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Wednesday 20 May

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Wednesday 20 May

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Wednesday 20 May

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Wednesday 20 May

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Le président croate Zoran Milanović a refusé d'accréditer Nissan Amdur comme nouvel ambassadeur d'Israël à Zagreb, invoquant à la fois une entorse au protocole diplomatique et son opposition à la politique du gouvernement de Benjamin Netanyahou.

- Le fil de l'Info / Courrier des Balkans, Israël-Palestine , Croatie, Relations internationales

Le président croate Zoran Milanović a refusé d'accréditer Nissan Amdur comme nouvel ambassadeur d'Israël à Zagreb, invoquant à la fois une entorse au protocole diplomatique et son opposition à la politique du gouvernement de Benjamin Netanyahou.

- Le fil de l'Info / Courrier des Balkans, Israël-Palestine , Croatie, Relations internationales

On Wednesday morning, Parliament and Council reached a provisional agreement on two pieces of legislation implementing EU tariff commitments under the August 2025 EU-US Joint Statement.
Committee on International Trade

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

On Wednesday morning, Parliament and Council reached a provisional agreement on two pieces of legislation implementing EU tariff commitments under the August 2025 EU-US Joint Statement.
Committee on International Trade

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

On Wednesday morning, Parliament and Council reached a provisional agreement on two pieces of legislation implementing EU tariff commitments under the August 2025 EU-US Joint Statement.
Committee on International Trade

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

On Wednesday morning, Parliament and Council reached a provisional agreement on two pieces of legislation implementing EU tariff commitments under the August 2025 EU-US Joint Statement.
Committee on International Trade

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Credit: Osugi / shutterstock.com

By Jordan Ryan
May 19 2026 (IPS)

 
Where does real power reside in the UN development system? A new policy brief from Cepei, a Colombian development policy institute, and the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), presented earlier in May, poses this deceptively simple question. The answer matters because institutions that cannot govern fairly or transparently struggle to sustain legitimacy, and legitimacy is essential for peace.

The Cepei-IDOS diagnosis identifies a “triple disconnect” that structures contemporary development governance. Formal oversight bodies (the Executive Boards, ECOSOC, the General Assembly) set policy directions but control only a fraction of financing. Real resources flow through bilateral arrangements between major donors and agency leadership, operating largely beyond collective scrutiny. The ten largest donors shape system priorities through informal channels of influence. Meanwhile, the programme countries that host the vast majority of UN development operations report significantly weaker upstream influence than traditional donor states. This misalignment between authority, resources and voice is no longer incidental. It has become embedded in the way the system operates.

What transforms this observation from an efficiency problem into a peace imperative is the reality that ungovernable systems cannot respond to prevention and peacebuilding needs. A development architecture shaped disproportionately by donor priorities and limited programme-country voice lacks the legitimacy, flexibility and democratic accountability required to address the structural drivers of conflict. When host countries experience UN operations as imposed rather than negotiated, and when funding priorities reflect donor interests rather than local prevention priorities, the development system becomes an actor in grievance production, not prevention.

The governance–legitimacy nexus works in both directions. Ungovernable institutions erode the multilateral system’s credibility in the Global South. Successive rounds of ineffective UN reform, driven by incremental adjustments within existing power structures, signal to programme countries that the system is designed to resist their inclusion. This perception is strengthened when donors can navigate around formal governance bodies through bilateral arrangements. Over time, institutional opacity breeds delegitimation. The UN is then weakened as a platform for both development cooperation and conflict prevention, because confidence in its democratic character has fractured.

The Cepei-IDOS brief positions the first 1000 days of the next Secretary-General’s term as a narrow window for visible structural change. The argument is neither revolutionary nor naive. It does not propose wholesale redesign of the UN system. Rather, it suggests that an incoming Secretary-General with political capital and an informed strategic agenda can make power visible, realign financial flows with governance decisions, strengthen coordination across fragmented programme delivery, and treat programme country inclusion not as charitable consultation but as an operational requirement. Small shifts in how decisions are made, where resources are allocated and whose voice is heard can accumulate into meaningful redistributions of power.

For those committed to multilateral peace and development, the brief is important precisely because it refuses the false choice between institutional realism and structural ambition. It recognises that the current system is durable and resistant to change. It also demonstrates that durability does not mean immutability. The Secretary-General occupies a unique position to convene, name problems and propose sequenced shifts in practice. Whether that role is exercised for incremental adjustment or for visible realignment of power depends on the strategic choices made in the first 1000 days, when institutional attention is high and political mandates are fresh.

The launch event captured something essential about the moment. Participants acknowledged that the system is ungovernable as presently designed while recognising that accepting that reality is not the same as accepting its inevitability. The brief itself can serve as an anchor for what peace advocates and policymakers need to argue in the months ahead: that the next Secretary-General should treat governance reform not as a technical fix but as a peace imperative. When multilateral institutions are trusted by the countries they purport to serve, they become more effective instruments of prevention and cooperation. When they are experienced as vehicles for donor capture, they become part of the problem they claim to address.

If the next Secretary-General treats governance reform as a peace imperative rather than a technical exercise, the UN development system can begin to rebuild the legitimacy it is steadily losing among the countries and communities it exists to serve.

Related articles from this author:
The Secretary-General This Moment Demands
From Reform to Reinvention: Reimagining the United Nations for the 21st Century
The UN’s Withering Vine: A US Retreat from Global Governance

Jordan Ryan is a member of the Toda International Research Advisory Council (TIRAC) at the Toda Peace Institute, a Senior Consultant at the Folke Bernadotte Academy and former UN Assistant Secretary-General with extensive experience in international peacebuilding, human rights, and development policy. His work focuses on strengthening democratic institutions and international cooperation for peace and security. Ryan has led numerous initiatives to support civil society organisations and promote sustainable development across Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. He regularly advises international organisations and governments on crisis prevention and democratic governance.

This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from the original with their permission.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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The health minister has acknowledged that medics are playing catch-up with the virus after being slow to detect it.

The health minister has acknowledged that medics are playing catch-up with the virus after being slow to detect it.

Sustainable beekeeping is increasingly recognized as a key asset for not only farming communities but for sustainable agrifood systems, the environment and the global community as a whole. Credit: Farai Shawn Matiashe/IPS

By Thanawat Tiensin
ROME, May 19 2026 (IPS)

For thousands of years, humans have kept bees. Beekeeping is a key agricultural activity, yet its full potential remains largely unrealized. Beekeeping produces far more than honey and generates far more income than many have chosen to acknowledge.

The contribution of bees to global agrifood systems runs to hundreds of billions of dollars annually, a figure that should anchor national policy and investment decisions, not appear as a footnote in environmental reports.

The case for investing more substantially in sustainable beekeeping and pollinator conservation can be and has been made at the farm level. When farming practices actively support pollinator health through crop diversification, reduced agrochemical use, and biodiversity-friendly habitat management, the results are measurable and can be significant.

As an example, in cashew cultivation in South India, agroecological farming practices increased the abundance of insect pollinators visiting flowers by nearly 400 percent, with yields trending substantially higher as a result.

Beekeeping generally requires relatively low capital investment, generates income across multiple product streams, and is well-suited to the resource constraints of small-scale producers

Cashew, like many high-value crops, suffers acute yield losses in the absence of pollinators, losses that better conservation of bees and other pollinators can directly address.

Beekeeping generally requires relatively low capital investment, generates income across multiple product streams, and is well-suited to the resource constraints of small-scale producers. In increasingly fragile and climate-stressed environments where other agricultural activities face growing uncertainty, beekeeping has shown unusual resilience.

Of the roughly 25,000 bee species on Earth, only 8 to 11 are honeybees. Around those species, humanity has built very advanced management systems, refined over millennia and now increasingly integrated with modern science. Many countries across the world have made beekeeping a pillar of rural livelihoods, and in 2017 World Bee Day officially entered the United Nations calendar.

Celebrated each year on 20 May, it marks the birthday of Slovenian Anton Janša, a founding figure of modern apiculture. We have made great strides in raising awareness of the importance of bees and other pollinators and the role they play in our lives and now we need to step up our efforts.

One important action that can promote sustainable beekeeping and realize its true economic and food security potential is to recognize bees as a valuable natural asset. When governments include beekeeping in national agriculture investments and support its potential to generate income, they can promote fair and just development of domestic value chains for a range of hive products.

This enables beekeepers to earn higher prices in international markets by producing honey that is sustainable and traceable. FAO’s “Good Beekeeping Practices for Sustainable Apiculture” provide guidelines for sustainable colony management, integrated pest and disease control, habitat stewardship, and the value chain development that allows beekeepers to generate returns beyond raw honey.

These practices, which have been tested across developing country contexts can raise both hive productivity and beekeeper income.

Another key action is to promote sustainable beekeeping through improving extension services, input subsidies, and training programs; these should be designed to help small-scale producers to integrate beekeeping into their production systems, capturing both the pollination benefits and the income from hive products that conventional farm support systems often overlook.

A further and equally important action is to ensure that benefits from beekeeping are accessible and reach those who need them most. Women and young people represent a growing segment of the global beekeeping community and have a lot to gain from having diversified income sources. When they can access training, equipment, and markets on equal terms, productivity and hive health have shown to improve.

The partnership between humans and bees has lasted for thousands of years and continues to evolve.

From the forests of Ethiopia to the pine slopes of Turkey, from the clover fields of Argentina to the manuka hillsides of New Zealand; farmers and beekeepers have long understood what agricultural policy is only beginning to recognize: that sustainable beekeeping and pollinator conservation can be a key asset for not only farming communities but for sustainable agrifood systems, the environment and the global community as a whole.

Thanawat Tiensin is the Assistant Director-General, Director, Animal Production and Health Division, FAO

Ghana will face fellow West African heavyweights Ivory Coast in qualifying for the 2027 Africa Cup of Nations, which will be co-hosted by Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.

Tax expenditures (TEs) in Zimbabwe represent a significant portion of government spending, amounting to 2.8 percent of GDP, 24.7 percent of total revenue, and 21.2 percent of public spending in 2023. Companies benefitting from TEs enjoy tax savings that trigger a reduction in government revenue, which may in turn result in higher budget deficits and sovereign debt. TEs are often regressive, e.g., when TEs related to personal income tax (PIT) benefit those in higher income tax brackets more, and TEs related to value-added tax (VAT) provide a larger benefit to higher income households, given their larger consumption in absolute terms. Although TEs are meant to boost investment, exports, innovation and employment, their real impact is often unknown, as Zimbabwe lacks a culture of ex-ante and ex-post evaluation of TEs.

Transparency: Section 3 of the Public Finance Management Act [Chapter 22:19] aims to secure transparency, accountability and sound management of revenues and expenditure, but does not provide specific provisions on TEs assessments nor reporting to the Parliament of Zimbabwe. Section 30 of the Zimbabwe Investment Development Agency (ZIDA) Act also highlights that ZIDA, in consultation with the Minister responsible for Finance, should publish guidelines for investment, which include general and special incentives applicable to specific categories of licensed investors. Against this backdrop, it is fair to say that there is no explicit policy on TE transparency in Zimbabwe.

Complex landscape: The rationale for the introduction of business-related TEs is to stimulate investment and production, which should then create employment opportunities and other benefits, potentially leading to higher government revenues in the medium or long term. If well-designed, tax incentives for investment can be a cost-effective policy tool. However, TEs may be vulnerable to lobbying and abuse, providing preferential tax treatment to specific groups with vested interests to keep the incentives in place even without much benefit to the economy at large. Empirical evidence on TEs is still limited in Zimbabwe, which undermines evidence-based tax policymaking.

Evaluation challenges: The government of Zimbabwe committed to develop a tax incentive monitoring and evaluation framework, managed by the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA), to facilitate the management of TEs and inform cost-benefit analyses by Treasury on an annual basis with effect from 1 January 2019. No ex-ante evaluation has been conducted so far, but some ex-post evaluations of TEs were undertaken in 2021 and 2023. In addition, ZIMRA has started to publish TE figures from 2019 onwards in its annual reports, although the statistics published are highly aggregated and do not cover all taxes upon which TEs are granted. The published TEs from the annual reports are revenue forgone from domestic and trade taxes. Although the Parliament of Zimbabwe has the competence to oversee the national budget cycle, it is currently not involved in the monitoring and control of TEs.

Fiscal sustainability: Fiscal sustainability enables governments to meet future public expenditure and financial obligations without resorting to excessive borrowing. Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013 (Act No. 1 of 2013, Section 299) provides for Parliamentary oversight of state revenues and expenditure to ensure accountability, monitoring and fiscal sustainability (Government of Zimbabwe, 2023a). Section 298 (1) b i of the Constitution states that the burden of taxation must be shared equally which implies that TEs should not be allocated without evaluating if they are beneficial to Zimbabwe. TEs can be described as hidden government spending, which can negatively affect fiscal sustainability. Zimbabwe’s TEs amounted to US$1.34 billion in 2023, which is about 2.8 percent of GDP, compared to the global average of about 4 percent of GDP. However, VAT rate reductions and exemptions on domestic sales, which constituted 51 percent and 27.1 percent of total TEs reported by ZIMRA in 2020, were not reported through the new Tax and Revenue Management System (TaRMS) in 2023. Moreover, TEs for CIT, PIT and excise duty were not reported since they are not captured by ZIMRA. The bulk of the reported figures for 2023 were TEs related to custom duties. Thus, the extent of TE use in Zimbabwe is underreported and may in fact be considerably higher than the global average. Moreover, this is happening at a time when Zimbabwe is facing limited fiscal space, with public debt constituting 59.7 percent of GDP in 2024.

Policy recommendations: The Government of Zimbabwe should conduct or commission ex-ante and ex-post evaluations of TEs to enhance their effectiveness. Statistics on TE use and revenue forgone should be publicly available and easily accessible to enhance transparency and access of information to the users. All TEs should be time-bound (with sunset clauses) and, ideally, only be renewed after an assessment has been undertaken to justify their existence. All new TEs should be subject to an ex-ante evaluation to clarify expectations and ensure that only effective TEs are implemented in the country. The Parliament of Zimbabwe should be involved in the monitoring and control of TEs. The legislation should ensure that TE proposals are in line with national development plans and policies. The Parliament of Zimbabwe should also ensure that TE reports are published at pre-defined dates. TE reporting should be comprehensive, reported annually. This means there should be a designated authority responsible for preparing the TE report, preferably in the Ministry of Finance, Economic Development and Investment Promotion. The legal framework should also establish the structure and frequency of TE evaluations, including both ex-ante assessments and ex-post evaluations.

Tax expenditures (TEs) in Zimbabwe represent a significant portion of government spending, amounting to 2.8 percent of GDP, 24.7 percent of total revenue, and 21.2 percent of public spending in 2023. Companies benefitting from TEs enjoy tax savings that trigger a reduction in government revenue, which may in turn result in higher budget deficits and sovereign debt. TEs are often regressive, e.g., when TEs related to personal income tax (PIT) benefit those in higher income tax brackets more, and TEs related to value-added tax (VAT) provide a larger benefit to higher income households, given their larger consumption in absolute terms. Although TEs are meant to boost investment, exports, innovation and employment, their real impact is often unknown, as Zimbabwe lacks a culture of ex-ante and ex-post evaluation of TEs.

Transparency: Section 3 of the Public Finance Management Act [Chapter 22:19] aims to secure transparency, accountability and sound management of revenues and expenditure, but does not provide specific provisions on TEs assessments nor reporting to the Parliament of Zimbabwe. Section 30 of the Zimbabwe Investment Development Agency (ZIDA) Act also highlights that ZIDA, in consultation with the Minister responsible for Finance, should publish guidelines for investment, which include general and special incentives applicable to specific categories of licensed investors. Against this backdrop, it is fair to say that there is no explicit policy on TE transparency in Zimbabwe.

Complex landscape: The rationale for the introduction of business-related TEs is to stimulate investment and production, which should then create employment opportunities and other benefits, potentially leading to higher government revenues in the medium or long term. If well-designed, tax incentives for investment can be a cost-effective policy tool. However, TEs may be vulnerable to lobbying and abuse, providing preferential tax treatment to specific groups with vested interests to keep the incentives in place even without much benefit to the economy at large. Empirical evidence on TEs is still limited in Zimbabwe, which undermines evidence-based tax policymaking.

Evaluation challenges: The government of Zimbabwe committed to develop a tax incentive monitoring and evaluation framework, managed by the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA), to facilitate the management of TEs and inform cost-benefit analyses by Treasury on an annual basis with effect from 1 January 2019. No ex-ante evaluation has been conducted so far, but some ex-post evaluations of TEs were undertaken in 2021 and 2023. In addition, ZIMRA has started to publish TE figures from 2019 onwards in its annual reports, although the statistics published are highly aggregated and do not cover all taxes upon which TEs are granted. The published TEs from the annual reports are revenue forgone from domestic and trade taxes. Although the Parliament of Zimbabwe has the competence to oversee the national budget cycle, it is currently not involved in the monitoring and control of TEs.

Fiscal sustainability: Fiscal sustainability enables governments to meet future public expenditure and financial obligations without resorting to excessive borrowing. Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013 (Act No. 1 of 2013, Section 299) provides for Parliamentary oversight of state revenues and expenditure to ensure accountability, monitoring and fiscal sustainability (Government of Zimbabwe, 2023a). Section 298 (1) b i of the Constitution states that the burden of taxation must be shared equally which implies that TEs should not be allocated without evaluating if they are beneficial to Zimbabwe. TEs can be described as hidden government spending, which can negatively affect fiscal sustainability. Zimbabwe’s TEs amounted to US$1.34 billion in 2023, which is about 2.8 percent of GDP, compared to the global average of about 4 percent of GDP. However, VAT rate reductions and exemptions on domestic sales, which constituted 51 percent and 27.1 percent of total TEs reported by ZIMRA in 2020, were not reported through the new Tax and Revenue Management System (TaRMS) in 2023. Moreover, TEs for CIT, PIT and excise duty were not reported since they are not captured by ZIMRA. The bulk of the reported figures for 2023 were TEs related to custom duties. Thus, the extent of TE use in Zimbabwe is underreported and may in fact be considerably higher than the global average. Moreover, this is happening at a time when Zimbabwe is facing limited fiscal space, with public debt constituting 59.7 percent of GDP in 2024.

Policy recommendations: The Government of Zimbabwe should conduct or commission ex-ante and ex-post evaluations of TEs to enhance their effectiveness. Statistics on TE use and revenue forgone should be publicly available and easily accessible to enhance transparency and access of information to the users. All TEs should be time-bound (with sunset clauses) and, ideally, only be renewed after an assessment has been undertaken to justify their existence. All new TEs should be subject to an ex-ante evaluation to clarify expectations and ensure that only effective TEs are implemented in the country. The Parliament of Zimbabwe should be involved in the monitoring and control of TEs. The legislation should ensure that TE proposals are in line with national development plans and policies. The Parliament of Zimbabwe should also ensure that TE reports are published at pre-defined dates. TE reporting should be comprehensive, reported annually. This means there should be a designated authority responsible for preparing the TE report, preferably in the Ministry of Finance, Economic Development and Investment Promotion. The legal framework should also establish the structure and frequency of TE evaluations, including both ex-ante assessments and ex-post evaluations.

Tax expenditures (TEs) in Zimbabwe represent a significant portion of government spending, amounting to 2.8 percent of GDP, 24.7 percent of total revenue, and 21.2 percent of public spending in 2023. Companies benefitting from TEs enjoy tax savings that trigger a reduction in government revenue, which may in turn result in higher budget deficits and sovereign debt. TEs are often regressive, e.g., when TEs related to personal income tax (PIT) benefit those in higher income tax brackets more, and TEs related to value-added tax (VAT) provide a larger benefit to higher income households, given their larger consumption in absolute terms. Although TEs are meant to boost investment, exports, innovation and employment, their real impact is often unknown, as Zimbabwe lacks a culture of ex-ante and ex-post evaluation of TEs.

Transparency: Section 3 of the Public Finance Management Act [Chapter 22:19] aims to secure transparency, accountability and sound management of revenues and expenditure, but does not provide specific provisions on TEs assessments nor reporting to the Parliament of Zimbabwe. Section 30 of the Zimbabwe Investment Development Agency (ZIDA) Act also highlights that ZIDA, in consultation with the Minister responsible for Finance, should publish guidelines for investment, which include general and special incentives applicable to specific categories of licensed investors. Against this backdrop, it is fair to say that there is no explicit policy on TE transparency in Zimbabwe.

Complex landscape: The rationale for the introduction of business-related TEs is to stimulate investment and production, which should then create employment opportunities and other benefits, potentially leading to higher government revenues in the medium or long term. If well-designed, tax incentives for investment can be a cost-effective policy tool. However, TEs may be vulnerable to lobbying and abuse, providing preferential tax treatment to specific groups with vested interests to keep the incentives in place even without much benefit to the economy at large. Empirical evidence on TEs is still limited in Zimbabwe, which undermines evidence-based tax policymaking.

Evaluation challenges: The government of Zimbabwe committed to develop a tax incentive monitoring and evaluation framework, managed by the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA), to facilitate the management of TEs and inform cost-benefit analyses by Treasury on an annual basis with effect from 1 January 2019. No ex-ante evaluation has been conducted so far, but some ex-post evaluations of TEs were undertaken in 2021 and 2023. In addition, ZIMRA has started to publish TE figures from 2019 onwards in its annual reports, although the statistics published are highly aggregated and do not cover all taxes upon which TEs are granted. The published TEs from the annual reports are revenue forgone from domestic and trade taxes. Although the Parliament of Zimbabwe has the competence to oversee the national budget cycle, it is currently not involved in the monitoring and control of TEs.

Fiscal sustainability: Fiscal sustainability enables governments to meet future public expenditure and financial obligations without resorting to excessive borrowing. Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013 (Act No. 1 of 2013, Section 299) provides for Parliamentary oversight of state revenues and expenditure to ensure accountability, monitoring and fiscal sustainability (Government of Zimbabwe, 2023a). Section 298 (1) b i of the Constitution states that the burden of taxation must be shared equally which implies that TEs should not be allocated without evaluating if they are beneficial to Zimbabwe. TEs can be described as hidden government spending, which can negatively affect fiscal sustainability. Zimbabwe’s TEs amounted to US$1.34 billion in 2023, which is about 2.8 percent of GDP, compared to the global average of about 4 percent of GDP. However, VAT rate reductions and exemptions on domestic sales, which constituted 51 percent and 27.1 percent of total TEs reported by ZIMRA in 2020, were not reported through the new Tax and Revenue Management System (TaRMS) in 2023. Moreover, TEs for CIT, PIT and excise duty were not reported since they are not captured by ZIMRA. The bulk of the reported figures for 2023 were TEs related to custom duties. Thus, the extent of TE use in Zimbabwe is underreported and may in fact be considerably higher than the global average. Moreover, this is happening at a time when Zimbabwe is facing limited fiscal space, with public debt constituting 59.7 percent of GDP in 2024.

Policy recommendations: The Government of Zimbabwe should conduct or commission ex-ante and ex-post evaluations of TEs to enhance their effectiveness. Statistics on TE use and revenue forgone should be publicly available and easily accessible to enhance transparency and access of information to the users. All TEs should be time-bound (with sunset clauses) and, ideally, only be renewed after an assessment has been undertaken to justify their existence. All new TEs should be subject to an ex-ante evaluation to clarify expectations and ensure that only effective TEs are implemented in the country. The Parliament of Zimbabwe should be involved in the monitoring and control of TEs. The legislation should ensure that TE proposals are in line with national development plans and policies. The Parliament of Zimbabwe should also ensure that TE reports are published at pre-defined dates. TE reporting should be comprehensive, reported annually. This means there should be a designated authority responsible for preparing the TE report, preferably in the Ministry of Finance, Economic Development and Investment Promotion. The legal framework should also establish the structure and frequency of TE evaluations, including both ex-ante assessments and ex-post evaluations.

Tax expenditures (TEs) in Zimbabwe represent a significant portion of government spending, amounting to 2.8 percent of GDP, 24.7 percent of total revenue, and 21.2 percent of public spending in 2023. Companies benefitting from TEs enjoy tax savings that trigger a reduction in government revenue, which may in turn result in higher budget deficits and sovereign debt. TEs are often regressive, e.g., when TEs related to personal income tax (PIT) benefit those in higher income tax brackets more, and TEs related to value-added tax (VAT) provide a larger benefit to higher income households, given their larger consumption in absolute terms. Although TEs are meant to boost investment, exports, innovation and employment, their real impact is often unknown, as Zimbabwe lacks a culture of ex-ante and ex-post evaluation of TEs.

Transparency: Section 3 of the Public Finance Management Act [Chapter 22:19] aims to secure transparency, accountability and sound management of revenues and expenditure, but does not provide specific provisions on TEs assessments nor reporting to the Parliament of Zimbabwe. Section 30 of the Zimbabwe Investment Development Agency (ZIDA) Act also highlights that ZIDA, in consultation with the Minister responsible for Finance, should publish guidelines for investment, which include general and special incentives applicable to specific categories of licensed investors. Against this backdrop, it is fair to say that there is no explicit policy on TE transparency in Zimbabwe.

Complex landscape: The rationale for the introduction of business-related TEs is to stimulate investment and production, which should then create employment opportunities and other benefits, potentially leading to higher government revenues in the medium or long term. If well-designed, tax incentives for investment can be a cost-effective policy tool. However, TEs may be vulnerable to lobbying and abuse, providing preferential tax treatment to specific groups with vested interests to keep the incentives in place even without much benefit to the economy at large. Empirical evidence on TEs is still limited in Zimbabwe, which undermines evidence-based tax policymaking.

Evaluation challenges: The government of Zimbabwe committed to develop a tax incentive monitoring and evaluation framework, managed by the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA), to facilitate the management of TEs and inform cost-benefit analyses by Treasury on an annual basis with effect from 1 January 2019. No ex-ante evaluation has been conducted so far, but some ex-post evaluations of TEs were undertaken in 2021 and 2023. In addition, ZIMRA has started to publish TE figures from 2019 onwards in its annual reports, although the statistics published are highly aggregated and do not cover all taxes upon which TEs are granted. The published TEs from the annual reports are revenue forgone from domestic and trade taxes. Although the Parliament of Zimbabwe has the competence to oversee the national budget cycle, it is currently not involved in the monitoring and control of TEs.

Fiscal sustainability: Fiscal sustainability enables governments to meet future public expenditure and financial obligations without resorting to excessive borrowing. Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013 (Act No. 1 of 2013, Section 299) provides for Parliamentary oversight of state revenues and expenditure to ensure accountability, monitoring and fiscal sustainability (Government of Zimbabwe, 2023a). Section 298 (1) b i of the Constitution states that the burden of taxation must be shared equally which implies that TEs should not be allocated without evaluating if they are beneficial to Zimbabwe. TEs can be described as hidden government spending, which can negatively affect fiscal sustainability. Zimbabwe’s TEs amounted to US$1.34 billion in 2023, which is about 2.8 percent of GDP, compared to the global average of about 4 percent of GDP. However, VAT rate reductions and exemptions on domestic sales, which constituted 51 percent and 27.1 percent of total TEs reported by ZIMRA in 2020, were not reported through the new Tax and Revenue Management System (TaRMS) in 2023. Moreover, TEs for CIT, PIT and excise duty were not reported since they are not captured by ZIMRA. The bulk of the reported figures for 2023 were TEs related to custom duties. Thus, the extent of TE use in Zimbabwe is underreported and may in fact be considerably higher than the global average. Moreover, this is happening at a time when Zimbabwe is facing limited fiscal space, with public debt constituting 59.7 percent of GDP in 2024.

Policy recommendations: The Government of Zimbabwe should conduct or commission ex-ante and ex-post evaluations of TEs to enhance their effectiveness. Statistics on TE use and revenue forgone should be publicly available and easily accessible to enhance transparency and access of information to the users. All TEs should be time-bound (with sunset clauses) and, ideally, only be renewed after an assessment has been undertaken to justify their existence. All new TEs should be subject to an ex-ante evaluation to clarify expectations and ensure that only effective TEs are implemented in the country. The Parliament of Zimbabwe should be involved in the monitoring and control of TEs. The legislation should ensure that TE proposals are in line with national development plans and policies. The Parliament of Zimbabwe should also ensure that TE reports are published at pre-defined dates. TE reporting should be comprehensive, reported annually. This means there should be a designated authority responsible for preparing the TE report, preferably in the Ministry of Finance, Economic Development and Investment Promotion. The legal framework should also establish the structure and frequency of TE evaluations, including both ex-ante assessments and ex-post evaluations.

Tax expenditures (TEs) in Zimbabwe represent a significant portion of government spending, amounting to 2.8 percent of GDP, 24.7 percent of total revenue, and 21.2 percent of public spending in 2023. Companies benefitting from TEs enjoy tax savings that trigger a reduction in government revenue, which may in turn result in higher budget deficits and sovereign debt. TEs are often regressive, e.g., when TEs related to personal income tax (PIT) benefit those in higher income tax brackets more, and TEs related to value-added tax (VAT) provide a larger benefit to higher income households, given their larger consumption in absolute terms. Although TEs are meant to boost investment, exports, innovation and employment, their real impact is often unknown, as Zimbabwe lacks a culture of ex-ante and ex-post evaluation of TEs.

Transparency: Section 3 of the Public Finance Management Act [Chapter 22:19] aims to secure transparency, accountability and sound management of revenues and expenditure, but does not provide specific provisions on TEs assessments nor reporting to the Parliament of Zimbabwe. Section 30 of the Zimbabwe Investment Development Agency (ZIDA) Act also highlights that ZIDA, in consultation with the Minister responsible for Finance, should publish guidelines for investment, which include general and special incentives applicable to specific categories of licensed investors. Against this backdrop, it is fair to say that there is no explicit policy on TE transparency in Zimbabwe.

Complex landscape: The rationale for the introduction of business-related TEs is to stimulate investment and production, which should then create employment opportunities and other benefits, potentially leading to higher government revenues in the medium or long term. If well-designed, tax incentives for investment can be a cost-effective policy tool. However, TEs may be vulnerable to lobbying and abuse, providing preferential tax treatment to specific groups with vested interests to keep the incentives in place even without much benefit to the economy at large. Empirical evidence on TEs is still limited in Zimbabwe, which undermines evidence-based tax policymaking.

Evaluation challenges: The government of Zimbabwe committed to develop a tax incentive monitoring and evaluation framework, managed by the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA), to facilitate the management of TEs and inform cost-benefit analyses by Treasury on an annual basis with effect from 1 January 2019. No ex-ante evaluation has been conducted so far, but some ex-post evaluations of TEs were undertaken in 2021 and 2023. In addition, ZIMRA has started to publish TE figures from 2019 onwards in its annual reports, although the statistics published are highly aggregated and do not cover all taxes upon which TEs are granted. The published TEs from the annual reports are revenue forgone from domestic and trade taxes. Although the Parliament of Zimbabwe has the competence to oversee the national budget cycle, it is currently not involved in the monitoring and control of TEs.

Fiscal sustainability: Fiscal sustainability enables governments to meet future public expenditure and financial obligations without resorting to excessive borrowing. Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013 (Act No. 1 of 2013, Section 299) provides for Parliamentary oversight of state revenues and expenditure to ensure accountability, monitoring and fiscal sustainability (Government of Zimbabwe, 2023a). Section 298 (1) b i of the Constitution states that the burden of taxation must be shared equally which implies that TEs should not be allocated without evaluating if they are beneficial to Zimbabwe. TEs can be described as hidden government spending, which can negatively affect fiscal sustainability. Zimbabwe’s TEs amounted to US$1.34 billion in 2023, which is about 2.8 percent of GDP, compared to the global average of about 4 percent of GDP. However, VAT rate reductions and exemptions on domestic sales, which constituted 51 percent and 27.1 percent of total TEs reported by ZIMRA in 2020, were not reported through the new Tax and Revenue Management System (TaRMS) in 2023. Moreover, TEs for CIT, PIT and excise duty were not reported since they are not captured by ZIMRA. The bulk of the reported figures for 2023 were TEs related to custom duties. Thus, the extent of TE use in Zimbabwe is underreported and may in fact be considerably higher than the global average. Moreover, this is happening at a time when Zimbabwe is facing limited fiscal space, with public debt constituting 59.7 percent of GDP in 2024.

Policy recommendations: The Government of Zimbabwe should conduct or commission ex-ante and ex-post evaluations of TEs to enhance their effectiveness. Statistics on TE use and revenue forgone should be publicly available and easily accessible to enhance transparency and access of information to the users. All TEs should be time-bound (with sunset clauses) and, ideally, only be renewed after an assessment has been undertaken to justify their existence. All new TEs should be subject to an ex-ante evaluation to clarify expectations and ensure that only effective TEs are implemented in the country. The Parliament of Zimbabwe should be involved in the monitoring and control of TEs. The legislation should ensure that TE proposals are in line with national development plans and policies. The Parliament of Zimbabwe should also ensure that TE reports are published at pre-defined dates. TE reporting should be comprehensive, reported annually. This means there should be a designated authority responsible for preparing the TE report, preferably in the Ministry of Finance, Economic Development and Investment Promotion. The legal framework should also establish the structure and frequency of TE evaluations, including both ex-ante assessments and ex-post evaluations.