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A hospital in Kabul. Afghanistan faces an already dire shortage of female doctors as women medical graduates remain barred from taking the final exam required to practice medicine. Credti: Learning Together.

By External Source
KABUL, Jun 1 2026 (IPS)

While Afghanistan faces a serious shortage of female doctors, the country’s Islamist regime has placed restrictions on female students from graduating, further exacerbating the situation. Female medical graduates are barred from writing their final exams, which provide them with the professional qualification to practice as medical doctors.

Nilab (name changed) from Afghanistan, graduated as a doctor three years ago from Al-Birun University in Parwan province. She has not been able to practice her profession because the Taliban have banned women from taking the final medical exam.

The final exam is an assessment that aims to measure the competence of medical graduates. It is conducted after seven years of study. Once the exam is passed, the graduate is granted a license to practice medicine. Those who have received the license can also apply for specialization training at teaching hospitals.

“If a doctor does not pass the required final exam, the situation is the same as if they were a student who had just finished high school. When applying for a job at any health center, the first question is: ‘Have you taken the final exam?’ Without it, you cannot work in any hospital, not even as a nurse,” says Nilab.

The final exam was last held for women in 2021. Since then, only men have been allowed to take the exam. The situation is exacerbating Afghanistan’s already dire shortage of female doctors

“I studied for 19 years. Of that time, I lived in a dormitory in another province for seven years, far from my family. It was a difficult time. In the final stage, only one exam, the final exam, has stopped all my progress. Now my future has been taken away from me.”

The final exam was last held for women in 2021. Since then, only men have been allowed to take the exam. The situation is exacerbating Afghanistan’s already dire shortage of female doctors.

Nilab lives with her mother in Kabul, and her family has seven siblings: four girls and three boys.

Two of her sisters and two brothers have also graduated from university, but their futures are uncertain.

Her younger sister scored one of the highest in the national university entrance exam and was accepted to study medicine, but she was unable to complete her studies. Another of Nilab’s brothers graduated in Russian literature but is unemployed.

The family’s only income comes from her mother and one of her siblings, a doctor named Khalida (name changed), who both work as teachers for primary school girls in a public school. With their meager salaries, they shoulder the financial burden of the entire family.

Nilab has tried to earn a living through other means. Until recently, women were allowed to study in non-university health schools.

“Despite all the challenges, I worked as a teacher in a two-year medical school. However, in January 2025, I also lost that opportunity when the Taliban closed medical schools,” Nilab says.

The years of education wasted have caused her a heavy psychological burden, stress and anxiety.

“We have seen how many young women have taken their lives in recent years. Young women’s trust in government, justice and human rights has plummeted to zero. When women’s voices are silenced and they remain imprisoned within us, it becomes unbearable pain. The pain wears us down, it becomes an unhealing wound,” she describes.

The Taliban’s decision has affected all female final-year medical students who completed their studies in 2022 and beyond. There is now a shortage of women in internal medicine, dentistry, surgery, cardiology, and even obstetrics and gynecology.

Khalida graduated from a private medical university in Kabul in 2022.

A street in Kabul, where restrictions on women’s education and employment are deepening Afghanistan’s health crisis. Credit: Learning Together.

“Our lives have been completely destroyed by not being able to take the final exam. The future we once dreamed of is gone. We worked hard for this future, which included 12 years of school, a year of preparing for the university entrance exam, and seven years at the university, but all that work has now been lost.”

After graduating, Khalida worked for a while in a few private hospitals without pay to gain experience in the field. At the same time, she specialized in ultrasound examinations. However, the final exam or the exam required for specialization was not organized, and she was eventually forced to stay home.

Sometimes, female doctors are forced to do jobs that are not in line with their training and are very poorly paid.

“I also worked for a while in a hospital distributing nutritional supplements to malnourished patients. However, this is a job that even a high school graduate can do. We are doctors who studied medicine for seven years, and we should serve women in the fields related to our profession.”

Khalida is currently studying English outside of university, hoping to pass the national English proficiency test so that she can get a scholarship and continue her studies abroad. She says that 19 years of studying in Afghanistan have not allowed her to alleviate the suffering of others or herself. She still depends on her family’s financial support. Without it, she fears that she will be forced to stay inside the four walls of her home.

As a result of the Taliban’s numerous restrictions on women, many have lost interest in their own lives. Some have lost faith in marriage, while others have been forced into marriage.

“I am single and have no desire to get married in Afghanistan under the current circumstances. I do not want to allow society to have a new generation that is even more unhappy than my own,” says Khalida.

UN experts have warned that restrictions on women’s education and employment in Afghanistan are deepening the country’s health crisis, particularly by reducing the number of female doctors and other female health professionals who could treat women.

“We female doctors are unable to serve the women of our society despite our years of education. Instead, we have become a burden on our families. There is nothing more difficult for an educated woman than this. We suffer simply because we are women living under Taliban rule,” says Khalida.

Excerpt:

The author is an Afghanistan-based female journalist, trained with Finnish support before the Taliban take-over. Her identity is withheld for security reasons

Egypt's Farida Khalil beat competitors twice her age to become world champion in modern pentathlon at the age of 14 after the sport was revamped.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Áine Feeney.

Parliament has been engaging in preparatory work on the 28th regime, debating and adopting a legislative-initiative report from the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) during the January 2026 plenary session. The JURI report recommended allowing national limited liability companies to register as ‘Societas Europaea Unificata (S.EU) to allow automatic recognition in all Member States. However, the report also recommended implementing safeguards to ensure that the regime does not undermine labour and social laws.

The Commission’s March 2026 proposal for a regulation establishing the 28th regime corporate legal framework would allow for quick, digital registration that is automatically valid across the EU. It would also provide for a single tax treatment of employee remuneration and a framework for winding up companies. While Parliament’s resolution supports the approach, it remains cautious about the proposal’s chances of success.

Overall, the objectives of the 28th regime as defined by the Commission and the Parliament are well aligned, as both institutions believe the regime should support the EU’s competitiveness, harmonise the single market and modernise the business environment. However, there are some key differences; EPRS conducted a comparative assessment of the Commission’s proposal for a 28th regime corporate legal framework and Parliament’s legislative-initiative resolution, identifying limitations in six areas of the Commission’s proposal, which include:

• Harmonised legal form;
• Registration and exit;
• Closure of companies;
• Attracting talent;
• Governance and safeguards;
• Dispute resolution.

The EPRS assessment found that the Commission proposal could have an impact on the generation of European added value, with particular reference to three of the identified shortcomings. Firstly, the scope of eligible companies is broad, without ensuring a clear and consistent definition. Secondly, the proposed ‘dual-track’ system could vary across Member States, reducing legal certainty for investors and restricting possibilities for cross-border scale-up of innovative companies. Finally, there is a lack of measures to establish a specialised dispute resolution mechanism.

Ultimately, the Commission proposal focuses on company law and operations while Parliament takes a broader view, considering the need to support the entire ecosystem around innovative companies, including labour law, investment, and cross-border scale up.

The 28th regime is a key measure in the European Commission’s 2025 competitiveness compass; an economic framework which aims to close the innovation gap, decarbonise the economy and reduce foreign dependencies. The need for such a comprehensive legal framework was highlighted by the 2024 Letta and Draghi reports. Its objective is to create a uniform set of rules for companies applicable across the EU, simplifying the legal framework to facilitate the competitiveness of businesses and start-ups operating in the single market.

The Commission envisages that it should be possible to establish a company under the 28th regime within 48 hours, which EPRS predicts could lead to an increase in venture capital invested in European companies of about €445 billion, thus supporting the potential of European start-ups to grow and scale-up in Europe.

Links to EPRS publications:

• The 28th regime
• A competitiveness compass for the EU
• Scaling up European Innovation
• The 28th regime: A new legal framework for innovative companies
• Deepening the single market in the light of the Letta and Draghi reports
• The 28th regime corporate legal framework
• Comparing EU institutions’ positions on a new legal framework for innovative companies

ÄNDERUNGSANTRÄGE 1 - 309 - Entwurf eines Berichts Einrichtung des Programms für agile, schnelle Innovation im Verteidigungsbereich (AGILE)
Ausschuss für Industrie, Forschung und Energie
Ausschuss für Sicherheit und Verteidigung
Tonino Picula, Ivars Ijabs

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Le cinéaste Meji Alabi réalise un documentaire historique de BBC Africa Eye consacré à la guerre civile au Nigeria.

L'installation d'une immense banderole du SNS sur la façade du palais Albanija, à Belgrade, a privé pendant plus de 48 heures une colonie de martinets pâles de l'accès à leurs nids. D'abord ignorée par les autorités, l'affaire a suscité une mobilisation citoyenne et s'est transformée en controverse politique nationale.

- Le fil de l'Info / Courrier des Balkans, Serbie, Environnement, Politique, animaux, Vucic

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Bonn, 1. Juni 2026. Das Inkrafttreten des UN-Hochseeschutzabkommens im Januar stärkt die multilaterale Zusammenarbeit im Bereich der Ozeane. Gleichzeitig gefährden geopolitische Entwicklungen die Ziele der UN-Ozeandekade.

Am UN-Welttag der Ozeane steht der Ozean im Zentrum eines Paradoxons. Das Inkrafttreten des Hochseeabkommens (oder BBNJ-Abkommen) am 17. Januar markierte nach zwei Jahrzehnten der Verhandlungen einen seltenen Erfolg multilateraler Zusammenarbeit: Es verleiht dem Schutz der biologischen Vielfalt und dem gerechten Vorteilsausgleich jenseits nationaler Hoheitsgewalt neues politisches Gewicht. Zugleich dominieren weiterhin archaische Narrative zur Rohstoffgewinnung, militärischen Sicherheit und territorialen Kontrolle die Betrachtung der Ozeane.

Auf den ersten Blick haben Kalaallit Nunaat/Grönland und die Straße von Hormus wenig gemeinsam. Das eine wird als arktische „Grenze“ mit schmelzendem Eis, mineralischen Ressourcen, indigener Souveränität und Großmachtrivalität imaginiert. Das andere gilt als maritimes „Nadelöhr“ – als schmaler Korridor, in dem Energievorräte, Ernährungssicherheit, Schifffahrt und militärische Bedrohungen aufeinandertreffen. Beide Betrachtungen reduzieren diese Räume auf die Kontrolle kritischer Ressourcen und strategische Zugänge.

Dies als geopolitisches Phänomen zu betrachten, greift zu kurz: Der Meeresraum wird als Infrastruktur und politisches Druckmittel neu geordnet. In Kalaallit Nunaat überlagert der Diskurs über die ökonomischen Chancen der Arktis die Auseinandersetzung mit den Selbstbestimmungsrechten der indigenen Bevölkerung und globalen Umweltbelangen. In Hormus verschärft die Blockade der Meerenge die prekären Arbeitsbedingungen von Seeleuten und hat globale Folgen, die Haushalte in der Golfregion und weit darüber hinaus treffen. Während die multilaterale Zusammenarbeit im Bereich der Ozeane an Fahrt gewinnt, kehrt die Meerespolitik zu vertrauten Mustern zurück: Militarisierung, Kontrolle von Seewegen und Ressourcengier werden gerechtfertigt mit Sorgen über strategische Bedrohungen.

Globale Meerespolitik zwischen Korridorlogik und planetarischem Denken

In der Meerespolitik galt die Hohe See lange als offener Raum, geprägt vom Spannungsverhältnis zwischen freier Bewegung und Begrenzung. Doch diese Freiheit war nie universell. Uneingeschränkte Bewegungsfreiheit hat es nie gegeben. Über Jahrtausende prägten ausgehandelte Zugangsrechte und Besteuerung maritime Ordnungen, aus denen eine „Korridorlogik“ entstand, in der Mobilität auf asymmetrischen Beziehungen beruht. In der Arktis befördert das schmelzende Eis einen „Ressourcenoptimismus“ und geostrategische Überlegungen, die die Einbettung der Region in globale gesellschaftliche und ökologische Transformationen und deren Auswirkungen auf die rund vier Millionen dort lebenden Menschen kaum berücksichtigen.

Das UN-Seerechtsübereinkommen (UNCLOS), das den rechtlichen Rahmen für alle maritimen und meeresbezogenen Aktivitäten bildet, galt als für die 1990er Jahre ungewöhnlich weitreichende Form planetarischen Denkens. Allerdings verfestigte es auch Trennungen, die zunehmend infrage gestellt werden: zwischen Oberfläche und Tiefe, Wassersäule und Meeresboden, Schifffahrtswegen und Fischgründen, Unterseekabelrouten und Militärzonen. Die verfassungspolitische Debatte in Chile um das „Maritorio“ versteht das Meer hingegen als lebendiges Territorium. Indigene, die die Arktis als ihre Heimat bezeichnen und die erneute Aufmerksamkeit für afro-asiatische maritime Verflechtungen erinnern daran, dass Meerespolitik nie allein in den Händen konventioneller Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsakteure lag. Über wissenschaftspolitische Plattformen wie die UN-Ozeandekade hinaus wird die neue regionale Meerespolitik so zunehmend von Fragen zu Erbe, Erinnerung und den asymmetrischen Abhängigkeiten geprägt, die scheinbar getrennte maritime Räume miteinander verbinden. Dadurch werden auch die Gründe hinterfragt, warum das Meer für Kapital, Energie, Rohstoffe, Daten und militärische Mobilität offen bleibt, Schifffahrtswege und Energiekorridore aber gesichert und Migrationsrouten kriminalisiert werden.

Zusammenarbeit im Bereich der Ozeane muss daher auch die Kosten der Aufrechterhaltung bestehender Systeme in den Blick nehmen. Sie erfordert eine Auseinandersetzung mit dem marinen Transit- und Zugangsregime – nicht nur als Bewegung über das Meer, sondern auch im Hinblick auf Arbeit, ökologische Überlebensbedingungen und die Lebenswelten, die den Ozean zu mehr als einer bloßen Route machen.

Wohin steuert die globale Meerespolitik?

Die globale Meerespolitik erfordert eine kritischere Auseinandersetzung mit den Verbindungen von Land- und Meeresräumen und geopolitischem Denken in Korridoren und Grenzräumen, sowie die Stärkung planetarischer Perspektiven. Die Diskussion über den möglichen Standort des BBNJ-Sekretariats in China zeigt, dass das BBNJ zudem eine hervorragende Gelegenheit bietet, um die globale Zusammenarbeit zu erneuern. Neben höheren Investitionen in kritisches Meereswissen, wie es die UN-Ozeandekade vorsieht, braucht es eine mutige politische Führung, die anerkennt, dass Meeresräume und maritime Dynamiken für Energiesicherheit, Ernährungssysteme, Klimaschutz und Lebensgrundlagen entscheidend sind. Der damit verbundene Reflexionsprozess ist eine Möglichkeit, die globale Zusammenarbeit im Bereich der Ozeane neu zu denken und politische Strukturen zur Bewältigung kollektiver Herausforderungen neu zu gestalten, in denen die Wechselbeziehungen zwischen Menschen, Meereslebewesen, Infrastrukturen, Märkten und unseren Lebensräumen anerkannt werden.

Bonn, 1. Juni 2026. Das Inkrafttreten des UN-Hochseeschutzabkommens im Januar stärkt die multilaterale Zusammenarbeit im Bereich der Ozeane. Gleichzeitig gefährden geopolitische Entwicklungen die Ziele der UN-Ozeandekade.

Am UN-Welttag der Ozeane steht der Ozean im Zentrum eines Paradoxons. Das Inkrafttreten des Hochseeabkommens (oder BBNJ-Abkommen) am 17. Januar markierte nach zwei Jahrzehnten der Verhandlungen einen seltenen Erfolg multilateraler Zusammenarbeit: Es verleiht dem Schutz der biologischen Vielfalt und dem gerechten Vorteilsausgleich jenseits nationaler Hoheitsgewalt neues politisches Gewicht. Zugleich dominieren weiterhin archaische Narrative zur Rohstoffgewinnung, militärischen Sicherheit und territorialen Kontrolle die Betrachtung der Ozeane.

Auf den ersten Blick haben Kalaallit Nunaat/Grönland und die Straße von Hormus wenig gemeinsam. Das eine wird als arktische „Grenze“ mit schmelzendem Eis, mineralischen Ressourcen, indigener Souveränität und Großmachtrivalität imaginiert. Das andere gilt als maritimes „Nadelöhr“ – als schmaler Korridor, in dem Energievorräte, Ernährungssicherheit, Schifffahrt und militärische Bedrohungen aufeinandertreffen. Beide Betrachtungen reduzieren diese Räume auf die Kontrolle kritischer Ressourcen und strategische Zugänge.

Dies als geopolitisches Phänomen zu betrachten, greift zu kurz: Der Meeresraum wird als Infrastruktur und politisches Druckmittel neu geordnet. In Kalaallit Nunaat überlagert der Diskurs über die ökonomischen Chancen der Arktis die Auseinandersetzung mit den Selbstbestimmungsrechten der indigenen Bevölkerung und globalen Umweltbelangen. In Hormus verschärft die Blockade der Meerenge die prekären Arbeitsbedingungen von Seeleuten und hat globale Folgen, die Haushalte in der Golfregion und weit darüber hinaus treffen. Während die multilaterale Zusammenarbeit im Bereich der Ozeane an Fahrt gewinnt, kehrt die Meerespolitik zu vertrauten Mustern zurück: Militarisierung, Kontrolle von Seewegen und Ressourcengier werden gerechtfertigt mit Sorgen über strategische Bedrohungen.

Globale Meerespolitik zwischen Korridorlogik und planetarischem Denken

In der Meerespolitik galt die Hohe See lange als offener Raum, geprägt vom Spannungsverhältnis zwischen freier Bewegung und Begrenzung. Doch diese Freiheit war nie universell. Uneingeschränkte Bewegungsfreiheit hat es nie gegeben. Über Jahrtausende prägten ausgehandelte Zugangsrechte und Besteuerung maritime Ordnungen, aus denen eine „Korridorlogik“ entstand, in der Mobilität auf asymmetrischen Beziehungen beruht. In der Arktis befördert das schmelzende Eis einen „Ressourcenoptimismus“ und geostrategische Überlegungen, die die Einbettung der Region in globale gesellschaftliche und ökologische Transformationen und deren Auswirkungen auf die rund vier Millionen dort lebenden Menschen kaum berücksichtigen.

Das UN-Seerechtsübereinkommen (UNCLOS), das den rechtlichen Rahmen für alle maritimen und meeresbezogenen Aktivitäten bildet, galt als für die 1990er Jahre ungewöhnlich weitreichende Form planetarischen Denkens. Allerdings verfestigte es auch Trennungen, die zunehmend infrage gestellt werden: zwischen Oberfläche und Tiefe, Wassersäule und Meeresboden, Schifffahrtswegen und Fischgründen, Unterseekabelrouten und Militärzonen. Die verfassungspolitische Debatte in Chile um das „Maritorio“ versteht das Meer hingegen als lebendiges Territorium. Indigene, die die Arktis als ihre Heimat bezeichnen und die erneute Aufmerksamkeit für afro-asiatische maritime Verflechtungen erinnern daran, dass Meerespolitik nie allein in den Händen konventioneller Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsakteure lag. Über wissenschaftspolitische Plattformen wie die UN-Ozeandekade hinaus wird die neue regionale Meerespolitik so zunehmend von Fragen zu Erbe, Erinnerung und den asymmetrischen Abhängigkeiten geprägt, die scheinbar getrennte maritime Räume miteinander verbinden. Dadurch werden auch die Gründe hinterfragt, warum das Meer für Kapital, Energie, Rohstoffe, Daten und militärische Mobilität offen bleibt, Schifffahrtswege und Energiekorridore aber gesichert und Migrationsrouten kriminalisiert werden.

Zusammenarbeit im Bereich der Ozeane muss daher auch die Kosten der Aufrechterhaltung bestehender Systeme in den Blick nehmen. Sie erfordert eine Auseinandersetzung mit dem marinen Transit- und Zugangsregime – nicht nur als Bewegung über das Meer, sondern auch im Hinblick auf Arbeit, ökologische Überlebensbedingungen und die Lebenswelten, die den Ozean zu mehr als einer bloßen Route machen.

Wohin steuert die globale Meerespolitik?

Die globale Meerespolitik erfordert eine kritischere Auseinandersetzung mit den Verbindungen von Land- und Meeresräumen und geopolitischem Denken in Korridoren und Grenzräumen, sowie die Stärkung planetarischer Perspektiven. Die Diskussion über den möglichen Standort des BBNJ-Sekretariats in China zeigt, dass das BBNJ zudem eine hervorragende Gelegenheit bietet, um die globale Zusammenarbeit zu erneuern. Neben höheren Investitionen in kritisches Meereswissen, wie es die UN-Ozeandekade vorsieht, braucht es eine mutige politische Führung, die anerkennt, dass Meeresräume und maritime Dynamiken für Energiesicherheit, Ernährungssysteme, Klimaschutz und Lebensgrundlagen entscheidend sind. Der damit verbundene Reflexionsprozess ist eine Möglichkeit, die globale Zusammenarbeit im Bereich der Ozeane neu zu denken und politische Strukturen zur Bewältigung kollektiver Herausforderungen neu zu gestalten, in denen die Wechselbeziehungen zwischen Menschen, Meereslebewesen, Infrastrukturen, Märkten und unseren Lebensräumen anerkannt werden.

Bonn, 1. Juni 2026. Das Inkrafttreten des UN-Hochseeschutzabkommens im Januar stärkt die multilaterale Zusammenarbeit im Bereich der Ozeane. Gleichzeitig gefährden geopolitische Entwicklungen die Ziele der UN-Ozeandekade.

Am UN-Welttag der Ozeane steht der Ozean im Zentrum eines Paradoxons. Das Inkrafttreten des Hochseeabkommens (oder BBNJ-Abkommen) am 17. Januar markierte nach zwei Jahrzehnten der Verhandlungen einen seltenen Erfolg multilateraler Zusammenarbeit: Es verleiht dem Schutz der biologischen Vielfalt und dem gerechten Vorteilsausgleich jenseits nationaler Hoheitsgewalt neues politisches Gewicht. Zugleich dominieren weiterhin archaische Narrative zur Rohstoffgewinnung, militärischen Sicherheit und territorialen Kontrolle die Betrachtung der Ozeane.

Auf den ersten Blick haben Kalaallit Nunaat/Grönland und die Straße von Hormus wenig gemeinsam. Das eine wird als arktische „Grenze“ mit schmelzendem Eis, mineralischen Ressourcen, indigener Souveränität und Großmachtrivalität imaginiert. Das andere gilt als maritimes „Nadelöhr“ – als schmaler Korridor, in dem Energievorräte, Ernährungssicherheit, Schifffahrt und militärische Bedrohungen aufeinandertreffen. Beide Betrachtungen reduzieren diese Räume auf die Kontrolle kritischer Ressourcen und strategische Zugänge.

Dies als geopolitisches Phänomen zu betrachten, greift zu kurz: Der Meeresraum wird als Infrastruktur und politisches Druckmittel neu geordnet. In Kalaallit Nunaat überlagert der Diskurs über die ökonomischen Chancen der Arktis die Auseinandersetzung mit den Selbstbestimmungsrechten der indigenen Bevölkerung und globalen Umweltbelangen. In Hormus verschärft die Blockade der Meerenge die prekären Arbeitsbedingungen von Seeleuten und hat globale Folgen, die Haushalte in der Golfregion und weit darüber hinaus treffen. Während die multilaterale Zusammenarbeit im Bereich der Ozeane an Fahrt gewinnt, kehrt die Meerespolitik zu vertrauten Mustern zurück: Militarisierung, Kontrolle von Seewegen und Ressourcengier werden gerechtfertigt mit Sorgen über strategische Bedrohungen.

Globale Meerespolitik zwischen Korridorlogik und planetarischem Denken

In der Meerespolitik galt die Hohe See lange als offener Raum, geprägt vom Spannungsverhältnis zwischen freier Bewegung und Begrenzung. Doch diese Freiheit war nie universell. Uneingeschränkte Bewegungsfreiheit hat es nie gegeben. Über Jahrtausende prägten ausgehandelte Zugangsrechte und Besteuerung maritime Ordnungen, aus denen eine „Korridorlogik“ entstand, in der Mobilität auf asymmetrischen Beziehungen beruht. In der Arktis befördert das schmelzende Eis einen „Ressourcenoptimismus“ und geostrategische Überlegungen, die die Einbettung der Region in globale gesellschaftliche und ökologische Transformationen und deren Auswirkungen auf die rund vier Millionen dort lebenden Menschen kaum berücksichtigen.

Das UN-Seerechtsübereinkommen (UNCLOS), das den rechtlichen Rahmen für alle maritimen und meeresbezogenen Aktivitäten bildet, galt als für die 1990er Jahre ungewöhnlich weitreichende Form planetarischen Denkens. Allerdings verfestigte es auch Trennungen, die zunehmend infrage gestellt werden: zwischen Oberfläche und Tiefe, Wassersäule und Meeresboden, Schifffahrtswegen und Fischgründen, Unterseekabelrouten und Militärzonen. Die verfassungspolitische Debatte in Chile um das „Maritorio“ versteht das Meer hingegen als lebendiges Territorium. Indigene, die die Arktis als ihre Heimat bezeichnen und die erneute Aufmerksamkeit für afro-asiatische maritime Verflechtungen erinnern daran, dass Meerespolitik nie allein in den Händen konventioneller Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsakteure lag. Über wissenschaftspolitische Plattformen wie die UN-Ozeandekade hinaus wird die neue regionale Meerespolitik so zunehmend von Fragen zu Erbe, Erinnerung und den asymmetrischen Abhängigkeiten geprägt, die scheinbar getrennte maritime Räume miteinander verbinden. Dadurch werden auch die Gründe hinterfragt, warum das Meer für Kapital, Energie, Rohstoffe, Daten und militärische Mobilität offen bleibt, Schifffahrtswege und Energiekorridore aber gesichert und Migrationsrouten kriminalisiert werden.

Zusammenarbeit im Bereich der Ozeane muss daher auch die Kosten der Aufrechterhaltung bestehender Systeme in den Blick nehmen. Sie erfordert eine Auseinandersetzung mit dem marinen Transit- und Zugangsregime – nicht nur als Bewegung über das Meer, sondern auch im Hinblick auf Arbeit, ökologische Überlebensbedingungen und die Lebenswelten, die den Ozean zu mehr als einer bloßen Route machen.

Wohin steuert die globale Meerespolitik?

Die globale Meerespolitik erfordert eine kritischere Auseinandersetzung mit den Verbindungen von Land- und Meeresräumen und geopolitischem Denken in Korridoren und Grenzräumen, sowie die Stärkung planetarischer Perspektiven. Die Diskussion über den möglichen Standort des BBNJ-Sekretariats in China zeigt, dass das BBNJ zudem eine hervorragende Gelegenheit bietet, um die globale Zusammenarbeit zu erneuern. Neben höheren Investitionen in kritisches Meereswissen, wie es die UN-Ozeandekade vorsieht, braucht es eine mutige politische Führung, die anerkennt, dass Meeresräume und maritime Dynamiken für Energiesicherheit, Ernährungssysteme, Klimaschutz und Lebensgrundlagen entscheidend sind. Der damit verbundene Reflexionsprozess ist eine Möglichkeit, die globale Zusammenarbeit im Bereich der Ozeane neu zu denken und politische Strukturen zur Bewältigung kollektiver Herausforderungen neu zu gestalten, in denen die Wechselbeziehungen zwischen Menschen, Meereslebewesen, Infrastrukturen, Märkten und unseren Lebensräumen anerkannt werden.

This chapter describes science-policy interfaces (SPIs) as an opportunity to support sustainable development by bridging the knowledge-action gap and fostering evidence-based policies. The biggest challenges of sustainable development presented and discussed in previous chapters, including climate change, biodiversity loss, environmental injustice, and pandemics, are growing increasingly complex and uncertain. It has long been argued that for public interventions, such as policies, to more effectively address such problems and enhance sustainable development, structured evidence-based advice is needed.
Based on examples and theoretical knowledge from the literature, the chapter demonstrates how SPIs have the potential to fill knowledge gaps and foster concerted action on complex sustainability problems, specifically related to the environmental dimensions of sustainable development. Examples of prominent SPIs at the global scale are the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), which we explore in depth later in the chapter.
The chapter also presents the scholarly discourse on the effectiveness of SPIs in brief, emphasising the importance of being aware of the benefits and limitations of SPIs and different models of formalised knowledge co-production. While many scholars advocate for a co-production model over a linear model, the literature agrees that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution for facilitating interactions and coordination between knowledge holders, policymakers, and other stakeholders to effectively enhance sustainable development and synergies between interventions. When talking about sustainable development, social-political contexts need to be considered because sustainability issues are inherently interlinked and political, as reiterated in previous chapters. This chapter emphasises that effective science-policy engagement requires a two-way, iterative knowledge exchange. This approach is essential for operationalising a co-production model that incorporates diverse perspectives and knowledge systems—an indispensable factor in addressing the complex, interlinked challenges of sustainable development. Building on the previous chapter’s exploration of the growing significance of science-policy interactions in sustainable development, we want to offer a behind-the-scenes perspective on the dynamics of major intergovernmental organisations shaping the science-policy interface.

This chapter describes science-policy interfaces (SPIs) as an opportunity to support sustainable development by bridging the knowledge-action gap and fostering evidence-based policies. The biggest challenges of sustainable development presented and discussed in previous chapters, including climate change, biodiversity loss, environmental injustice, and pandemics, are growing increasingly complex and uncertain. It has long been argued that for public interventions, such as policies, to more effectively address such problems and enhance sustainable development, structured evidence-based advice is needed.
Based on examples and theoretical knowledge from the literature, the chapter demonstrates how SPIs have the potential to fill knowledge gaps and foster concerted action on complex sustainability problems, specifically related to the environmental dimensions of sustainable development. Examples of prominent SPIs at the global scale are the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), which we explore in depth later in the chapter.
The chapter also presents the scholarly discourse on the effectiveness of SPIs in brief, emphasising the importance of being aware of the benefits and limitations of SPIs and different models of formalised knowledge co-production. While many scholars advocate for a co-production model over a linear model, the literature agrees that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution for facilitating interactions and coordination between knowledge holders, policymakers, and other stakeholders to effectively enhance sustainable development and synergies between interventions. When talking about sustainable development, social-political contexts need to be considered because sustainability issues are inherently interlinked and political, as reiterated in previous chapters. This chapter emphasises that effective science-policy engagement requires a two-way, iterative knowledge exchange. This approach is essential for operationalising a co-production model that incorporates diverse perspectives and knowledge systems—an indispensable factor in addressing the complex, interlinked challenges of sustainable development. Building on the previous chapter’s exploration of the growing significance of science-policy interactions in sustainable development, we want to offer a behind-the-scenes perspective on the dynamics of major intergovernmental organisations shaping the science-policy interface.

This chapter describes science-policy interfaces (SPIs) as an opportunity to support sustainable development by bridging the knowledge-action gap and fostering evidence-based policies. The biggest challenges of sustainable development presented and discussed in previous chapters, including climate change, biodiversity loss, environmental injustice, and pandemics, are growing increasingly complex and uncertain. It has long been argued that for public interventions, such as policies, to more effectively address such problems and enhance sustainable development, structured evidence-based advice is needed.
Based on examples and theoretical knowledge from the literature, the chapter demonstrates how SPIs have the potential to fill knowledge gaps and foster concerted action on complex sustainability problems, specifically related to the environmental dimensions of sustainable development. Examples of prominent SPIs at the global scale are the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), which we explore in depth later in the chapter.
The chapter also presents the scholarly discourse on the effectiveness of SPIs in brief, emphasising the importance of being aware of the benefits and limitations of SPIs and different models of formalised knowledge co-production. While many scholars advocate for a co-production model over a linear model, the literature agrees that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution for facilitating interactions and coordination between knowledge holders, policymakers, and other stakeholders to effectively enhance sustainable development and synergies between interventions. When talking about sustainable development, social-political contexts need to be considered because sustainability issues are inherently interlinked and political, as reiterated in previous chapters. This chapter emphasises that effective science-policy engagement requires a two-way, iterative knowledge exchange. This approach is essential for operationalising a co-production model that incorporates diverse perspectives and knowledge systems—an indispensable factor in addressing the complex, interlinked challenges of sustainable development. Building on the previous chapter’s exploration of the growing significance of science-policy interactions in sustainable development, we want to offer a behind-the-scenes perspective on the dynamics of major intergovernmental organisations shaping the science-policy interface.

From 25 to 27 May, a delegation of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) of six MEPs led by the Committee Chair David McAllister (EPP, Germany) visited Cape Town, Pretoria, and Johannesburg, South Africa.
The delegation met South African political leaders and partners to discuss deepening EU-South Africa cooperation. Key topics included international relations in a changing geopolitical landscape, security, political ties, and the Global Gateway, the EU's strategy for global infrastructure investment.
Press release
Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Populisten unterscheiden sich von Demokraten vor allem in der Art, wie sie Angst instrumentalisieren. Sie glauben: Wer Angst macht, hat Macht. Und leider stimmt das. , Wer verstehen will, warum demokratische Gesellschaften heute so fragil geworden sind, muss nicht auf Migration, Globalisierung oder technologische Umbrüche schauen. Er muss auf die politische Instrumentalisierung von Angst blicken. Und die hat einen ökonomischen Kern. Neu ist, wie gezielt Angst ...

Noemi Hernandez Rodriguez Borjas at the first of the 71st GEF Council Meeting. Credit: IISD/ENB/Danny Skilton

By Kizito Makoye
SAMARKAND, Uzbekistan, Jun 1 2026 (IPS)

While the Global Environment Facility (GEF) said its eighth replenishment cycle (GEF-8) was about to exceed environmental targets for biodiversity protection, marine conservation, ecosystem restoration, and reducing greenhouse gas emissions, governments and civil society groups called for stronger safeguards to ensure that local communities, Indigenous Peoples, and smaller implementing agencies are not left behind as funding mechanisms become more complex.

The 71st GEF Council Meeting is taking place at the Congress Center in the ancient city of Samarkand, Uzbekistan.

Amid the optimism, delegates cautioned that billions of dollars flowing into efforts to restore forests, protect oceans and combat climate change must also deliver accountability and earn the trust of the communities whose livelihoods are affected.

The delegates endorsed the final work programme under GEF-8, which is expected to bring overall programming to 97 percent of available resources before the four-year cycle ends.

Officials described the programme as politically significant, marking it as the final package of projects before negotiations on the ninth replenishment cycle (GEF-9), which will guide billions of dollars in environmental financing over the coming years.

“We see good progress, and we know that programming is anticipated to be 97 percent by the end of the GEF-8 cycle,” Dr Dawda Badgie, a council member from The Gambia, said, noting that several environmental indicators had surpassed their targets.

Fred Boltz, the GEF’s Head of Programming, said resources across most funding windows would be fully committed by the end of the current four-year cycle.

“In all focal areas, integrated programmes, blended finance, the small grants programme and efforts by indigenous peoples and local communities will yield extraordinary results from GEF-8 investment, achieving or greatly surpassing six of ten GEF-8 outcome targets,” Boltz told delegates.

According to GEF officials, investments under GEF-8 are expected to place well over hundreds of millions of hectares of land and sea under improved biodiversity management, restore more than 10 million hectares of ecosystems, improve management of 59 transboundary water systems and benefit more than 32 million people worldwide.

Boltz said climate investments alone are expected to deliver more than 2.2 billion metric tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions reductions, while marine conservation efforts will contribute to the creation or improved management of more than 1.9 billion hectares of marine protected areas – equivalent to more than five percent of the world’s oceans.

He said targets related to marine protected areas, ecosystem restoration, emissions reductions, shared water ecosystems and sustainable fisheries management are expected to be significantly exceeded by the end of the cycle.

Among the highlighted initiatives was a conservation financing mechanism in Madagascar that combines blended finance resources with climate adaptation funding to support an outcome-payment bond for biodiversity conservation, including the protection of the island’s iconic lemurs.

Boltz said land degradation funding would also be fully utilised, helping restore more than 10 million hectares of land and ecosystems worldwide.

Key projects include support for the Great Green Wall initiative across the Sahel and a water-land management programme in Central Asia covering two river basins that support about 80 percent of the population in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

The chemicals and waste portfolio, expected to reach 95 percent utilisation, is projected to eliminate more than 260,000 metric tonnes of hazardous chemicals and waste through programmes reducing pollution and promoting cleaner industrial production.

One initiative seeks to eliminate mercury use in the non-ferrous metals sector, including copper and aluminium production, industries experiencing growth due to increasing demand from electric vehicles and renewable energy technologies.

The international waters portfolio is expected to be 99 percent committed by the end of GEF-8.

The fund is supporting implementation of the Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) agreement in more than 60 countries and has helped improve management of 59 shared water systems globally.

Blended finance resources under GEF-8 are expected to be fully deployed, supporting initiatives such as debt-for-nature swaps in Latin America and the Caribbean and renewable energy investments in small island states.

“The Latin America and Caribbean Debt for Nature Conversion Facility helps countries address debt burdens and support biodiversity conservation at the same time,” he said.

The GEF’s Small Grants Programme, which supports conservation efforts at the community level, is also expected to fully use its allocation.

Boltz said local civil society organisations would help place nearly seven million hectares of landscapes and 300,000 hectares of marine habitats under improved management practices, benefiting around 870,000 people, half of whom are women.

“He added that support for Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IPLCs) would expand under GEF-9.”
It is expected that the GEF will announce support for 10 Indigenous-led initiatives, including 5 Indigenous-led funds, by the end of 2026.

The fund has invested in youth leadership through the 10-million-dollar Fonseca Leadership Programme, which has supported 250 fellows from 52 countries, 42 percent of whom are young women.

Mohamed Bakarr, who oversees the GEF’s integrated programmes, said that all 11 integrated initiatives approved under GEF-8 were fully programmed.

Together, they deploy USD 1.65 billion in GEF resources and mobilise an additional USD 11.2 billion in co-financing across 98 countries.

“The integrated programmes mobilise 45 percent more co-financing per project on average,” Bakarr said, adding that governments were contributing significantly higher shares of funding than in previous replenishment cycles.

The June 2026 work programme includes 16 projects requiring USD 129.5 million in GEF financing and US$11.9 million in agency fees, for a total allocation of USD 141.3 million.

The projects are expected to leverage USD 828 million in co-financing, resulting in a co-financing ratio of 6.4 to one.

The work programme will support environmental initiatives in more than 19 countries, including seven least-developed countries and four small island developing states.

Delegates hailed a renewable energy initiative in Uzbekistan, which they expect will mobilise more than USD 1 billion in private investment.

Japan’s representative, Yoko Yamoto, described the project as an icon for GEF presence in Central Asia.

“We welcome the development of the NGI project in Uzbekistan, the host country for this session, and especially raising the GEF’s presence in Central Asia,” Yamoto said.

However, the same project attracted criticism.

Representing the GEF Civil Society Organisation Network, Sagar Aryal argued that civil society organisations and affected communities had not been consulted during the project’s design phase.

The criticism reflected broader concerns that GEF’s financial instruments may advance faster than mechanisms designed to ensure transparency, accountability, and community participation.

“The Stakeholder Engagement Plan is promised only before CEO endorsement, not before this Council takes a decision today,” Aryal said. “As GEF scales up blended finance, this question matters more, not less. We ask that community engagement and consultations be required before Council approval and not deferred after it.”

Civil society groups also praised greater support for community-led conservation.

Aryal highlighted continued support for the Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund and a new Global Flyways Grant Mechanism focused on the East Asian-Australasian Flyway.

“Together, these two projects represent close to 20% of this work programme going to or directly through civil society,” he said. “This is the highest share we have seen… it shows what is possible.”

“As GEF-9 begins, we ask, can this be the floor and not the ceiling?” he added.

Delegates also criticised the concentration of projects among implementing agencies, noting that almost two-thirds of projects were submitted by just Conservation International and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

In response to the criticism, Boltz affirmed that, despite the concerns, overall allocations stayed within limits.

“UNDP share presently is at 29.8 percent for GEF-8 overall,” he said, noting that medium-sized projects and enabling activities involving other agencies would help improve diversification.

The Secretariat also defended the programme’s performance, stating that GEF8 was on track to meet or exceed several core environmental targets.

Boltz said six of ten core indicators were on track and that terrestrial and marine conservation areas supported under GEF-8 had surpassed 2 billion hectares, up from 1.5 billion hectares in GEF-7.

As the meeting moved toward endorsing the final work programme, consensus emerged that GEF-8 is ending as one of the institution’s most successful replenishment cycles in environmental results, programming and co-financing. But delegates said success alone would not shield the institution from growing demands for greater inclusion, transparency and institutional diversity.

Note: The Eighth Global Environment Facility Assembly is underway until June 6, 2026, in Samarkand, Uzbekistan.
This feature is published with the support of the GEF. IPS is solely responsible for the editorial content, and it does not necessarily reflect the views of the GEF.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Les électeurs du Kosovo retournent aux urnes le 7 juin, pour les troisièmes législatives en 18 mois. Aucune sortie de crise n'est assurée, car il faudra une majorité des deux-tiers au sein du Parlement pour élire le nouveau chef de l'État. Vetëvendosje espère un plébiscite mais, à défaut, évoque déjà la possibilité d'un nouveau scrutin à l'automne...

- Articles / Kosovo, Politique, Kosovo Vetëvendosje, Radio Slobodna Evropa

Credit: Adobe stock. Source Africa Renewal, United Nations

By Cristina Duarte
UNITED NATIONS, Jun 1 2026 (IPS)

Africa holds 9 per cent of global renewable freshwater, over 600 gigawatts of untapped hydropower potential, and between 60 and 65 per cent of the world’s uncultivated arable land.

Its workforce is the youngest on the planet. Its consumer market will reach 2.5 billion people by 2050. Together, these constitute every production factor that global water, energy and food systems will need in the coming decades.

This is not a continent of scarcity. It is a continent of strategic abundance, and the African Union’s decision to anchor its 2026 theme in water and sanitation signals that the continent’s leadership is ready to govern it as such.

Consider what governed abundance looks like. The Grand Inga Dam alone could generate twice the output of the Three Gorges and electrify industries across Central, Southern and West Africa. The Lesotho Highlands Water Project already proves that African-engineered, transboundary water infrastructure can operate at scale and supply major urban economies.

Expanding managed irrigation from 3.7 per cent of sub-Saharan Africa’s arable land (the lowest figure in the developing world) to even 10 per cent within a decade would transform food security, generate millions of jobs across agricultural value chains, and cut the continent’s exposure to rainfall variability.

Every one of these investments is within Africa’s technical reach. The engineering is known. The water is there. The land is there. The workforce is there.

The question is governance. On this, Africa must be frank with itself: the prevailing approach does not match the scale of the opportunity. Governments and donors have treated water as a social service delivery challenge, a matter of boreholes and latrines managed project by project, rather than as productive infrastructure on the same footing as roads, ports and energy grids.

A hand pump installed without a maintenance budget is not development. A pit latrine built without connection to a sanitation system is not development. These interventions may register as progress on a results framework, but they do not transform economies. They are consumables, not assets.

The evidence of this mismatch is plain. Less than half of Africa’s population, or 41 per cent, has access to safely managed drinking water. Twenty-three million primary school-age children attend class hungry. Some 429 million Africans live in extreme poverty, a number projected to remain above 400 million in 2030.

These figures do not describe a resource-poor continent. They describe a governance model that treats water as charity rather than strategy, and a “build, neglect, rebuild” cycle that consumes scarce capital without producing lasting systems.

Africa can break this cycle, and I propose three shifts that would change the trajectory.

First, adopt Strategic Asset Management as a continental doctrine.

Dams, irrigation networks, urban treatment plants and transboundary systems are assets with 50- to 100-year lifespans. They demand sustained institutional stewardship, not five-year project horizons. Govern them across the full lifecycle, from planning through maintenance and renewal, with climate adaptation at every stage.

The build, neglect, rebuild pattern ends when African governments treat water systems as national infrastructure: as permanent assets to maintain, not temporary projects to hand over.

Credit: Adobe Stock

Second, launch a continental irrigation expansion.

South Asia irrigates 41 per cent of its arable land. Sub-Saharan Africa irrigates 3.7 per cent. Closing even a fraction of that gap within a decade would generate employment, build agricultural value chains, strengthen food sovereignty and reduce dependence on imported food. Water without irrigation grows nothing. Land without water feeds no one. Managed irrigation is the fastest route from endowment to economic value.

Third, build enforceable cooperative governance for shared basins.

Ninety per cent of Africa’s surface water crosses at least one national boundary. The Nile, the Niger, the Congo, the Zambezi: these are regional systems that demand regional governance. Africa already has models that work. The Senegal River Basin Development Organisation, has managed a four-country transboundary system for half a century. The task is to make cooperative governance the norm, not as diplomatic courtesy but as a strategic requirement for regional stability and integration.

Financing these shifts requires Africa to lead with its own resources. Closing the water security gap demands between $50 billion and $64 billion annually, according to the AU High-Level Panel and the African Development Bank respectively. The primary financing base must be domestic: reform tariffs progressively, protect maintenance budgets, stop the leakages, and treat water investment with the seriousness that roads and energy grids receive.

Africa must also mobilise international climate finance, which the continent has chronically underutilized, for integrated water investments. And African Governments should not consider the approval of foreign land deals without mandatory water-impact assessments. African Governments need to address land management and governance in an integrated fashion with water governance. Every crop grown on a foreign-leased African field and exported is a transfer of virtual water off the continent, water that was never priced, never accounted for, never governed. Land and water are inseparable. To alienate one is to alienate the other.

The world will develop Africa’s water and land in the coming decades. That process is already under way. Wealthier nations, facing their own water and food constraints, understand the arithmetic of African abundance and are positioning accordingly. The only question is whether this development happens on African terms or someone else’s.

Let me end on a somber note. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will not be achieved in Africa by 2030. Honesty demands we say so. But the generation after 2030 can inherit something different, if Africa’s leadership chooses now to govern water as what it already is: a driver of economic transformation, a foundation of peace, and the most important asset the continent holds in trust for its children.

Africa’s water is its future. The question is, will Africa govern it, or will it be governed by others?

Cristina Duarte is the Under Secretary-General for the Office of the Special Advisor on Africa.

Source: Africa Renewal, United Nations

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Filmmaker Meji Alabi directs a landmark BBC Africa Eye documentary about Nigeria's civil war.