Feed aggregator

Filip Turek, who is under discussion as a candidate for foreign minister in the new Czech government, is facing accusations of racism, homophobia and sexism. Deník N newspaper has published several posts with such content taken from Turek's Facebook page, which were later deleted. Election winner Andrej Babiš has described the problem as"serious" but needs Turek's party Motorists for Themselves to secure a governing majority.

La Société Algérienne d’Exploitation des Tramways (SETRAM) a publié un communiqué ce jeudi pour alerter les usagers d’une importante perturbation du trafic sur la ligne […]

L’article Alger : le trafic du tramway perturbé pour cette raison (SETRAM) est apparu en premier sur .

The community gets together to repair a school in the city of Saraqib, located south of Idlib, that was destroyed by bombing during the Assad regime. Credit: Sonia Al Ali/IPS

By Sonia Al Ali
IDLIB, Syria, Oct 16 2025 (IPS)

The war has deprived thousands of Syrian children of their right to education, especially displaced children in makeshift camps. Amidst difficult economic conditions and the inability of many families to afford educational costs, the future of these children is under threat.

Adel Al-Abbas, a 13-year-old boy from Aleppo, northern Syria, was forced to quit his education after being displaced from his city and moving to a camp on the Syrian-Turkish border. He says, “I was chasing my dream like any other child, but my family’s poverty and the harsh circumstances stood in my way and destroyed all my dreams.”

Adel had hoped to become an engineer, but he left school and gave up on his goal. He replaced books and pens with work tools to help his impoverished family secure life’s necessities. He adds, “We are living in extremely difficult conditions today; we can’t even afford food. So, I have to find a job to survive and help my family, especially after my father was hit by shrapnel in the head, which caused him a permanent disability.”

Adel’s mother is saddened by her son’s situation, saying to IPS, “We need the income my son brings in after my husband got sick and became unable to provide for our family. In any case, work is better than an education that is now useless after he’s been out of school for so long and has fallen behind his peers.”

Reem Al-Diri, an 11-year-old, left school after her family was displaced from rural Damascus to the city of Idlib in northern Syria. Explaining why, she speaks with a clear sense of regret: “I loved school very much and was one of the top students in my class, but my family decided I had to stop my education to help my mom with the housework.”

The young girl confirms that she watches children on their way to school every morning, and she wishes she could go with them to complete her education and become a teacher in the future.

Reem’s mother, Umayya Al-Khalid, justifies her daughter’s absence from school, saying, “After we moved to a camp on the outskirts of Idlib, the schools became far from where we live. We also suffer from a lack of security and the widespread kidnapping of girls. So, I feared for my daughter and preferred for her to stay at home.”

Causes of school dropout

Akram Al-Hussein, a school principal in Idlib, northern Syria, speaks about the school dropout crisis in the country.

“School dropouts are one of the most serious challenges facing society. The absence of education leads to an unknown future for children and for the entire community.”

Al-Hussein emphasizes that relevant authorities and the international community must exert greater efforts to support education and ensure it does not remain a distant dream for children who face poverty and displacement.

He adds, “The reasons and motivations for children dropping out of school vary, ranging from conditions imposed by war—such as killings, displacement, and forced conscription-to child labor and poverty. Other factors include frequent displacement and the child’s inability to settle in one place during the school year, as well as a general lack of parental interest in education and their ignorance of the risks of depriving a child of schooling.”

In this context, the Syria Response Coordinators team, a specialized statistics group in Syria, noted in a statement that the number of out-of-school children in Syria has reached more than 2.5 million, with northwestern Syria alone accounting for over 318,000 out-of-school children, with more than 78,000 of them living in displacement camps. Of this group, 85 percent are engaged in various occupations, including dangerous ones.

In a report dated June 12, 2024, the team identified the key reasons behind the widening school dropout crisis.

A shortage of schools relative to the population density, a shift towards private education, difficult economic conditions, a lack of local government laws to prevent children from entering the labor market, displacement and forced migration, and a marginalized education sector with insufficient support from both local and international humanitarian organizations are seen as the causes.

The team’s report warned that if this trend continues, it will lead to the emergence of an uneducated, illiterate generation. This generation will be consumers rather than producers, and as a result, these uneducated children will become a burden on society.

Initiatives to Restore Destroyed Schools

The destruction of schools in Syria has significantly contributed to the school dropout crisis. Throughout the years of war, schools were not spared from destruction, looting, and vandalism, leaving millions of children without a place to learn or in buildings unfit for education. However, with the downfall of the Assad regime, several initiatives have been launched to restore these schools. This is seen as an urgent and immediate necessity for building a new Syria.

Samah Al-Dioub, a school principal in the northern Syrian city of Maarat al-Nu’man, says, “Syria’s schools suffered extensive damage from both the earthquake and the bombings. We have collected funds from the city’s residents and are now working on rehabilitating the school, but the need is still immense and the costs are very high, especially with residents returning to the city.” She explained that their current focus is on surveying schools and prioritizing which ones need renovation the most.

Engineer Mohammad Hannoun, director of school buildings at the Syrian Ministry of Education, states that approximately 7,400 schools across Syria were either partially or completely destroyed. They have restored 156 schools so far.

Hannoun adds, “We are working to rehabilitate schools in all Syrian regions, aiming to equip at least one school in every village or city to welcome returning students. The Ministry of Education, along with local and international organizations and civil society, are all contributing to these restoration efforts.”

Hannoun points out that the extensive damage to school buildings harms both teachers and students. It leads to a lack of basic educational resources, puts pressure on the few schools that are still functional, and causes a large number of students to drop out, which ultimately impacts the quality of the educational process.

As part of their contingency plans, Hannoun explains that the ministry, in collaboration with partner organizations, intends to activate schools with the available resources to accommodate children returning from camps and from asylum countries. This effort is particularly focused on affected areas that have experienced massive waves of displacement.

The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) said in 2025, 16.7 million people, including 7.5 million children, are in need of humanitarian support in the country, with 2.45 million children out of school, and 2 million children are at risk of malnutrition.

The phenomenon of school dropouts has become a crisis threatening Syria’s children, who have been forced by circumstances to work to earn a living for their families. Instead of being in a classroom to build their futures, children are struggling to survive in an environment left behind by conflict and displacement.

 

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
!function(d,s,id){var js,fjs=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],p=/^http:/.test(d.location)?'http':'https';if(!d.getElementById(id)){js=d.createElement(s);js.id=id;js.src=p+'://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js';fjs.parentNode.insertBefore(js,fjs);}}(document, 'script', 'twitter-wjs');   Related Articles

• Amputated Limbs, Enduring Pain: The Suffering of Syria’s War Wounded
• Camps of Death, Terror: Syrian Survivors Face Long Road To Recovery

The European Union’s Pact for the Mediterranean: Opportunity for a reset in the region?

The European Union’s new Pact for the Mediterranean arrives on the 30th anniversary of the Barcelona Process, representing a renewed impetus to forge a working relationship with the ten countries of its Southern Neighbourhood. To achieve this and allow the EU to full unlock the region’s many opportunities, the Pact is called upon to address a complex set of circumstances, which will require it to confront several key structural challenges.

Challenges

• Internal EU Disunity: The competing interests of member-states in the Mediterranean (e.g., France and Italy in Libya) undermine the EU’s ability to act as a unified bloc.
• Geopolitical Considerations: The EU must either confront or accommodate Turkey’s regional aspirations, including its Mavi Vatan maritime doctrine. Turkey’s demeanour directly obstructs key EU energy and connectivity projects, while challenging the rights of Greece and Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean.
• Trust Deficit: The EU faces the conundrum of both overcoming reservations over its values-oriented approach, often perceived as veiled neocolonialism, that hinder cooperation while not appearing as overtly transactional, and thus alienating its partners. It must offer an attractive solution to its leading Southern partners and pre-empt them from seeking new alliances (e.g., Egypt joining BRICS).

However, there are several opportunities that the European Union can pursue in the region across several fields including energy, migration, and increased geopolitical influence in an area that directly impacts its interests.

Opportunities

• Energy Hub: The Mediterranean is critical for the goal of EU energy independence from Russian fossil fuels, both by harnessing the region’s energy reserves and as a point of entry for energy from North Africa, Asia, and the United States. This includes a strategic role for Greece as a key port of entry for American LNG via the Revithoussa LNG Terminal and the Alexandroupolis FSRU.
• Migration Management: The Pact must reform the EU’s externalization model to address migration flows, a process complicated by internal divisions and ethical concerns following incidents like the Pylos shipwreck.
• Agency: The Pact is the EU’s chance to assert its own strategic autonomy in a critical region, in which power has been traditionally wielded by those far from the Mediterranean shore. With the prevalence of competing corridors (e.g., China’s BRI and the proposed IMEC) in a critical waterway, the European Union must (to) ensure it is not a spectator in its own neighbourhood.

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by Constantine Capsaskis, Research Fellow, ELIAMEP and Athina Fatsea, Junior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP.

Introduction

The upcoming Pact for the Mediterranean is a manifestation of renewed impetus by the European Union to once again forge a modus vivendi with the ten countries of the so-called Southern Neighbourhood.

The Pact will arrive on the 30th anniversary of the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, commonly known as Barcelona Process, in 1995, which set the goal of transforming the region into an “area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation, guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity”. This was to be achieved by focusing on enhanced political dialogue, increased economic interdependence, and social and cultural exchanges that would strengthen relations between Europe and its Mediterranean neighbours.[1]

The Barcelona Process can be seen as a product of its time, launched in the post-Cold War certainty of Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” and the assured “universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government”.[2] There was little scope or resilience for the developments witnessed in the region, from the spread of terrorism in the early 2000s to the pivotal Arab Spring in 2011 and its aftershocks, including increased political violence and an explosion of refugee and migrant movement via cross-Mediterranean routes. Exacerbated by the spectre of a multipolar world order and a renewed global emphasis on hard power and ‘realist’ diplomatic approaches, evidenced by the deepening division of regional rivalries in the Mediterranean, it is safe to say that little of the optimism enshrined in the Barcelona Process survived the 21st century.

“The Southern Mediterranean region is facing governance, socio-economic, climate, environmental and security challenges, many of which result from global trends and call for joint action by the EU and Southern Neighbourhood partners”, noted the European Union in its 2021 “Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood” which sought to address the many difficulties of the region.[3] Yet, almost five years later, little has been achieved in resolving these issues. In fact, the return of large-scale warfare both in Europe and the Middle East, the increase of competition between the global superpowers, and the selective engagement of the United States, have created an even more dangerous set of circumstances for the region. This is the situation that the Union’s new Pact for the Mediterranean is called upon to address.

Despite the many challenges in the region, however, it also offers several opportunities. The Mediterranean in the long run can enable the European Union’s ambitious “Green Deal”, with renewable energy from the African continent helping drive the transition, and in the short run can offer viable alternative non-renewable energy resources to reduce European dependency on Russian fossil fuels. The region will also be pivotal in addressing the issue of migration which continues to be a pressing political issue for many member-states.

It is clear that the Mediterranean is a critical area for both the European Union’s strategic autonomy and its economic independence. A stable, prosperous, and secure, Southern Neighbourhood will greatly benefit the EU at a time of geopolitical flux. However, to this end the Pact for the Mediterranean must also confront several key challenges.

Challenge #1 – Division within the European Union

Despite the goal of a common foreign policy for the European Union, it is commonly accepted that each member state often prioritises its own national interests ahead of the pursuit of any shared goal.[4] And while disagreements over priorities have hamstrung several EU initiatives in the Mediterranean in the past, including the two European Union Naval Force Mediterranean operations,[5] in extreme cases there have even been instances of open competition between member states in the region.

Nowhere have the divergences between member states been felt more acutely than in Libya, both during the final years of the civil war that ended in 2020 and the subsequent continued division of the country between the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU) and the Tobruk-led Government of National Stability (GNS).

On the one hand, Italy has worked closely with the GNU, both in the fields of migration and energy co-operation, while France and Greece have mostly focused on forging ties with the de facto ruler of Eastern Libya, Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar. Following the end of the civil war in 2020, this stark divide became less obvious, as there were attempts from most parties involved to bridge existing differences and grievances. Greece, for example, has undertaken significant diplomatic efforts to initiate a rapprochement with the GNU, focused on the issue of maritime delimitation, with the two sides even starting talks on the matter in September 2025.[6] However, telltale signs remain of this divergence.

On the one hand, Italy has worked closely with the GNU, both in the fields of migration and energy co-operation, while France and Greece have mostly focused on forging ties with the de facto ruler of Eastern Libya, Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar. Following the end of the civil war in 2020, this stark divide became less obvious, as there were attempts from most parties involved to bridge existing differences and grievances. Greece, for example, has undertaken significant diplomatic efforts to initiate a rapprochement with the GNU, focused on the issue of maritime delimitation, with the two sides even starting talks on the matter in September 2025.[6] However, telltale signs remain of this divergence. While Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni has held several meetings with GNU Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, including a trilateral summit with Turkey in August 2025, both Greece and France continue meeting with representatives of Haftar, as recently as September 2025 in the case of the former.

It is worth noting that, despite the much improved situation today, the divergence at the time. […] Over this period, which, during the Libyan Civil War, geographically mirrored the political support provided by their respective nations to Libya’s domestic players. 

It is worth noting that, despite the much improved situation today, the divergence between Paris and Rome during the conflict led to a very public souring of bilateral relations at the time.[7] Over this period, Italy’s ENI and France’s TotalEnergies have also been involved in fierce competition over Libya’s energy resources, which, during the Libyan Civil War, geographically mirrored the political support provided by their respective nations to Libya’s domestic players. This competitive dynamic complicates the EU’s ability to act as a unified geopolitical or economic bloc in the region.

Tangentially related to Libya, the troubled activity of both Operation Sophia and Operation Irini also emphasize the effect of divergences between member-states in action. Tension between Italy’s government at the time, and in particular the conduct of then Italian Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini, and other members of the mission, primarily Germany, continued to escalate and reached a climax when Germany withdrew from the mission. Ursula Von Der Leyen, then German Federal Minister of Defense, even went so far as to accuse the Italian commanders of Operation Sophia of sabotaging the mission.[8]

Operation Irini, which succeeded Sophia with a mandate to enforce a United Nations arms embargo on Libya until 2027, has also faced its own share of problems. Most notably, in 2020 Malta withdrew from the operation and threatened to veto any European decisions on the operation.[9] The operation also resulted in a series of tense stand-offs with the Turkish Navy, something which will be explored in more depth later.

Libya is just one country out of the ten highlighted by the European Union as its Southern Neighbourhood. Admittedly, its central role in both Europe’s energy endeavours in the Mediterranean and as a major transit point for migrant corridors make it stand out.[10] However, the failure of the European Union to devise a common policy in its approach to the war-torn country is telling.

Divergences also exist on a wide range of other issues, from the recognition of Palestinian statehood to the stance of member states on external actors such as Russia and China. The North-South divide within the EU on the issue of migration also persists, with the Mediterranean EU member states increasingly moving towards more controversial practices to tackle the influx of migrants and refugees (including Italy’s controversial deal with Albania and Greece’s suspension of asylum applications for three months).

The Pact for the Mediterranean must provide a credible path to an accord between European member states in the region, otherwise the Union risks once again being unable to react to developments in the region. This would lead EU countries in the region to revert to the status quo of focusing on regional bilateral and multilateral cooperation schemes and will allow external actors like Russia and Turkey to continue to maintain the initiative.

Challenge #2 – Trust Deficit

Several of the governments of the South Neighbourhood have long harboured a wariness over European Union values-oriented policies for attempting to violate their sovereignty and erode their control, often decrying these measures as veiled neocolonialism in which the European countries seek to secure their own interests (usually in their former colonies) and promote Eurocentric values.[11]

After all, the Barcelona Declaration of 1995 stated that all participants seek to “respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and guarantee the effective legitimate exercise of such rights and freedoms, including freedom of expression, freedom of association for peaceful purposes and freedom of thought, conscience and religion, both individually and together with other members of the same group, without any discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, language, religion or sex”.[12] Thirty years later, not only has this not been achieved, but arguably the environment is less conducive to the safeguarding of these rights. In fact, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights notes that: “The Middle East and North Africa faces significant challenges, including situations of armed conflict, the rise of violent extremism and the counter-terrorism narrative affecting civil and political rights as well as deeply rooted discrimination against groups”.[13]

It is clear that today the EU has already adopted a more transactional approach with many of the key actors in the region and has retreated from many of its past stances on the issue. While, for example, the 2024 Joint Declaration on the Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership between the European Union and Egypt reiterates the commitment to “work […] to further promote democracy, fundamental freedoms, and human rights, gender equality and equal opportunities”,[14] there are many (including Humans Right Watch[15]) who argue that there has been little progress on this front. This is not something that has stopped the European Union from acknowledging “Egypt as a reliable partner, as well as Egypt’s unique and vital geo-strategic role as a pillar of security, moderation, and peace in the region of the Mediterranean, the Near East and Africa”.[16]

But there is little evidence that this has achieved much in shifting the widespread perception of EU intentions in the region. There are even those that argue that the European Union’s more pragmatic approach is, in fact, more neocolonial in nature.[17]

In the Sahel, not far from the Mediterranean coast, there are already developments that should be of concern to European policymakers. The French military withdrawal from Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad,[18] while undoubtedly rooted in different and complex circumstances, emphatically illustrates the continued dynamism of anti-colonial sentiment, particularly when it is fuelled by hostile actors like Russia.[19]

At the same time, European ambivalence over Israeli actions in Gaza did little to earn the EU any goodwill with the Arab populations of the Mediterranean. While it remains to be seen if the current ceasefire will last, the EU’s unwillingness to act on the matter in the same decisive manner it had displayed following the Russian invasion of Ukraine certainly rankled with several actors in the region.[20] After all, it was not too long ago that the European Union and the United States were calling on these countries to freeze out Russia. “The EU actively urges all countries not to provide material or other support for Russia’s war of aggression” was the Commission’s recommendation when documents leaked that Egypt was secretly planning to produce 40,000 missiles for Russia.[21]

It is clear that the Pact for the Mediterranean must move beyond pious generalities about strengthening the relations of the EU with its Southern Neighbours. Fuelled by the possibility of a new multipolar world order, and the selective engagement of the United States, it is clear that several governments in the region see little reason to engage with the European Union’s exacting list of governance reforms. Egypt has already been admitted as a full member of the BRICS.[22]

The fanning of decolonial sentiment, coupled with the proliferation of rhetoric emphasizing competition between the Global North and Global South, have undeniably exacerbated the situation. It will require a delicate balancing act by the European Union to move beyond these difficulties and to work to materially improve relations in the Mediterranean, while at the same time not compromising on the very values that make the European Union what it is.

Challenge #3 – Turkey

Turkey’s regional aspirations in the Eastern Mediterranean must be considered when developing the European Union’s Pact for the region. The maximalist claims of the Mavi Vatan (Blue Homeland) maritime doctrine not only directly impinge on the rights of two EU member states (Greece and Cyprus) but directly involve countries which are part of the Southern Neighbourhood (namely, Syria, Libya, and Egypt). The EU’s ambivalent stance on Turkey cannot be considered in a vacuum and directly affects its relations with the region.

While the EU has unequivocally condemned the Turkish – Libyan Memorandum of Understanding on the delimitation of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of 2019,[23] several European Union projects are directly affected by it. Most notably, the Great Sea Interconnector that proposes to link the power grids of Greece, Cyprus, and Israel, faces significant geopolitical hurdles from Ankara’s objection to the project on the grounds that it violates its claimed maritime rights. It is worth noting here that the interconnector is a Project of Common Interest for the European Commission.

In the summer of 2025, Turkish naval vessels stopped research vessel Fugro Gauss from conducting surveys for the East to Med Corridor (EMC), the proposed fiber-optic cable that would link Israel to France via Greece and Cyprus. “We always conduct the necessary monitoring, preventing any unauthorized activity on our continental shelf, and we do not allow activities or projects [such as the Great Sea Interconnector project] that disregard our country”, noted Turkish sources.[24]

This risk can be assumed to hold for other proposed trans-Mediterranean projects, including the GREGY (Greece – Egypt) electrical interconnector, while it certainly acted as a detrimental factor in the feasibility considerations of the EastMed pipeline project. In fact, the EastMed pipeline was effectively shelved in January 2022, following the decision of the United States to publicly withdrew its support, primarily attributed to American concerns that the project would act as a spoiler for rapprochement efforts with Ankara.[25]

While Turkey’s involvement in Libya has solidified over the last five years, it is also becoming an increasingly influential player in the Middle East following the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. The extent of Turkey’s influence with new President Ahmed al-Sharaa remains to be seen, but its military presence in northern Syria and northern Iraq has undeniably shifted the regional balance of power.  This is further compounded by its developing regional security ties, most notably though the diffusion of Turkish-produced military equipment like the Bayraktar TB2 drones, which has transformed the country’s power projection and cemented it as a major regional arms exporter.[26]

The relationship between Turkey and the European Union has been the subject of many research papers and debates and lies quite beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is increasingly clear that some accommodation will have to be reached with a Turkey that seeks to establish itself as the regional power of the Eastern Mediterranean.

With member-states having significantly different views on how to accommodate Turkey in the region’s security architecture, emphasized by the current debate on its membership in the EU’s SAFE joint procurement project on rearmament, the Pact for the Mediterranean will also be called upon to navigate between the existential threat from Turkey felt by two European Union member states, Turkey’s rivalry with France for primacy in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as Italy’s, Malta’s, and Spain’s more accommodating stance.

Opportunity #1 – Energy

The European Union has staked its independence from Russian fossil fuels on the energy reserves of the Mediterranean and the Southern Neighbourhood. This includes several “tried and tested” options. Libya’s proven oil reserves are the largest on the African continent, even as political factors on the ground continue to complicate its exploitation.[27] Its neighbour, Algeria’s share of natural gas imports to the EU is at 17.8%, making it the second-largest supplier after Norway (50.8%) for the second quarter of 2025.[28] However, there is concern that the country will be unable to ramp up production to meet European demand.[29]

Recent energy developments in the Eastern Mediterranean have also generated strong interest as a potential solution in ensuring the EU’s energy autonomy. The discovery of substantial gas fields in the region, including the Israeli Leviathan, the Cypriot Aphrodite, and the Egyptian Zohr, in the 2010s marked a paradigm shift for the region. The discoveries in the maritime areas of Cyprus and Israel in particular, due to these countries’ smaller population and lower levels of consumption, could make the two countries net global exporters of natural gas.[30] Overall, the region is estimated to have as much as 8 trillion cubic metres in natural gas.

There are important geopolitical and infrastructure challenges that need to be overcome for this to become a reality, however. Firstly, Cyprus’ continued territorial disputes with Turkey, which refuses to recognize its EEZ, means that development in the extraction and exploitation of these resources has yet to materialise. In Egypt, among other issues, onshore liquefaction plants do not have the capacity to meet European demand, with Egypt only currently able to export the equivalent of 5% of the demand.[31] Additionally, the Egyptian government has so far failed to fully liberalise its gas market, which has also stunted investment in the country’s energy sector.

There are the kind of issues that must be addressed by the Pact. If the European Union is serious about its commitment to diversify its energy sources and become independent of Russian fossil fuels by 2027, it must prioritise its efforts in the Mediterranean. As a result, it must take concrete steps to facilitate Cyprus’ ability to capitalise on its gas discoveries while assisting Egypt in further developing its liquefied natural gas (LNG) export facilities.

But it is important to stress that massive infrastructure projects are required to further develop energy connectivity in the region. These include the aforementioned Great Sea and GREGY electricity interconnectors, but shelved projects like the EastMed pipeline should also be considered once more. Indicatively, Cyprus is currently set to export its gas through Egypt with Julien Pouget, Senior Vice President of Middle East & North Africa, Exploration & Production at TotalEnergies, noting that “TotalEnergies is very pleased to be part of the opening of an export route through Egypt for Cyprus gas. This Host Government Agreement represents a major step in valorizing the Cyprus gas through available LNG capacities in Egypt, contributing to Europe energy security by bringing additional LNG volumes”.[32] Clearly, a link to transport gas from the Eastern Mediterranean directly to Europe would be a welcome development.

Aside from its own reserves, the Mediterranean is also a critical point of entry for energy resources from other parts of the world. The Suez Canal has seen an increase in northbound oil and gas flows following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with Europe increasingly relying on imports from the Middle East.[33] At the same time, the United States is looking to expand the export of American LNG to the continent. Countries like Greece, which has been developing its regasification capacity, have been singled out in this endeavour, as emphasized in the recent visit of United States Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum in Athens.[34] This is because the country is strategically positioned to serve as an entry point, notably via the Revithoussa LNG terminal and the new Alexandroupolis Floating Storage and Regasification Unit (FSRU).

The Mediterranean will also likely be important for the European Union’s ‘green transition’, with the region possessing bountiful renewable energy sources in its solar and wind power generation potential.[35] If all solar, wind, and hydropower, projects in the region are completed, combined with current generation capacity, it is estimated that the region could produce a total of 779,2 GW, almost three times the current capacity and 73% of the regional goal of 1 TW.[36] Once again, the Pact must ensure that it creates a proactive and efficient framework in promoting this transition across the Mediterranean, but also ensuring the necessary infrastructure links to import this energy.

Opportunity #2 – Migration

Migration has been one of the primary challenges of the European Union over the last decade, both at the domestic political level and institutionally. At the country level, it has fuelled the rise of far-right parties across the continent, which often accompany their anti-migrant rhetoric with Euroscepticism. There have also been divisions between the member-states on how to best manage the influx of migrants and refugees. These are comprehensive differences, ranging from the very basics of practices when rescuing migrants at sea to questions of refugee and migrant quotas. The practical solution to this issue was the externalisation of the EU’s border control, with primary responsibility for managing migrants flow being delegated to the countries of the Southern Neighbourhood, with assistance packages being agreed with countries like Turkey (a total of €9 billion), Egypt (€7.4 billion), Lebanon, and Tunisia to stem the flow of migrants and refugees.[37]

But it is important to note the scale of the problem. More than a million people have crossed the Mediterranean over the last decade, with Greece registering almost a quarter of a million asylum applications just between 2019 and 2023.[38] Specifically, in 2023, the EU recorded over 380,000 irregular border crossings, the highest number since 2016, with the Central Mediterranean route, from North Africa, mainly Tunisia and Libya, to Italy and Malta, being the most active.[39]

With the failure of the European Union to adopt a comprehensive and shared approach to the issue, the states most affected by migration have established their own policies and methods to tackle the issue. The principle of non-refoulement and the definition of ‘safe countries’ has been at the heart of this debate, both in Italy and Greece. The two countries have also faced legal challenges to their policies with the European Court of Justice ruling against Italy’s controversial deal with Albania, and the European Court of Human Rights challenging Greece’s three-month suspension of the right to asylum.

Allegations of human rights violations have also been levelled against the border enforcement agencies tackling migration on both sides of the Mediterranean, with Libya being once more at the heart of the issue. European Union border agency Frontex has been accused of being complicit in severe violations of human rights by the Libyan coastguard as it provides it with aerial surveillance assistance. This often results in the return of migrants and refugees attempting to cross the Mediterranean to ‘systematic and widespread abuse’ in Libya.[40] Additionally, non-governmental organizations (NGO) operating in the region to rescue migrants and refugees have claimed that the Libyan Coast Guard has begun to shoot at the vessels in an effort to deter their activity. “It’s unacceptable that the Italian government and the EU allows criminal militia to fire on civilians,” said a spokesperson for one of these NGOs.[41] Yet, both Greece and Italy are set to continue their close co-operation with their Libyan partners to tackle the issue of migration.

But it is not only these partners that have been accused of violating the rights of migrants and asylum seekers. The Hellenic Coast Guard has long been accused of conducting pushbacks, and in the aftermath of the Pylos shipwreck and the more than 500 presumed dead, there were even institutional calls for the Frontex agency to leave the country in protest of its handling of migrant vessels.[42] The incident tragically highlighted the lack of effective search-and-rescue (SAR) capabilities and coordination in the Mediterranean, a crucial gap the Pact is set to address.

The issue of migration is a minefield for the European Union, filled with difficult choices and undesirable outcomes. As anti-migration rhetoric continues to proliferate at home, it is unlikely that the European Union will seek to radically change its enforcement model in the region. However, the Pact for the Mediterranean will have to be very careful in how it approaches the issue.

It is important that tackling the issue of migration does not continue to be perceived as being in the self-serving interest of the European Union, solved by offloading the ‘dirty work’ to its partners in the Southern Neighbourhood.[43] This would not only substantially undermine the EU’s credibility, particularly when it comes to issues of promoting good governance and the rule of law, but also leave it indebted to third parties and provide leverage to these actors.

Instead, the Pact for the Mediterranean must act as a starting point for a comprehensive reform of the European Union’s overall approach to migration. If the concerns of the European south are not addressed, then these states will likely once more pursue their own policy on the matter irrespective of whether it breaks from EU strategy or even legal and ethical norms.

Opportunity #3 – Connections and Corridors

The Mediterranean has been one of the most important meeting points of humanity for millennia, with cultural and commercial exchanges flourishing along its coastline since the Bronze Age. The Barcelona Process focused heavily on the importance of civil society for the further development of the ties between the states of the Mediterranean. However, today, the rise of far-right parties in Europe and the resurgence and entrenchment of authoritarian regimes in North Africa and the Middle East following the Arab Spring have left little room for manoeuvre in this regard.[44]

At the same time, the Mediterranean is set to become more interconnected than ever before. Economic corridors and infrastructure connectivity is expected to become a dominant feature of the region, something which must be capitalized upon to increase the cultural and social cohesion between the Mediterranean states. Cooperation on key issues and shared threats, including climate change, water resilience, and global pandemics, should be a key priority for the Pact. Even cooperation on tourism, which is a significant source of income for countries in the region, must be further developed, despite more than two billion euros having been already allocated to a total of 17 Interreg programmes in the region.[45]

Countries around the Mediterranean will face significant water shortages in the future, with millions of people already facing water scarcity.[46] With many of the world’s most water-stressed areas being located in the region, close co-operation will be required to counter the issue as there exist both a serious investment gap and a lack of technical expertise in confronting this problem.[47] Yet, it will be important for the European Union to actively assist its partners in mitigating the impact of climate change and to avoid the further desertification of the region, something that would only exacerbate cross-Mediterranean migratory flows.

Technological innovation and digital connectivity can also have an important role in bridging the divide between the states in the region and further unlock the area’s potential. Undersea fibre optic cables already account for the vast majority of internet traffic, and the EU Global Gateway investment project has already been seen as a valuable instrument in further developing a sustainable digital infrastructure and regulatory framework for the Mediterranean in the future despite difficulties in securing adequate funding.[48] Developing a communications network in line with European values and standards could allow the EU to engage in specific digital economy partnerships, aligning the region to its own economic and development priorities and further underlining its global role as an important digital partner.[49]

Several initiatives have been successful in forging links within the region, and instead of retreat, the Pact for the Mediterranean must double down on these efforts to promote a shared space of peace and prosperity. Soft power has always been one of the most important ways in which the European Union has pursued its goals on the global stage. “The role of culture as a vector for peace, democracy and economic development will continue to be supported to help build a more inclusive Mediterranean. Culture is a field where there is a real added value in working at regional level to reduce social isolation and build connections across the Mediterranean region”, noted the EU’s Regional Multiannual Indicative Programme.[50]

Opportunity #4 – Agency

Since the Napoleonic Era, political control of the Mediterranean has been determined by actors who were far from its shores, from the British Empire in the long nineteenth century to the Cold War struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union in the latter half of the twentieth. However, in the post-Cold War era these traditional rivalries have been steadily retreating, with the termination of Russia’s lease on the military base of Tartus acting as an emphatic capstone. But there is also the high likelihood that the Mediterranean will continue to feature prominently in a renewed era of Great Power competition. Indicatively, the Mediterranean saw one of the most significant concentration of warships in the world during the opening days of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

China is increasingly becoming a major factor in the region, developing its bilateral relations with the countries of North Africa and West Asia through a focus on soft power and development (best exemplified by the country’s Belt and Road Initiative or BRI) and buoyed by Beijing’s official policy of non-interference in domestic politics.[51] But it has also began developing deeper security and diplomatic relations with actors in the region, including establishing Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships with Algeria and Egypt. In fact, aside from the fact that China has become the leading trade partner for both countries, it also is providing them with military equipment and support (even conducting joint naval exercises with Egypt).[52] Chinese military supplies to northern Africa accounted for almost half (49%) of its total military exports to the continent. China also opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti, not far from the southern entrance to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Additionally, China has been attempting to establish itself in the Balkans and Eastern Europe through the 14+1 cooperation scheme, with the COSCO-owned Greek port of Piraeus seen as a key entryway for the BRI into Europe.

While the United States will likely continue its pivot to the Indo-Pacific in an effort to contain Chinese aspirations, a more comprehensive and hawkish US policy could likely see the country re-engaging with the Mediterranean to this effect. With the current administration’s efforts to reinforce American shipbuilding capabilities, both military and commercial, it may also seek to re-establish its presence in one of the world’s most critical waterways. While the United States Sixth Fleet has dwindled in size since the end of the Cold War, usually down to one carrier battle group, it is strongly reinforced in times of crises. In the aftermath of the October 7, 2023, attack by Hamas, the USS Gerald Ford carrier and the amphibious assault ships USS Bataan and USS Wasp were all deployed to join the Sixth Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean.

There are elements within the US military chain of command who directly view the BRI as a threat to US interests, as it strengthens China’s control over the global logistics system. The establishment of Alexandroupolis as the main port of entry for NATO materiel, a port free of connection to either China or Russia, was not a coincidence, nor was the Greek’s state decision to cancel the tender for the port due to its increased geopolitical and strategic importance spontaneous.[53] “[S]ome OBOR [One Belt One Road] investments could create potential military advantages for China, should China require access to selected foreign ports to pre-position the necessary logistics support to sustain naval deployments in waters as distant as the Indian Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, and Atlantic Ocean to protect its growing interests”, tellingly noted a Pentagon report in 2018.[54]

If the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC), supported by elements of the United States administration as a counterweight to the BRI,[55] materialises it would add yet another dimension to a possible renewed global struggle over the Mediterranean, with India and China likely to compete for influence in the region, and likely, the same actors. The IMEC, announced in September 2023, is intended to serve as a strategic and economic bridge between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, positioning the Mediterranean as a central node in future global trade architecture. This convergence of competing great power-led corridors highlights the region’s increasing strategic value, necessitating a proactive and unified EU response through the new Pact.[56]

Additionally, states from the Gulf region, primarily Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, have also gradually increased their footprint in the Mediterranean, even if their focus is limited in scope. Initially enmeshing themselves in the region in the aftermath of the Arab Spring to counter the spread of the Turkey- and Qatar-backed Muslim Brotherhood,[57] the two Gulf states have since developed strategic and economic ties with both sides of the Mediterranean coast, particularly Greece and Egypt. These investments often focus on strategic sectors like ports, logistics, and renewable energy, creating an alternative source of capital and influence outside traditional EU and Chinese channels.

This could be a defining moment for the European Union to prove that it can be a serious geopolitical player.

This could be a defining moment for the European Union to prove that it can be a serious geopolitical player. While the threat of a US withdrawal from NATO has subsided, it is clear that the EU must move beyond its dependence on American policy to secure its own security and prosperity. The Mediterranean continues to be a region in flux, with several global and regional powers seeking to assert themselves in this strategically and economically critical area. The Pact for the Mediterranean must facilitate the European Union in its efforts to seize the initiative and muster the agency to chart its own path in a region that directly impacts it, rather than to once more be relegated to the role of a reactive spectator.

Conclusion

The Pact for the Mediterranean will arrive at a challenging time for the region. The divergence between the European Union and its Southern Neighbourhood seems more likely to grow deeper instead of being bridged. There are serious challenges on all fronts, political, economic, and social, that risk its viability entirely. A more holistic approach by the European Union to the region can only benefit its influence and credibility, but it must be careful in acknowledging and addressing the concerns of its member states in the region and be cognisant of the adverse global conditions.

Ultimately, the Pact will be judged by its implementation. Whether it will offer measurable and concrete actions to confront the challenges and grasp the opportunities of the region, or whether it will remain a document defined by good intentions, remains to be seen. To succeed, the Pact must prioritize internal EU cohesion, credibly address the trust deficit with Southern partners by balancing values and transactional interests, and demonstrate a unified strategic stance toward external actors, particularly Turkey. Only through such a consistent action can the EU fully capitalize on the energy, connectivity, and geopolitical agency opportunities the Mediterranean offers.

 

Bibliography

Primary Sources

“Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Borrell i Fontelles on behalf of the European Commission – Parliamentary question – P-001267/2023”, European Parliament, 26/5/2023.
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-9-2023-001267-ASW_EN.html

“Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Conference (27-28 November 1995) – Declaration and Work Programme”, European Commission, 4/12/1995.
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/doc_95_7

“Cohesion Policy towards a more sustainable tourism in the Mediterranean”, European Commission, 14/8/2025.
https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/whats-new/newsroom/14-08-2025-cohesion-policy-towards-a-more-sustainable-tourism-in-the-mediterranean_en

“EU imports of energy products – latest developments”, Eurostat, September 2025.
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=EU_imports_of_energy_products_-_latest_developments#:~:text=Norway%20was%20the%20largest%20supplier,Norway%20increased%20by%207.2%20pp

“Human Rights Situation in the MENA Region”, Regional Office for the Middle East and North Africa, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
https://romena.ohchr.org/en/human-rights-situation-mena-region

“Joint Declaration on the Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership between The Arab Republic Of Egypt and the European Union”, European Commission, 17/3/2024.
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_24_1513

“Libya/Türkiye: Statement by the Spokesperson on a reported agreement on hydrocarbons”, European Union External Action Service, 3/10/2022.
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/libyat%C3%BCrkiye-statement-spokesperson-reported-agreement-hydrocarbons_en

“Red Sea chokepoints are critical for international oil and natural gas flows”, U.S. Energy Information Administration, 4/12/2023.
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61025

“Regional Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) 2021-2027 for EU support to the Southern Neighbourhood”, European Commission.
https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/19e6c4a6-7d6a-4831-8a8c-f4bea98cf5a0_en

“Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood: A new Agenda for the Mediterranean”, European Commission, Brussels, 9/2/2021.
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/joint_communication_renewed_partnership_southern_neighbourhood.pdf

“Significant rise in irregular border crossings in 2023, highest since 2016”, Frontex, 26/1/2024.
https://www.frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/significant-rise-in-irregular-border-crossings-in-2023-highest-since-2016-C0gGpm#:~:text=Significant%20rise%20in%20irregular%20border%20crossings%20in%202023%2C%20highest%20since%202016,-2024%2D01%2D26&text=The%20number%20of%20irregular%20border,to%20preliminary%20calculations%20by%20Frontex

“The Mediterranean: An Energy and Decarbonization Opportunity for Europe”, International Association of Oil and Gas Producers, October 2025.
https://iogpeurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/The-Mediterranean-an-energy-and-decarbonization-opportunity-for-Europe-UPDATED.pdf

Secondary Sources

Bianco, Cinzia, ‘Gulf monarchies and the eastern Mediterranean: Growing ambitions’, European Council on Foreign Relations.
https://ecfr.eu/special/eastern_med/gcc

Bilal, San, Teevan, Chloe and Tilmes, Klaus, ‘Financing inclusive digital transformation under the EU Global Gateway’, European Centre for Development Policy Management, July 2024.
https://ecdpm.org/application/files/6617/1982/5473/Financing-Inclusive-Digital-Transformation-EU-Global-Gateway-ECDPM-Discussion-Paper-370-2024.pdf

Borell, Josep, ‘When member states are divided, how do we ensure Europe is able to act?’, European Union External Action Service, 2/10/2020.
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/when-member-states-are-divided-how-do-we-ensure-europe-able-act-0_en

Chafer, Tony, Bertrand, Eloïse and Stoddard, Ed, ‘France’s Strategic Failure in Mali: A Postcolonial Disutility of Force?’, Royal United Services Institute, 7/2/2024.
https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/frances-strategic-failure-mali-postcolonial-disutility-force

China Power Team. “How Dominant is China in the Global Arms Trade?” China Power. April 26, 2018. Updated May 27, 2021.
https://chinapower.csis.org/china-global-arms-trade/

Dimitriadi, Angeliki, ‘Snapshot of Migration to Greece in the Last Five Years’, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, December 2024.
https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Policy-brief_Greece.pdf

Elgendy, Karim, ‘Here’s how and why the Mediterranean could lead in the global clean energy revolution’, Climate Champions, 4/4/2025.
https://www.climatechampions.net/news/mediterranean-in-the-global-clean-energy-revolution/

Escribano, Gonzalo, ‘Another round of Algerian gas for Europe’, Real Instituto Elcano, 17/3/2025.
https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/another-round-of-algerian-gas-for-europe/

“EU-North Africa: Migration First?”, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 18/7/2024.
https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/eu-north-africa-migration-first-181145

Fukuyama, Francis, ‘The End of History?’, The National Interest, Vol. 16 (Summer, 1989), pp. 3-18.

Ghafar, Adel Abdel and Jacobs, Anna L., ‘China in the Mediterranean: Implications of Expanding Sino-North Africa Relations’, Brookings, July 2020.
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/FP_20200720_china_mediterranean_ghafar_jacobs.pdf

Gruarin, Valentina, ‘EU Policy in North Africa and Eastern Mediterranean: Balancing Differentiated Integration for Conflict Resolution and Democracy Support’, EUROMESCO Policy Brief No. 140, February 2024.
https://www.euromesco.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Policy-Brief-N%C2%BA140.pdf

Hammond, Joseph, ‘Freeing Libya’s Locked-Up Oil Reserves’, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 14/9/2025.
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/freeing-libyas-locked-oil-reserves

Helmy, Dyaa, ‘Egypt’s Relations with BRICS: One Year After Joining the Group – Future Perspectives’, The Egyptian Cabinet Information and Decision Support Center, 16/1/2025.
https://idsc.gov.eg/upload/DocumentLibraryIssues/AttachmentA/10166/Egypt%27s%20Relations%20with%20BRICS%20%20One%20year%20after%20joining%20the%20group%20-%20future%20perspectives%20%20.pdf

Hokayem, E., & Momtaz, R., Turbulence in the Eastern Mediterranean: Geopolitical, Security, and Energy Dynamics (London, Routledge, 2024).

Karacsony, Eszter, ‘Integrating the EU’s hinterland through IMEC’, Observer Research Foundation, 26/8/2025.
https://www.orfonline.org/research/integrating-the-eu-s-hinterland-through-imec

Martins, Bruno Oliveira; Pinar Tank & Beste İşleyen, ‘Turkish drones as a foreign policy tool: A technology-mediated search for autonomy’, Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2023.
https://www.prio.org/publications/13435

Pastori, Gianluca, ‘Who Controls the Rimland: Competition and Rivalry in the Mediterranean’, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 16/7/2020.
https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/who-controls-rimland-competition-and-rivalry-mediterranean-26983

Sacks, David, ‘Will the U.S. Plan to Counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative Work?’, Council on Foreign Relations, 14/9/2023.
https://www.cfr.org/blog/will-us-plan-counter-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-work

Saini Fasanotti, Federica, ‘Libya and the Franco-Italian rivalry’, Geopolitical Intelligence Services Reports, 26/3/2019.
https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/italy-france/

Youngs, Richard, ‘The EU’s Dead-on-Arrival Pact for the Mediterranean’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 18/9/2025.
https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/09/the-eus-dead-on-arrival-pact-for-the-mediterranean?lang=en

Zubel, Karolina, ‘The contribution of the Mediterranean cities and regions to building water resilience’, European Committee of the Regions, 2024.
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/21361dc9-26dc-11ef-a195-01aa75ed71a1

News

Argiri, Lena, ‘Greece emerging as critical energy hub in Eastern Mediterranean’, Kathimerini English Edition, 21/9/2025.
https://www.ekathimerini.com/economy/energy/1281386/diplomatic-engagement-is-key-for-chevrons-energy-project/

Barigazzi, Jacopo, Stamouli, Nektaria, and Leali, Giorgio, ‘Italy and Greece sound the alarm over Libya. But allies aren’t rushing to help.’, Politico, 14/7/2025.
https://www.politico.eu/article/italy-greece-sound-alarm-over-libya-allies-arent-rushing-to-help/

Cavcic, Melisa, ‘TotalEnergies and Eni sign on dotted line for Cyprus gas exports through Egypt’, Offshore Energy, 18/2/2025.
https://www.offshore-energy.biz/totalenergies-and-eni-sign-on-dotted-line-for-cyprus-gas-exports-through-egypt/

“Egypt: Repression, Rising Poverty in Sisi’s Second Decade”, Humans Right Watch, 16/1/2025.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/01/16/egypt-repression-rising-poverty-sisis-second-decade

“EU: Frontex Complicit in Abuse in Libya”, Humans Right Watch, 12/12/2022.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/12/12/eu-frontex-complicit-abuse-libya

“Greece to cancel Alexandroupoli port tender as its importance increases”, Kathimerini English Edition, 7/11/2025.
https://www.ekathimerini.com/economy/1197356/greece-to-cancel-alexandroupolis-port-tender-as-its-importance-increases/

“Italy-Libya migration pact under scrutiny as bullets fly”, France24 News, 3/10/2025.
https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20251003-italy-libya-migration-pact-under-scrutiny-as-bullets-fly

Melly, Paul, ‘Chad exploits Russian-Western rivalry to its advantage’, BBC News, 5/10/2024
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2kr40nlkpo

Nedos, Vassilis, ‘Ankara blocks research on cable route’, Kathimerini English Edition, 8/8/2025.
https://www.ekathimerini.com/politics/foreign-policy/1277492/ankara-blocks-research-on-cable-route/

“PM Mitsotakis announces EEZ delimitation talks with Libya”, Kathimerini English Edition, 21/09/2025.
https://www.ekathimerini.com/politics/foreign-policy/1281553/mitsotakis-announces-eez-delimitation-talks-with-libya/

Scicluna, Chris and Emmott, Robin, ‘Malta pulls out of new EU Libya sea patrols in migration row’, Reuters, 8/5/2020.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-libya-idUSKBN22K1UT/

Stamouli, Nektaria and Röhn, Tim, ‘Greece must face punishment over abuses against migrants, Frontex official says’, Politico, 24/4/2025.
https://www.politico.eu/article/frontex-greece-punishment-migration-abuse-jonas-grimheden/

 

[1]https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/joint_communication_renewed_partnership_southern_neighbourhood.pdf

[2] Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’, The National Interest, Vol. 16 (Summer, 1989), p. 4.

[3]https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/joint_communication_renewed_partnership_southern_neighbourhood.pdf

[4] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/when-member-states-are-divided-how-do-we-ensure-europe-able-act-0_en

[5] E., Hokayem, & R., Momtaz, Turbulence in the Eastern Mediterranean: Geopolitical, Security, and

Energy Dynamics (London, Routledge, 2024), pp. 265-266.

[6] https://www.ekathimerini.com/politics/foreign-policy/1281553/mitsotakis-announces-eez-delimitation-talks-with-libya/

[7] https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/italy-france/

[8] Hokayem, & Momtaz, Turbulence in the Eastern Mediterranean, pp. 265-266.

[9] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-libya-idUSKBN22K1UT/

[10] https://www.politico.eu/article/italy-greece-sound-alarm-over-libya-allies-arent-rushing-to-help/

[11] https://www.euromesco.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Policy-Brief-N%C2%BA140.pdf

[12] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/doc_95_7

[13] https://romena.ohchr.org/en/human-rights-situation-mena-region

[14] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_24_1513

[15] https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/01/16/egypt-repression-rising-poverty-sisis-second-decade

[16] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/ga/statement_24_1513

[17] https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/09/the-eus-dead-on-arrival-pact-for-the-mediterranean?lang=en

[18] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2kr40nlkpo

[19] https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/frances-strategic-failure-mali-postcolonial-disutility-force

[20] https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/09/the-eus-dead-on-arrival-pact-for-the-mediterranean?lang=en

[21] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-9-2023-001267-ASW_EN.html

[22]https://idsc.gov.eg/upload/DocumentLibraryIssues/AttachmentA/10166/Egypt%27s%20Relations%20with%20BRICS%20%20One%20year%20after%20joining%20the%20group%20-%20future%20perspectives%20%20.pdf

[23] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/libyat%C3%BCrkiye-statement-spokesperson-reported-agreement-hydrocarbons_en

[24] https://www.ekathimerini.com/politics/foreign-policy/1277492/ankara-blocks-research-on-cable-route/

[25] Hokayem, & Momtaz, Turbulence in the Eastern Mediterranean, pp. 265-266.

[26] https://www.prio.org/publications/13435

[27] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/freeing-libyas-locked-oil-reserves

[28] https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=EU_imports_of_energy_products_-_latest_developments#:~:text=Norway%20was%20the%20largest%20supplier,Norway%20increased%20by%207.2%20pp

[29] https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/another-round-of-algerian-gas-for-europe/

[30] Hokayem, & Momtaz, Turbulence in the Eastern Mediterranean, p. 63.

[31] Ibid., p. 66.

[32] https://www.offshore-energy.biz/totalenergies-and-eni-sign-on-dotted-line-for-cyprus-gas-exports-through-egypt/

[33] https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61025

[34] https://www.ekathimerini.com/economy/energy/1281386/diplomatic-engagement-is-key-for-chevrons-energy-project/

[35] https://iogpeurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/The-Mediterranean-an-energy-and-decarbonization-opportunity-for-Europe-UPDATED.pdf

[36] https://www.climatechampions.net/news/mediterranean-in-the-global-clean-energy-revolution/

[37]Hokayem, & Momtaz, Turbulence in the Eastern Mediterranean, p. 263.

[38] https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Policy-brief_Greece.pdf

[39]https://www.frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/significant-rise-in-irregular-border-crossings-in-2023-highest-since-2016-C0gGpm#:~:text=Significant%20rise%20in%20irregular%20border%20crossings%20in%202023%2C%20highest%20since%202016,-2024%2D01%2D26&text=The%20number%20of%20irregular%20border,to%20preliminary%20calculations%20by%20Frontex

[40] https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/12/12/eu-frontex-complicit-abuse-libya

[41] https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20251003-italy-libya-migration-pact-under-scrutiny-as-bullets-fly

[42] https://www.politico.eu/article/frontex-greece-punishment-migration-abuse-jonas-grimheden/

[43] https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/eu-north-africa-migration-first-181145

[44] https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/09/the-eus-dead-on-arrival-pact-for-the-mediterranean?lang=en

[45] https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/whats-new/newsroom/14-08-2025-cohesion-policy-towards-a-more-sustainable-tourism-in-the-mediterranean_en

[46] https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/21361dc9-26dc-11ef-a195-01aa75ed71a1

[47] Ibid.

[48] https://ecdpm.org/application/files/6617/1982/5473/Financing-Inclusive-Digital-Transformation-EU-Global-Gateway-ECDPM-Discussion-Paper-370-2024.pdf

[49] Ibid.

[50] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/19e6c4a6-7d6a-4831-8a8c-f4bea98cf5a0_en

[51] https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/FP_20200720_china_mediterranean_ghafar_jacobs.pdf

[52] https://chinapower.csis.org/china-global-arms-trade/

[53] https://www.ekathimerini.com/economy/1197356/greece-to-cancel-alexandroupolis-port-tender-as-its-importance-increases/

[54] https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/who-controls-rimland-competition-and-rivalry-mediterranean-26983

[55] https://www.cfr.org/blog/will-us-plan-counter-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-work

[56] https://www.orfonline.org/research/integrating-the-eu-s-hinterland-through-imec

[57] https://ecfr.eu/special/eastern_med/gcc

Au sein du parti "Les Démocrates", la tension reste vive autour du retrait du parrainage du député Michel Sodjinou. Dans une lettre rendue publique ce 15 octobre, le premier vice-président du parti, Éric Houndété, admet les frustrations de son collègue et ami, tout en l'appelant à « transcender les divergences » pour l'intérêt du pays.

Depuis plusieurs jours, la principale formation politique de l'opposition traverse une crise interne qui menace la participation de son duo de candidats à la présidentielle de 2026.

Le retrait du parrainage du député Michel Sodjinou prive le ticket Renaud Agbodjo–Jude Bonaventure Lodjou du nombre de signatures nécessaires à la validation de sa candidature.

Dans une lettre adressée à Michel Sodjinou et datée du 15 octobre, Éric Houndété reconnaît ouvertement les raisons profondes du malaise. Le 1er vice-président du parti LD y évoque les « frustrations » et « humiliations inutiles » que son collègue aurait subies au sein même du parti, en raison notamment de leur proximité politique.
« Je sais quelles ont été tes frustrations pour toutes les contrariétés voire les humiliations inutiles nourries et entretenues par certains de nos camarades du parti à mon endroit. Je sais qu'à titre personnel, tu as souffert également des agissements de certains camarades de ta circonscription électorale et de la coordination nationale pour notre proximité », écrit Houndété.

Le vice-président reconnaît également que Michel Sodjinou avait exprimé, dès le 2 septembre, ses appréhensions quant à la procédure de désignation du candidat du parti. À cette date, les députés de la formation d'opposition avaient retiré leurs formulaires de parrainage à la CENA pour les remettre au président Boni Yayi.
« Tu avais pris la décision de ne pas remettre le tien, ou de ne le remettre que lorsque tu aurais été d'accord sur le candidat choisi. C'est moi qui t'avais supplié de le remettre et de faire confiance aux instances de notre parti », admet Éric Houndété.

Mais la désignation du duo Agbodjo–Lodjou, jugée par certains cadres comme « le résultat de manœuvres d'exclusion », a fini par convaincre Michel Sodjinou de reprendre son indépendance. Par exploit d'huissier, il a exigé du président du parti, Boni Yayi, la restitution de son formulaire de parrainage, une démarche validée ensuite par décision de justice.

Malgré cette fracture, Éric Houndété dit espérer encore un sursaut de cohésion au sein du parti. Dans un ton empreint d'humilité, il implore son ami et collègue de « remettre le parrainage au parti » au nom de l'unité et de l'intérêt national.

« C'est pour cela que je viens très humblement me mettre à tes genoux pour te supplier de remettre le parrainage au parti. Je sais que c'est difficile pour toi, mais l'histoire nous interpelle et le Bénin tout entier nous regarde », plaide-t-il.

La démarche du premier vice-président traduit une prise de conscience des tensions internes qui minent le parti de Boni Yayi à la veille d'une échéance cruciale. Le parti dispose encore de 48 heures pour compléter son dossier déposé mardi 14 octobre à la CENA.

Si Michel Sodjinou ne revient pas sur sa décision, le duo Agbodjo–Lodjou risque de ne pas franchir l'étape du parrainage, compromettant ainsi la participation du principal parti de l'opposition à la présidentielle de 2026.

Le député Michel Sodjinou, coordonnateur de la 19ᵉ circonscription électorale du parti ‘'Les Démocrates'' (LD), est sorti de son silence. Dans une déclaration rendue publique, il dénonce la dérive autoritaire qui, selon lui, mine désormais la formation politique dirigée par Boni Yayi. Pour l'élu, la désignation du duo présidentiel Me Renaud Agbodjo – Jude Bonaventure Lodjou pour la présidentielle de 2026 illustre une fois encore « l'étouffement de la démocratie interne » et « la confiscation du pouvoir par un cercle restreint ».

Michel Sodjinou affirme ne plus reconnaître le processus de désignation du duo présidentiel, qu'il qualifie de « mise en scène contraire aux principes fondateurs du parti ». « Je ne peux pas me rendre complice d'une mascarade qui trahit les valeurs de justice, de dialogue et de liberté d'expression pour lesquelles nous avons créé Les Démocrates », écrit-il.

Dans sa déclaration, le député fustige « un leadership d'un autre âge » et « des méthodes qui rappellent les dérives du passé », évoquant une gouvernance interne dominée par « les calculs régionaux et les décisions imposées d'en haut ». Il accuse la direction du parti d'avoir marginalisé plusieurs cadres, réduit les débats contradictoires et instauré un système où « la loyauté se mesure à l'obéissance aveugle ».

Sur la désignation du duo de candidats, Michel Sodjinou déplore « l'absence totale de concertation » et l'imposition d'un choix déjà arrêté avant même la fin des travaux de la commission interne. Il dénonce également la pratique ayant consisté à faire signer à blanc les formulaires de parrainage des députés.
Tout en réaffirmant son attachement au parti et à ses idéaux, le parlementaire appelle à « un sursaut moral » pour sauver ‘'Les Démocrates'' d'une crise existentielle. « Ce n'est pas un geste de rupture, mais un acte de fidélité à nos valeurs et à notre histoire commune », insiste-t-il, invitant ses camarades à reconstruire le parti sur les bases du dialogue, de la transparence et de la confiance.

Cette sortie intervient dans un contexte de fortes tensions internes, alors que le duo Agbodjo–Lodjou, désigné par la direction du parti, fait face à un déficit de parrainages requis pour valider sa candidature à la présidentielle de 2026.

Le parti ‘'Les Démocrates'' a désigné, le mardi 14 octobre 2025, Me Renaud Agbodjo et Jude Bonaventure Lodjou comme duo candidats à la présidentielle de 2026. Cette décision, prise à l'issue d'une session extraordinaire tendue, a ravivé les divisions internes. La veille, le député Michel Sodjinou avait saisi la justice pour récupérer son formulaire de parrainage que la direction du parti avait remis au président Boni Yayi. Le tribunal lui a donné raison, bouleversant les plans du parti.

Privé de ce parrainage, le duo Agbodjo–Lodjou ne dispose plus du nombre requis de signatures pour déposer sa candidature à la CENA. Le parti dispose encore de 48 heures pour compléter son dossier auprès de la CENA, faute de quoi il sera exclu de la course à l'élection présidentielle de 2026.

A.A.A