimilation against the mostly Muslim Uyghur population for years.

The organisers found another venue at the last minute, and the conference went ahead, but the episode was revealing. This was a small gathering, of no great consequence to anyone beyond those in the room, in a global south city over 19,000 kilometres from Beijing, yet China still went out of its way to stop it. The episode showed how China aims to deny its critics any platform, however modest, anywhere. A phone call to a compliant government is the least of what it does in pursuit of this objective.

China’s global campaign

China is the world’s leading perpetrator of transnational repression, the practice of reaching beyond borders to intimidate, punish and silence critics in exile. Its new ‘Ethnic Unity Law‘, in force since July, lets the government target dissidents abroad when they are deemed to be ‘undermining ethnic unity’ or ‘creating ethnic division’. Freedom House has documented at least 319 instances of China’s physical transnational repression targeting Hong Kong democracy activists, Tibetans and Uyghurs, in addition to Taiwanese civil society and political figures, whom it treats as if they were Chinese nationals.

China’s transnational repression spans the spectrum of severity. At the far end, dissidents disappear. Chinese dissident Yi Haihua reportedly vanished in Dubai in April, having fled China via Hong Kong the previous November. China also uses prosecution and imprisonment to punish dissent abroad. Those targeted include a student who was handed a six-year sentence when he returned to China after participating in a pro-democracy protest in Australia.

Less extreme but far more widespread are surveillance, intimidation and repression by proxy, through which China monitors and threatens dissidents abroad and pressures family members back home. China also applies economic leverage against states, as seen in April when the government of Zambia, a state heavily indebted to China, called off the RightsCon digital rights conference, over the participation of Taiwanese activists, days before it was due to open in Lusaka.

Beyond China

China is not alone. Vietnam and Russia are the second and third worst offenders, and at least 54 states have engaged in transnational repression, with six — Afghanistan, Benin, Georgia, Kenya, Tanzania and Zimbabwe — identified as using these tactics for the first time in 2025.

Latin America, once largely spared, is now home to transnational repression. In June 2025, former Nicaraguan army major Roberto Samcam, an outspoken critic of dictator Daniel Ortega, was shot dead at his home near San José, Costa Rica, the third such killing of a Nicaraguan exile there in recent years. Nicaragua has also taken the lead in stripping dissenters of nationality. Since 2023, the government has removed citizenship from over 300 former journalists, opponents and political prisoners and confiscated their assets, leaving them stateless and unprotected.

Venezuela under Nicolás Maduro pursued its opponents with similar determination. In February 2024, men in fake police uniforms abducted exiled former army lieutenant Ronald Ojeda from his apartment in Santiago de Chile. His dismembered body was found buried under concrete nine days later. Chilean prosecutors concluded the killing was ordered by the Venezuelan government and carried out through a Venezuelan gang, part of a growing practice of outsourcing violence that offers plausible deniability. In October 2025, gunmen in Bogotá opened fire on exiled activists Yendri Velásquez and Luis Peche. Fortunately, they survived their multiple gunshot wounds.

Weak response

In March 2025, a New York jury convicted two members of an Eastern European crime ring hired by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard over a 2022 plot to kill exiled journalist Masih Alinejad at her Brooklyn home. This June, a UK court convicted two men of spying on UK-based Hong Kong democracy activists, and in July, it convicted those responsible for a knife attack on exiled Iranian television presenter Pouria Zeraati. The USA has imposed visa bans on Thai officials responsible for forcibly returning Uyghurs to China.

Yet these are exceptions in a pattern of host states quietly enabling the repression they claim to oppose. On top of failing to do enough to prevent transnational repression on their soil, many are facilitating it through their border and immigration systems, with geopolitical calculations and political pressure to curb immigration numbers trumping human rights protections.

In June, Germany deported Tajik opposition activist Asadullo Boboev and his son despite a documented risk of arrest. Tajik authorities detained Boboev on arrival. The USA has repeatedly returned Russians to the authoritarian government they fled, and has let officials from Iran’s consulate into US detention facilities to help process Iranian asylum seekers for deportation, including Christian converts and women’s rights protesters. In 2025, the UK reopened the door to extraditions to Hong Kong, five years after suspending cooperation over the territory’s draconian national security law. The Trump administration’s 2025 dismantling of USAID and freeze on democracy funding have cut off support that once helped threatened activists relocate and rebuild their lives.

The European Parliament, the G7 and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights have all formally acknowledged transnational repression as an assault on human rights and state sovereignty, but recognition hasn’t brought stronger responses. Democratic states must resist pressure, impose consequences on foreign officials who order transnational repression and refrain from returning exiles to face danger. Democracies must not prioritise calculations of trade and diplomacy over the protection of the people seeking safety.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also a Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

 

 

 

 

A take on the hit US TV series has become an unlikely tool for Egyptians to complain about life amid strict surveillance.

By Roberto Savio
Sep 15 2026 (IPS)

On 11 September 2001 I was in New York, on one of my frequent visits to the United Nations, to which I was tied by a consultancy contract. That morning I woke up late, around eleven, sleeping off the jet lag of the flight from Italy. I was staying at the Hyatt Park, today the Millennium. A hotel a few metres from the Glass Palace, built to serve the world of the United Nations.

Roberto Savio

When I came down to the lobby, I was taken aback by an extreme state of agitation, from the staff to the guests. I tried to speak to a bellboy I knew, but he ran off without answering. So I went to reception, where everyone was on the telephone and no one paid me any attention. Finally, someone I knew told me: “They’ve attacked the Twin Towers!” And then she too rushed away.

At that point, with the professional deformation of the journalist, I went out into the street to take a taxi and get to the scene. But the street was deserted. Not a car in sight, and the few passers-by were running as well, certainly to get home.

So I did the only intelligent thing left to me, which was to watch television. The images were clear and terrible. But the anchors were groping in total darkness, in a bewilderment I had never seen. It was clear that this was an attack and not an accident. But by whom? And why? The CBS presenter was asking: “But who could wish America harm, when we have always helped the whole world?” And the one on NBC: “The Evil Empire is over, it set with the fall of the Berlin Wall two years ago. Where does this hatred come from?”

New York comes to a halt

On the day of the attack, as on the day after, New York ceased to exist. The streets were deserted. Shops, restaurants, supermarkets, closed. There was no public transport. In my hotel, where the staff had not turned up, the managers improvised pathetic sandwiches, which was all that could be offered to the guests to keep them fed. Everyone was at home digesting the shock, avoiding unpredictable dangers, and watching television. Only on the second day, beyond the appalling images of people falling from the sky, of office workers and firemen covered in a mantle of ash, did figures and data begin to appear. And in those days, the American dream vanished.

The American myth and its crisis

The United States had been the clear winner of the Second World War. And from then on, the undisputed leader of the world, opposed only by the Evil Empire, the Soviet Union. But American citizens saw the socialist world as politically absurd and economically backward, a place people were constantly fleeing in order to take refuge in the world of freedom, democracy and prosperity, the United States. It was they who had set in motion the reconstruction of Europe, which, though historically the centre of the West, was by then an arm of American hegemony. And their aid to the development of the Third World had saved millions of people from hunger and famine. In the collective imagination, this took on enormous proportions, which had nothing to do with reality. Shortly before 11 September, the New York Times had published a survey according to which the American “in the street” believed that development aid amounted to anywhere from a minimum of 5 per cent of Gross Product up to 10 per cent. In fact it was 0.10.

The common feeling in those days was disbelief. In the history of the United States, Americans had first read about and then watched wars, massacres and every kind of violence as distant events, even when their own sons were involved, as in the Second World War. But they had never suffered an attack at home. And the fact that this had been possible was the first, subconscious feeling of distrust towards the institutions — which, with other events and with time, would become an important part of today’s political reality. Until then, polls had always recorded a serene confidence in a State that guaranteed security.

From the American dream to Trump and Musk

To make an effective analysis of how the American dream progressively faded would require far more space than we have. But let me try to summarise the threads of the carpet that slowly covered the United States we knew, replacing them with those of Trump and Musk.

First of all, it should be remembered that in the decade of the Eighties a number of things happened that carried great significance not only globally, but with great weight inside the United States.

The first was the Conference of Heads of State in Cancún, in 1981, convened by the United Nations to continue the dialogue for a New World Order based on cooperation and international solidarity, adopted by acclamation by the General Assembly in 1973. I was head of communications for the Summit, and I lived it from the inside. The 25 most representative heads of state of the moment were there, and from Indira Gandhi to Mitterrand, from Nyerere to Trudeau, all spoke of the need to strengthen international cooperation. When Reagan’s turn came, elected shortly before, his speech was categorical, and was later taken up by Thatcher: “American citizens elected me to serve their interests and not those of others. And therefore I do not accept the straitjacket of United Nations resolutions. From now on, America will choose its own road.”

In those same years, at American urging, the international community adopted the Washington Consensus, drawn up by the American Treasury, the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank. The consensus broke with the economic doctrines that had prevailed since the end of the war. It eliminated every social component, making the market and its laws of absolute competition the centre of society. The State was to withdraw from its central role and let the market take its place. Expenditure that was not immediately productive, such as health and education, was to be taken over by the private sector. And competition, at every level, from the individual to the global, was to be the yardstick by which success is judged.

The result was that many factories and companies moved to countries with lower labour costs and fewer controls. America lost millions of jobs, of people who until then had been a middle class — white, rural, with a social conscience. But the same happened in the rural world, of white, conservative Americans with little education and an unconscious racism towards workers of colour.

The wars and the financial collapse

Nor should it be forgotten that after the attack on the Twin Towers, the United States began the war in Afghanistan, from which it would withdraw ignominiously twenty years later. And shortly afterwards, in 2003, it began the invasion of Iraq, from which it withdrew in 2011, giving life to the Islamic Caliphate (ISIS), which would become a great element of destabilisation throughout the Middle East. During these years, Americans discover that their country is not invincible. It was supposed to overcome the trauma of Vietnam. Instead, the failure of the most powerful military machine in the world continues. In the end, all that will remain is a tragic balance sheet of ruins and dead, and a total expenditure of around eight trillion dollars. To put it in perspective, the American budget today is thirty trillion dollars.

But in my view, the final blow to the American dream came a few years later, with the collapse of Wall Street, an event which once again found me present while it was happening. Finance without controls had gone so far as to turn the stock exchange into a genuine casino, a place of ever riskier bets. Under Clinton, in 1999, a law was repealed which since 1923 had established a clear separation between deposit banks (those serving citizens and businesses, loans and mortgages) and investment banks, that is, banks of speculation. The capital of the deposit banks, which were not very profitable, flowed into the investment banks. Americans do not say, as we Europeans do, that they “gamble” on the stock exchange, but that they “invest” in it. And a great many citizens do so, as do their pension funds.

In 2008 the speculative bubble bursts, sweeps away Lehman Brothers, an icon of Wall Street, and gives rise to a crisis which obviously affects the whole world. It is calculated that all the countries of the world together had to commit some 20,000 dollars in rescue money for every citizen of the planet in order to avoid a total collapse of finance. In the crisis, millions upon millions of Americans lose their savings. Their pensions too are in danger. Since the decade of the Eighties, the bargaining power of the unions has been in continuous decline. Wages in real, purchasing terms have been steadily falling. Many citizens are struggling with precarious and part-time jobs with which they can barely reach the end of the month. Many have to hold down two jobs in order to survive. The poverty rate rises to 15 per cent, and child poverty to African levels. UNICEF’s figures are dramatic. And so begins the conviction that the elites are the enemies of the people, that politics no longer has anything to do with citizens’ real concerns. Electoral abstention increases. And so the immigrant, the labour force on which America was built, becomes the enemy who takes my job, pollutes my child’s classroom, takes my place in the hospital, and commits crimes and outrages.

Religion, sovereignism and the new right

It is not only politics that digs out this feeling of frustration and anger, which explains Trump’s great success. It is also religion. Fundamentalist evangelicals now number 60 million in the United States, and their message takes up exactly the economic and social vision of the Washington Consensus. We must compete, because God judges us by our success; whoever is poor is poor because he has not fought. They support an Israel that recovers its ancient kingdom of Samaria and Judea (and therefore a vast ethnic cleansing), because they preach that Jesus will make a “second coming”, a return to earth, only when Israel has returned to the time of Jesus. And in this world flourishes the sovereignism of Bannon, who wants to turn the right into a great international (later overshadowed by Musk, who wants an anti-system sovereignism of the far right). Catholic integralism flourishes, embraced by J. Vance, the vice-president placed there by Silicon Valley and a possible next President. The integralism that leads the Secretary of Defense (or rather of War, as he prefers it) to bring religion into the armed forces, to present the war against Iran in terms of religion. And a population in which the level of economic and social distress reaches 20 per cent sees the flourishing of the first trillionaire in history (let us look at a trillion: 1,000,000,000,000), who boasts of paying no taxes, eliminates American development aid, and dismisses tens of thousands of public servants without criterion.

The internet and the end of shared truth

Shortly afterwards comes the development of communications technology. In 2004 Facebook is born, Reddit in 2005, Twitter in 2006. All at once, millions of Americans find themselves connected to one another, bypassing the enormous media system of the United States, which was in any case in few hands. I was one of the great champions of the internet, until (I believe it was Bill Gates) someone launched a slogan: “Now it is not important to know; it is important to know where to look” — which brought me to a state of great concern. If I find, but do not possess, what I have looked for, it will slide off me, like water off a goose’s back.

But the problem is that the internet was not born as a common good, as a service for humanity. It was born as a source of profit, and with the orgy of available information, being consulted became fundamental. Hence the abandonment of any meaningful mechanism of ethical or professional control over the information in circulation. So, in order to keep the connection and not lose the user, priority went to the most sensational, extraordinary, striking information. Before long this would be exploited by creators of false or tendentious news, with a great flowering of conspiracy theories which, for example, see in the President of the Republic and the Pope a network of paedophiles covered by the secret services. I read, again I think in the NYT, that the FBI estimated at 45 million the number of people adhering to these conspiracies, which stripped the institutions of all legitimacy. And so the internet gave them a megaphone, which carried the most incredible ideas from the bar to the whole of society. And above all to the extremists, infinitely more fanatical than ordinary citizens.

Numerous studies and statistics tell us of the impact of the isolation that leads young people, instead of socialising, to shut themselves up in the internet, in a virtual world in which AI becomes the real friend and adviser. This falls upon a society that has always idealised the individual against the social, and where a winning political line sees in the reduction of the State the freedom of citizens, in taxes an unjust expropriation of the fruit of their labour, and in social spending, such as medical care, a clear socialist imprint.

Obviously, a reaction of suffering is under way in the United States. The Mayor of New York, who declares himself a socialist, has been elected, and other openly progressive figures are entering the field. But this is happening with a strong polarisation, with an intolerant and profound confrontation, which offers no glimpse, in the immediate future, of a path towards national consensus, but quite the contrary. Trump calls the Democrats “communists”, and politics has by now become the great instrument of division. The future does not look at all like a return to the America of dreams.

Bin Laden’s legacy and Europe

Bin Laden could never have imagined, in destroying the Twin Towers, that he would set in motion such a mechanism of destruction.

But his legacy is not measured only in treaties. It is measured also in everyday gestures, which we have stopped recognising as such. Today no one is surprised at having to arrive at the airport two hours before departure: shoes and belts in the tray, liquids in hundred-millilitre bottles, queues, scanners, searches. The new generations experience it as a law of nature, because they never knew the before. It was enough to turn up half an hour ahead, check in, and go straight to the gate. No controls. That world disappeared on a September morning, and it has never come back. This is terrorism’s most silent victory: not to have changed our ideas, but our habits, to the point that we no longer remember having had different ones.

We should also analyse how this mechanism did not remain in the United States. With different characteristics, and in a different reality, it spread to Europe as well. One need only look at the Maastricht Treaty, on which our European Union is based. Concluded in the Dutch town in 1992, at the height of the intoxication with the extreme capitalism of the Washington Consensus, it provides for obligations and competences in the economic field alone. The social field is part of an added document, which has no binding value. And now, out of 27 member states of the Union, a majority are sovereignist, and therefore opposed to any real power for Brussels. Next year we will have elections in Spain, France, Italy and Poland. Countries of great weight. If sovereignism prevails in these too, Europeans — who look upon Trump as an aberration — will have fulfilled his dream: to destroy the European Union.

Publisher of OtherNews, Italian-Argentine Roberto Savio is an economist, journalist, communication expert, political commentator, activist for social and climate justice and advocate of an anti-neoliberal global governance. He is co-founder of Inter Press Service (IPS) news agency and its President Emeritus.

IPS UN Bureau

 

 

 

 

Credit: Cia Pak / UN

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Sep 15 2026 (IPS)

As the race for the election of a new Secretary-General (UNSG) gathers momentum, the spotlight is on the 193-member General Assembly, the highest policy making body at the United Nations, which has refused to assert itself and continues to play a subservient role in the elections of UNSGs.

Perhaps this year will be no exception either.

According to Article 97 of the United Nations Charter, the Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council (SC), which puts forward a single recommended candidate.

Traditionally, the General Assembly (GA) has always approved that recommendation, usually by acclamation or a resolution

But the GA has never rejected a SC nominee. Despite a growing demand for a female SG in the 81- year history of the UN, what if the SC nominee this year is a male candidate.?

Isn’t it time for the GA to assert its authority and reject any candidates– male or female—who lacks the right credentials for the post of Chief Administrative Officer of the United Nations? Isn’t it also time for the GA to cease being a mere rubber stamp — approving without questioning the Security Council decision?

Richard Gowan, Director for Global Issues and Institutions and a longtime UN watcher at the Brussels-based Crisis Group, told Inter Press Service (IPS): “I really, really doubt that the General Assembly would reject a candidate approved by the Security Council– unless he or she was a certified axe murderer. And even then, it might be a close call.”

There has been a lot of talk about the General Assembly asserting itself more in the selection process. But member states are also worried that the veto powers in the Council will not be able to agree on anyone at all. There is more and more talk of the Council reaching the end of the year without making a recommendation, he said.

“ I think that there will be a deal in the end, but to be frank if the veto powers do agree on a candidate, a lot of countries will conclude that they have to accept him or her. Even if diplomats in New York think the person on offer is sub-standard, their political bosses in capitals will not want to offend Washington, Beijing and Moscow by challenging the choice”.

* I can imagine a situation in which the veto powers force through a candidate from outside Latin America and the Caribbean, leading the Latin Americans to abstain or vote against them in protest over the breach of the regional rotation principle. Although a lot of members do really want a female Secretary-General, I find it less likely that a lot of states would vote against a man on principle.”

* I think that a lot of diplomats would worry about damaging their relations with the next Secretary-General before they even take office. And in the final analysis, there will be a tendency to say that it is better to give the next UN chief a broad endorsement for the sake of the organization. Turning the next Secretary-General into a lame duck in advance would look bad, declared Gowan.

Jesselina Rana, UN Advisor, CIVICUS, a global alliance of civil society organisations and activists, told IPS in theory the GA can push back if a woman is not recommended, once voting starts. It only takes a simple majority present and voting to appoint the SG. In practice, it never has happened.

Real pressure has to come earlier. This means the GA asking for multiple candidates before the Security Council makes its recommendation or even holding GA straw polls to gauge preferences., she said.

Dr Palitha Kohona, former Chief of the UN Treaty Section, told IPS to seek clarity from the Charter, which substantially reflects the reality of the world after the Second World War, would not be particularly helpful in the appointment of a new SG.

“We continue to be dominated by that reality which in the view of some commentators, including the present writer, is outdated. Practices have been developed which essentially perpetuate that reality. Whatever the P5 decides is likely to prevail.”

The Charter itself says little on the appointment process of the SG. Article 97 stipulates that the General Assembly will appoint a Secretary-General on the recommendation of the Security Council. Resolutions 11/1 of 1946 and 54/246 of 1997 are important in this regard, said Dr Kohona, a former Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations.

The Security Council (SC) has continued to play the preeminent role in the selection of a candidate for the position of SG. In fact, the role played by the veto wielding Permanent 5 (P5) is critical.

In the first instance, he pointed out, the SC will seek consensus prior to recommending a candidate to the GA, although 9 votes in favour of a candidate in the Council would suffice to progress the matter. If consensus is not feasible, the Council will vote on the candidates available.

The practice of conducting straw polls among the members of the SC has become popular in recent times. To the disconcert of many members of the world body, the recommendation is adopted at a private meeting in accordance with Rule 48 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure. The P5 has fiercely hung on to this privilege.

“It is now almost mandatory for aspirants to the post of SG to undertake visits to the capitals of the P5 to seek their blessings and not say or do anything that would cause them unease”.

In South Asia, people are familiar with the somewhat similar practice of making offerings to deities in order to obtain divine blessings prior to undertaking any important task.

This was not always the case. When, in 1951, Trygve Lie was vetoed by the Soviet Union, as he sought his second term, the US had him appointed through a clear majority of votes in the GA.

Given the difficulties that Trygve Lie faced subsequently, especially in dealing with a hostile Soviet Union, it would be unlikely that such a break from accepted practice would be adopted today. The life of a SG appointed in this manner would simply be too difficult, he argued.

While many would consider that at least now a woman should occupy the position of SG, the present writer subscribes to the view, that the best candidate should be picked to head this supremely important global position, irrespective of gender.

“The ideal candidate should be able to work effectively with the P5, maintain the confidence of the members of the Organization, manage a complex universal bureaucracy and advance the goals and ideals of the Character without fear or favour, declared Dr Kohona.

Meanwhile, in an article published in PassBlue last month, Graca Machel, a co-founder and the Deputy Chair of The Elders, an independent group of global leaders, said historically, the selection of a new secretary-general has been treated as the domain of the UN Security Council, especially its five permanent members, known as “the P5.”

But the wording of the UN Charter is clear that while the Council should recommend a candidate, the appointment is made by the General Assembly. If the P5 propose an unsuitable candidate for reasons of realpolitik, the states of the General Assembly can and should reject them and insist that more suitable individuals be put forward said Machel, the only woman in modern history to have served as First Lady of two countries: South Africa and Mozambique.

“The concentration of such power in the hands of only five member states — Britain, China, France, Russia and the US — has never been consistent with the democratic spirit of multilateralism. It is particularly indefensible today, when two permanent members, Russia and the US, have recently breached the Charter through launching unilateral wars of aggression,” she pointed out.

The concentration of such power in the hands of only five member states — Britain, China, France, Russia and the US — has never been consistent with the democratic spirit of multilateralism. It is particularly indefensible today, when two permanent members, Russia and the US, have recently breached the Charter through launching unilateral wars of aggression.

“As an African woman who fought in my country’s liberation struggle and has spent decades working for peace, justice and human dignity, I find it profoundly troubling that the UN still reflects, at its uppermost levels of the Security Council, the power hierarchies of 1945 and the colonial era”, she declared.

All 193 members of the General Assembly bear responsibility for ensuring a credible process and must affirm their commitment to multilateralism, universal human rights and the rules-based international order. They have an obligation to ensure that those principles are reflected in the candidate they support.

“If the Security Council presents a candidate who lacks the independence, experience, integrity and broad confidence required for the office, the General Assembly is not bound to rubber-stamp that choice. Member states have the right and responsibility to demand a candidate worthy of the Charter and of the peoples in whose name the UN acts”.

The next secretary-general cannot be merely an administrator of international consensus, especially when consensus itself is often paralyzed. The office requires a leader with moral courage, political judgment and strategic independence — someone to speak truth to power, to work quietly and effectively behind the scenes and to retain the trust of governments without becoming beholden to any of them, declared Machel.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

 

 

 

L'affirmation d'OpenAI selon laquelle l'entreprise aurait résolu certaines parties des équations de Navier-Stokes a rapidement suscité la polémique.

Angola hopes hosting the E1 Series will boost tourism after NBA star LeBron James attends the inaugural powerboat race in the capital Luanda.

Angola hopes hosting the E1 Series will boost tourism after NBA star LeBron James attends the inaugural powerboat race in the capital Luanda.

Nigerian billionaire Aliko Dangote says he wants ordinary people to share in the success of his oil refinery.

A nationwide appeal was launched after Elizabeth Moselakgomo went missing last week. Four other women's bodies have been found nearby.