Afrique

La Fédération Béninoise de Football (FBF) et le réseau de télécommunications CELTIIS ont procédé, vendredi 16 octobre 2026 à Cotonou, à la remise des primes de performance et des subventions aux acteurs du football national.

Le sacre de Sobemap en Celtiis Ligue Pro vaut une récompense de 20 millions FCFA. Le club champion du Bénin figure parmi les bénéficiaires des primes distribuées par la Fédération béninoise de football (FBF) et son partenaire Celtiis, lors d'une cérémonie organisée au Stade de l'Amitié Général Mathieu Kérékou.

Derrière Sobemap, Coton FC, vice-champion, repart avec 10 millions FCFA. Chez les dames, Dynamique FC reçoit également 10 millions FCFA pour son titre en D1 féminine, tandis qu'Élite AC, vice-championne, bénéficie de 5 millions FCFA.

La Fédération Béninoise de Football (FBF) a perçu une enveloppe de 14 millions FCFA.

Présent à la cérémonie, le président de la FBF, Marcellin Bocove, a salué l'accompagnement de CELTIIS, qui contribue, selon lui, à améliorer l'organisation des championnats et la visibilité du football béninois. Il a également rappelé aux clubs leurs obligations contractuelles, notamment le respect des dispositions relatives à la visibilité de la marque CELTIIS pendant les compétitions.

CELTIIS a réaffirmé la volonté de l'entreprise de poursuivre son soutien au football béninois.

La cérémonie s'est achevée par la remise symbolique des chèques aux bénéficiaires.

M. M.

QUELQUES IMAGES

Sa Majesté le Roi Mohammed VI, que Dieu L'assiste, accompagné de Son Altesse Royale le Prince Héritier Moulay El Hassan, a présidé, samedi au Palais Royal à Rabat, un Conseil des ministres.

Sa Majesté le Roi Mohammed VI, que Dieu L'assiste, accompagné de Son Altesse Royale le Prince Héritier Moulay El Hassan, a présidé, samedi au Palais Royal à Rabat, un Conseil des ministres, indique un communiqué du Cabinet Royal.

"Sa Majesté le Roi Mohammed VI, que Dieu L'assiste, accompagné de Son Altesse Royale le Prince Héritier Moulay El Hassan, a présidé, ce samedi 17 octobre 2026 correspondant au 05 Joumada 1er 1448 H au Palais Royal à Rabat, un Conseil des ministres consacré à l'examen et à l'adoption des orientations générales du Projet de Loi de Finances au titre de l'année 2027.

Au début des travaux du Conseil, et conformément aux dispositions de l'article 49 de la Constitution, Monsieur le ministre de l'Economie, des Finances et de la Performance publique a présenté devant Sa Majesté le Roi un exposé sur les grandes lignes du Projet de Loi de Finances de l'année 2027.

Monsieur le ministre a souligné que ce Projet intervient dans un environnement international profondément instable, marqué par l'alourdissement du coût des conflits géostratégiques, la montée des tendances protectionnistes et l'exacerbation de la concurrence autour de l'énergie, de la technologie et du financement.

Face à ces mutations, notre pays poursuit, sous la Conduite éclairée de Sa Majesté le Roi, que Dieu Le préserve, la consolidation des fondements de sa résilience et le renforcement du dynamisme de son économie. Ainsi, l'économie nationale devrait enregistrer une croissance de 4,7% à la fin de l'année en cours, avec une inflation contenue à 0,7%, parallèlement à une réduction du déficit budgétaire qui devrait être ramené à 3% du PIB.

Le Projet de Loi de Finances de l'année budgétaire 2027 s'articule autour des cinq priorités suivantes :

Premièrement : Restauration du pouvoir d'achat et consolidation des fondements d'un Etat social soutenable : Dans ce cadre, une réforme structurelle des marchés et des prix sera engagée, à partir de l'année 2027, et accompagnée de mesures visant à soutenir le pouvoir d'achat des citoyens, à poursuivre la généralisation de la couverture médicale, tout en veillant à la soutenabilité de ses régimes, à la revalorisation de l'aide sociale directe, outre la mise à niveau des systèmes publics de santé et d'éducation et le renforcement de l'accès à un logement décent, à travers le déploiement du programme d'aide directe au logement.

Deuxièmement : Insertion des jeunes dans l'éducation, la formation et l'emploi décent : Le gouvernement oeuvrera au lancement d'un programme national intégré pour les jeunes 2027-2031, fondé sur leur orientation vers un ensemble de programmes articulés sur la formation, l'incubation et la facilitation de l'accès au financement, aux mécanismes de garantie et aux marchés.

Troisièmement : Accélération de la mise en œuvre de la régionalisation avancée et de la nouvelle génération des programmes de développement territorial intégré : et ce, conformément aux Hautes Orientations Royales qui concernent la réorganisation des compétences régionales, selon une approche fondée sur la clarté et l'efficacité, ainsi que sur la consolidation des mécanismes de coordination et de contractualisation entre l'Etat et les régions, parallèlement à la pleine mise en œuvre de la Charte nationale de la déconcentration administrative.

Quatrièmement : Renforcement de la souveraineté stratégique hydrique, énergétique, alimentaire et numérique : de manière à assurer la sécurité stratégique hydrique, à accélérer le programme de développement des énergies renouvelables et à poursuivre le déploiement de l'offre Maroc pour l'hydrogène vert, ainsi que la mise en œuvre progressive de la feuille de route de l'infrastructure gazière, parallèlement à une série de mesures visant à garantir la sécurité alimentaire et à renforcer la souveraineté numérique nationale.

Cinquièmement : Edification d'une économie forte, capable de financer l'ambition sociale et souveraine, parallèlement à l'accélération de la mise en œuvre des réformes institutionnelles et la préservation des équilibres macroéconomiques et budgétaires : et ce, dans le but de la mobilisation des financements nécessaires pour accélérer la dynamique des chantiers, des grands projets de développement et des stratégies sectorielles engagés dans les différents domaines, parallèlement au développement de nouveaux écosystèmes industriels souverains.

Le projet de Loi de Finances pour l'année 2027 accorde également une attention particulière au renforcement de l'investissement privé, à travers la consolidation des mécanismes d'appui prévus par la Charte de l'investissement et la poursuite de la réforme des Centres Régionaux d'Investissement, tout en mettant l'accent sur le soutien aux très petites, petites et moyennes entreprises.

Le Projet de Loi de Finances de l'année 2027 accorde, en outre, une importance particulière à la question des jeunes qui constitue l'un des enjeux les plus importants et les plus urgents de cette phase, ce qui exige de dépasser la multiplicité des programmes sectoriels dispersés ayant montré leurs limites, au profit d'une politique nationale intégrée pour le suivi des parcours des jeunes, de l'éducation et de la formation jusqu'à l'emploi et le logement, leur garantissant une stabilité économique et sociale.

Et en application des Hautes Orientations Royales, il sera procédé à l'accélération de la mise en œuvre de la nouvelle génération des programmes de développement territorial intégré, en mobilisant des crédits budgétaires de l'ordre de 25 milliards de dirhams".

LES RÉSULTATS DOUBLE CHANCE SONT LÀ !

LOTO STAR Tirage N°124/26

Samedi 17 Octobre 2026 (14H)

– Zone A (5 premiers numéros) :

09 • 45 • 73 • 78 • 68

– Zone B (5 derniers numéros) :

80• 57 • 14 • 27 • 06

Félicitations aux heureux gagnants.

Pas encore cette fois ? Gardez le sourire !

Rendez-vous à 18H pour le prochain tirage.

Jouez avec modération et responsabilité. Le jeu doit rester un plaisir.

A TOI DE JOUER #Akaxòa

#LNBSA #XòGbɔnAlɔkpaVo #JeuResponsable #LaChanceAvecModération

LES RÉSULTATS LOTO STAR SONT LÀ !

TIRAGE N°124/26
Samedi 17 Octobre 2026 (11H)

90 • 31 • 18 • 83 • 28

Félicitations aux heureux gagnants !

Pas encore gagné ? Gardez le sourire !

Rendez-vous au prochain tirage de 14H pour une nouvelle chance.

Jouez dans les centres de jeux ou en ligne : Tapez 590# ou lnbloto.bj

Jouez avec modération et responsabilité. Le jeu doit rester un plaisir.

A TOI DE JOUER
#LaChanceAvecModération

Au Bénin, les bénéficiaires du Programme des 20 000 logements peuvent obtenir les clés de leur habitation sans verser d'apport initial. Le dispositif prévoit ensuite le paiement de mensualités, selon les modalités du contrat signé. Le gouvernement a assoupli les conditions d'accès.

Devenir propriétaire sans mobiliser une importante somme d'argent au départ est désormais possible dans le cadre du Programme des 20 000 logements au Bénin. Les bénéficiaires peuvent visiter leur logement, accomplir les démarches nécessaires, recevoir les clés, puis commencer à payer progressivement les mensualités prévues.

Cette possibilité est illustrée par le parcours de Rodrigue, un artisan menuisier, ou de maman Pascaline une vendeuse dans une vidéo diffusée le 17 octobre 2026 par le gouvernement.

Le futur acquéreur choisit son logement, s'y installe après son attribution et rembourse progressivement son coût. A terme, il peut en devenir propriétaire, conformément aux conditions de son contrat.

Cette formule de location-accession permet aux personnes qui ne disposent pas d'une épargne importante d'accéder à un logement sans réunir au préalable une somme conséquente. Elle ne signifie toutefois pas que le logement est gratuit.

Le bénéficiaire doit disposer de ressources suffisantes pour payer les mensualités et les charges liées à son habitation.

Des conditions d'accès élargies

Réuni le mercredi 7 octobre 2026, le Conseil des ministres a approuvé de nouvelles modalités de commercialisation des logements sociaux et économiques. L'objectif est d'élargir le nombre de bénéficiaires, après les difficultés constatées dans la commercialisation, notamment en raison de critères jugés trop restrictifs.

Pour les logements sociaux, l'accès est désormais ouvert à tous les fonctionnaires et agents publics, quel que soit leur niveau de revenu.

Les travailleurs du secteur privé sont également concernés, notamment les commerçants, les artisans, les salariés et les personnes exerçant une profession libérale.

Autre évolution importante : il n'est plus obligatoire d'être primo-accédant, c'est-à-dire d'acheter son premier logement. Les personnes qui possèdent déjà un bien immobilier peuvent également solliciter un logement social, sous réserve de satisfaire aux autres conditions d'attribution.

Le Conseil des ministres a également autorisé l'achat groupé de logements au comptant pour certaines catégories de bénéficiaires, notamment à travers des entreprises ou des organismes qui souhaitent faciliter l'accès au logement de leurs agents.

Les logements économiques bénéficient, eux aussi, de nouvelles modalités. La location simple est désormais autorisée, sous réserve de disponibilité. Les entreprises peuvent également acquérir des lots de logements au profit de leurs salariés. La mise en location simple des appartements figure parmi les possibilités retenues.

Ces mesures s'appliquent aux logements disponibles en stock et prêts à être habités. Leur extension à d'autres phases du programme pourra être envisagée en fonction des besoins, précise le compte rendu du Conseil des ministres.

Le programme propose plusieurs formules d'acquisition, dont la location-accession avec ou sans apport initial et la vente directe au comptant. Selon les caractéristiques du logement et le contrat retenu, le candidat doit donc examiner les conditions de paiement avant de s'engager.

Un programme déployé dans 14 villes

Le Programme des 20 000 logements prévoit la construction de 20 000 logements économiques et sociaux de type F4 dans 14 villes du Bénin. Il comprend 12 960 logements individuels et 7 040 logements collectifs. Les opérations s'inscrivent notamment dans la création de nouvelles cités à Abomey-Calavi (Ouèdo), Porto-Novo (Djègan-Kpèvi), Sèmè-Kpodji, Parakou, Abomey et Bohicon, ainsi que dans l'aménagement de nouveaux quartiers dans d'autres localités.

Les personnes intéressées peuvent consulter les types de logements, les modalités d'acquisition et les critères d'attribution sur https://programmelogements.bj/ le portail officiel du Programme des 20 000 logements. Le site permet également de découvrir les logements proposés et d'engager les démarches de réservation.

M. M.

DIGITAL 08H : Avez-vous tenté votre chance ?
Le tirage DIGITAL 08H N°274 a livré son verdict !
Samedi 17 Octobre 2026

Avez-vous joué ?
Avez-vous misé sur vos numéros porte-bonheur ?

RÉSULTAT : 87 • 27 • 17 • 15 • 13

Félicitations aux heureux gagnants !

Pas encore cette fois ? Gardez le sourire.

Rendez-vous à 11H pour le prochain tirage.

Jouez dans les points de vente ou : Tapez *590# ou rendez-vous sur lnbloto.bj

Jouez avec modération et responsabilité. Le jeu doit rester un plaisir.

A TOI DE JOUER #XòGbɔnAlɔkpaVo

#LNBSA #JeuResponsable #LaChanceAvecModération

L'Autorité de Régulation des Marchés Publics (ARMP) a sanctionné la Personne Responsable des Marchés Publics (PRMP) de la commune de Gogounou pour violation des règles de transparence et d'égalité de traitement des soumissionnaires.

Belko Arouna, Personne Responsable des Marchés Publics (PRMP) de la commune de Gogounou, est exclu de la commande publique au Bénin pour cinq ans.

Cette sanction couvre la période allant du 19 octobre 2026 au 18 octobre 2031.

Des irrégularités ont été relevées dans une procédure de passation de marché portant sur l'aménagement de couloirs et d'aires de pâturage, selon la décision n°2026-106 de l'Autorité de Régulation des Marchés Publics (ARMP), en date du 15 octobre 2026.

Selon l'ARMP, l'intéressé a enfreint les principes d'égalité de traitement des candidats et de transparence des procédures dans le cadre d'un appel d'offres relatif aux travaux prévus dans les arrondissements de Sori et de Wara.

Une offre réintégrée sans réexamen collégial

À l'origine de l'affaire, l'établissement JEC SERVICE avait vu son offre rejetée pour non-conformité dans le cadre du lot 2. Le dossier ne comportait pas le diplôme de fin d'apprentissage en maçonnerie ou le Certificat de qualification aux métiers (CQM) de Sèmakou Jean Sokenou, présenté comme membre du personnel clé de l'entreprise.

Après ce rejet, l'établissement a introduit un recours gracieux auquel il a joint la pièce manquante.

Belko Arouna a alors donné une suite favorable à la demande et décidé de réintégrer l'offre dans la procédure, sans réunir au préalable la Commission d'ouverture et d'évaluation (COE).

Pour l'ARMP, cette démarche constitue une irrégularité. Le Conseil de régulation indique que la PRMP s'est substitué à la commission compétente en acceptant des pièces qui ne figuraient pas dans l'offre initiale. Elle souligne que les règles des marchés publics interdisent de compléter une offre après coup pour la rendre plus compétitive.

Devant l'organe de régulation, Belko Arouna a contesté les faits qui lui étaient reprochés. Il a soutenu que sa réponse visait seulement à prendre acte du recours, en attendant que la commission se réunisse pour réexaminer le dossier et qu'une décision définitive soit prise.
Cet argument n'a pas convaincu l'ARMP.

Le Conseil de régulation a confirmé le rejet de l'offre de JEC SERVICE et ordonné la poursuite de la procédure de passation du marché, notamment pour le lot 2.

M. M.

Lors de cet atelier, nous étudierons des airs et des chants de la région élargie d'Asie Mineure et la manière dont le répertoire correspondant a été intégré et domestiqué, principalement dans les îles du nord-est de la mer Égée et des Cyclades.
À travers le répertoire et la pratique, nous étudierons les points communs et les différences stylistiques de ces régions spécifiques. Parallèlement, l'analyse des chants et des airs nous permettra d'identifier les caractéristiques (développement (…)

- Agenda / France - Régions, Turquie

L'ordre juridique international édifié au lendemain de la seconde guerre mondiale est-il condamné à disparaitre pour laisser place aux seuls rapports de force entre quelques puissances hégémoniques ?

- Lettres de...

Some of the 200 patients were found with "sores all over their bodies" and in overcrowded rooms.

Plusieurs associations, aidées par des syndicalistes, ont réussi ces derniers jours à faire suspendre ou en tout cas retarder l'expédition à destination du principal fabricant d'armes israélien de composants mécaniques pour véhicules de combat susceptibles d'être engagés sur des théâtres de guerre, en violation des accords internationaux et de la législation française.

- Défense en ligne / France, Israël, Armes (ventes d')

Hyron Andrews dies at his Johannesburg Lions' team hotel before their Champions Cup match at La Rochelle on Saturday.

On Friday, EP President Roberta Metsola hosted Gulf Cooperation Council Speakers, with both sides committing to stronger strategic ties and deeper parliamentary cooperation.

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

On Friday, EP President Roberta Metsola hosted Gulf Cooperation Council Speakers, with both sides committing to stronger strategic ties and deeper parliamentary cooperation.

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

On Friday, EP President Roberta Metsola hosted Gulf Cooperation Council Speakers, with both sides committing to stronger strategic ties and deeper parliamentary cooperation.

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The award ceremony will take place at 18.00, on Wednesday 21 October, at the European Parliament in Strasbourg (Daphne Caruana Galizia Press Room).

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The award ceremony will take place at 18.00, on Wednesday 21 October, at the European Parliament in Strasbourg (Daphne Caruana Galizia Press Room).

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

On Wednesday 21 October, Bernd Lange and Pascal Canfin will discuss EU-China trade developments ahead of the Trade Committee’s visit to Beijing and Shanghai.
Committee on International Trade

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

On Wednesday 21 October, Bernd Lange and Pascal Canfin will discuss EU-China trade developments ahead of the Trade Committee’s visit to Beijing and Shanghai.
Committee on International Trade

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The following paper has received a distinction in the policy paper competition organized by ELIAMEP’s Turkey Programme, focusing on Turkey’s domestic developments, foreign relations, and socio-political dynamics.

Amidst intensifying global technological rivalry, this paper examines digital cooperation as a vital functional anchor for EU– Turkey relations. It argues that engaging through frameworks like the Digital Europe Program (DEP) allows both actors to navigate the “technosphere trap” by balancing economic competitiveness with strategic vigilance. While acknowledging structural fault lines regarding digital sovereignty and trust, the analysis outlines three pragmatic pathways—market, innovation, and technical-driven cooperation—for fostering a resilient, future-proof partnership despite broader political stagnation.

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by Jacopo Franceschini, Fellow at Centre of Applied Turkish Studies (CATS); Ayhan Gücüyener Evren, Postdoctoral Researcher, TRSIDIPLOM Project and Erman Ermihan, Assistant Professor, Istanbul Nişantaşı University.

Introduction

From platform regulation to chip exports, technological domains now lie at the heart of global geopolitical contestation. The “innovation imperative”[1] pushes rising powers to see technology not only as a driver of economic growth, but also as a prerequisite for sustaining their international ascent, generating pressures and spillover effects for the established international order.[2] Furthermore, this rivalry is not dyadic between China and the United States; it is increasingly forcing other countries to position themselves and navigate growing uncertainty under the threat of technological decoupling.[3]

Competitiveness requires greater control over technology use, vibrant industrial ecosystems, and the ability to shape digital standards, while vigilance demands secure infrastructure and the diversification of technological dependencies. 

Confronted by the “technosphere trap” dilemma, a condition in which the governance of the digital ecosystem (through standards, infrastructures, platforms, and norms) is dominated by a few actors, regional powers can mitigate the risk of overdependence on a single pole by cooperating in different functional digital domains. In such a context, competitiveness and vigilance become complementary rather than competing imperatives. Competitiveness requires greater control over technology use, vibrant industrial ecosystems, and the ability to shape digital standards, while vigilance demands secure infrastructure and the diversification of technological dependencies. Digital cooperation, in turn, paves the way for regulatory convergence that minimizes compliance costs and prevents market fragmentation, while resilient data governance and infrastructures are sustained through joint innovation frameworks.[4]

In this context, examining the potential promises and pitfalls of a Turkey–EU digital partnership becomes essential for understanding how both actors might escape the technosphere trap shaped by the competition between major technopoles. Therefore, in this article, we argue that alignment between their digital visions through initiatives like the Digital Europe Program (DEP) acts as a potential form of functional integration, particularly at a time when Turkey’s EU accession process remains stalled. In a period of growing instability, the EU and Turkey have already demonstrated the capacity to strengthen their political and economic alignments, as recently seen in the defense sector. Similarly, a closer partnership in the digital field would allow joint efforts to stay competitive and preserve both their strategic digital autonomy in the global tech race. In this way, we argue that the EU and Turkey could forge a more resilient position in the future global digital landscape.

We further assert that, against the backdrop of increasing technological rivalry between the US and China, initiatives like the DEP serve not only as frameworks for technical cooperation but also as strategic (geo)economic tools, providing opportunities for concrete alignments in key sectors such as artificial intelligence (AI), cybersecurity, high-performance computing, and advanced digital skills. In essence, this paper explores how digital cooperation allows Turkey and the EU to pursue both competitiveness and vigilance imperatives simultaneously, advancing common interests through a forward-looking and strategically balanced framework.

The timing of this agenda is particularly critical. As the EU accelerates its comprehensive digital agenda and pursues greater digital autonomy, and as Turkey seeks to enhance its strategic autonomy and diversify technological partnerships, digital cooperation emerges as one of the few policy fields where both sides share an objective sense of urgency. The rollout of the EU’s AI Act and Digital Services Package, and Europe’s broader drive for digital sovereignty, coincides with Turkey’s efforts to modernize its data governance, expand its cybersecurity capacities, and strengthen its digital economy.[5] These parallel trajectories create a unique window for pragmatic and mutually reinforcing engagement.

Digital cooperation can serve as a foundation for high-impact “low politics” capable of rebuilding mutual trust even when political channels remain strained. 

This paper first outlines the strategic drivers that make digital cooperation increasingly necessary. Digital cooperation can serve as a foundation for high-impact “low politics” capable of rebuilding mutual trust even when political channels remain strained. Such cooperation has the potential to standardize digital regulations, bolster an innovative ecosystem, and integrate Turkey into the emerging European digital governance framework. The EU is already influencing Turkey’s digital policies, as evidenced by Ankara’s recent legislative processes aligning with the EU Digital Markets and AI Act. Overall, this section examines the cooperation mechanisms already in place and explains how shared economic, societal and political interests make such cooperation sustainable.

The paper then evaluates the principal fault lines. These challenges do not necessarily undermine the possibility of cooperation, but they may shape its depth[6]. As elaborated in the following sections, while the EU and Turkey’s differentiated narratives and strategies on digital sovereignty and strategic autonomy may constitute sources of friction, challenges in establishing trust across domains such as cybersecurity warrant further consideration. Finally, the paper outlines three pathways for EU–Turkey digital cooperation based on approaches driven by markets, innovation, and technical factors. The market-driven pathway prioritises joint efforts on securing digital supply chains, particularly in the AI domain. The innovation-driven pathway focuses on joint innovation initiatives, especially within the framework of the DEP. And t he technically driven pathway emphasizes regulatory rapprochement to sustain resilient and vigilant infrastructures, as both actors become increasingly digitally interconnected.

The Strategic Logic of Digital Cooperation

The history of EU–Turkey relations demonstrates that functional, technically driven cooperation often endures, even when political channels falter. The Customs Union, migration management mechanisms, and joint research initiatives such as Horizon Europe have shown that rule-based, depoliticized coordination can sustain and even advance bilateral ties. Digital governance—at once strategic, technocratic, and innovation-oriented—has the potential to replicate this pattern, offering a contemporary functional anchor at a time when broader accession-related dynamics remain uncertain.

By accelerating EU–Turkey joint efforts on innovation and supply chain security, digital cooperation can gradually help both actors reduce their dependencies without requiring intensive engagement in high diplomacy.

From this perspective, digital cooperation fits into a more effective tradition of “functional integration” in EU–Turkey relations. Instead of reopening the politically sensitive debate on accession, cooperation on concrete digital tools—from defining digital standards to adopting similar frameworks for data and digital infrastructure or emerging technologies—allows both actors to deepen their interdependence in a targeted manner. By accelerating EU–Turkey joint efforts on innovation and supply chain security, digital cooperation can gradually help both actors reduce their dependencies without requiring intensive engagement in high diplomacy. Over time, this could help reduce the political, economic and social costs of misalignment and increase the attractiveness of greater integration—not just digital, but also in other EU– Turkey dossiers.

The DEP is emblematic of this logic. Designed to bridge the gap between research and large-scale deployment, the DEP prioritizes investments in high-performance computing, AI, cybersecurity, advanced digital skills, and the dissemination of innovative digital technologies. For Turkey, participation in the DEP offers a structured channel to access European know-how, infrastructure, and project portfolios, while also aligning domestic policy choices with emerging EU priorities. For the EU, engaging with Turkey means extending the reach of its regulatory and technological ecosystem to a key neighboring economy whose digital market is already deeply intertwined with the Single Market.

…the rationale for digital cooperation rests on three core strategic tenets: that cooperation can boost each party’s competitiveness when it follows a win-win and symmetrical logic; that cooperation through convergence on standards can accelerate interoperability and reduce transaction costs; and that cooperation through pooling expertise and resources can sustain and expand innovation capacity.

EU–Turkey cooperation on innovation is already well established, as Turkey has participated in EU research and innovation programmes since 2003, with Turkish entities receiving €362 million in net EU contributions to date.[7] Beyond this, the rationale for digital cooperation rests on three core strategic tenets: that cooperation can boost each party’s competitiveness when it follows a win-win and symmetrical logic; that cooperation through convergence on standards can accelerate interoperability and reduce transaction costs; and that cooperation through pooling expertise and resources can sustain and expand innovation capacity.

First, this cooperation responds to the shared imperative of competitiveness. Both Turkey and the EU risk falling behind the United States and China in key enabling technologies. Against this backdrop, while the EU seeks to address fragmentation within its research and innovation system, Turkey is mobilising its resources around the National Technology Initiative (Milli Teknoloji Hamlesi) and launching programmes such as HIT-30[8] to attract investment in high-technology sectors. Meanwhile, cultivating digital skills has become a priority for both actors: while the EU finances initiatives under the DEP to attract young talent to the ICT field, Turkey is seeking to ease bureaucratic barriers to work permits for international digital talent through programmes such as Talent Transfer (Yetenek Transferi).

Turkish businesses and research institutions have already been given the opportunity to integrate into European value chains in areas such as trustworthy AI, industrial data spaces, or secure cloud services.[9] At the same time, European partners benefit from the rapidly expanding Turkish technology ecosystem. In 2023, Turkey was one of the EU’s leading markets for high-technology exports, accounting for €14 billion.[10] In this landscape, pooling resources through joint projects, within the frameworks like DEP can mitigate structural disadvantages such as a lack of venture capital, market fragmentation, or skills shortages.

By promoting interoperable standards and secure cross-border digital infrastructure, EU– Turkey cooperation can reduce both sides’ vulnerability to value chain disruptions, cyber threats, and extraterritorial pressures exerted by third countries.

Beyond the economic benefits, the aforementioned “technosphere trap” directly links to the quest for resilience. By promoting interoperable standards and secure cross-border digital infrastructure, EU– Turkey cooperation can reduce both sides’ vulnerability to value chain disruptions, cyber threats, and extraterritorial pressures exerted by third countries. Joint investments in cybersecurity centers, threat intelligence sharing mechanisms, and regional early warning systems can help manage cyber risks that do not stop at territorial borders. Similarly, collaboration on data governance and cloud infrastructure can support diversification strategies that mitigate excessive dependence on a single technological hub.

Another driver of digital cooperation lies in the dissemination of regulatory standards and convergence on models. European digital governance, ranging from the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) to the Digital Services and Digital Markets Acts, is more than just a set of technical instruments; it also acts as a technopolitical force, defining what is “trustworthy”, “reliable”, and “secure”[11]. These instruments also exert a real influence on the Turkish regulatory framework. In the field of AI, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey is demonstrating its intention to adopt a European-style regulatory framework, drawing inspiration from the EU AI Act rather than deregulatory models of the American sort, or the centralized control models preferred in China. This alignment in the digital sphere is neither linear nor automatic, but it is certainly a facilitator in the dialogue between the EU and Turkey in areas ranging from trade to data protection where having a common legal approach already makes dialogue easier. Overall, fragmented regulation tends to lock countries into external technospheres; in contrast, regulatory convergence-driven digital cooperation can create strategic leverage, particularly in areas such as AI governance that are still taking shape.

Digital cooperation also has a clear social and political dimension. Collaboration on digital skills, e-government services, and smart city solutions addresses the tangible needs of citizens and local administrations. Joint projects that improve connectivity in underserved regions, digital literacy, or public-sector innovation can yield visible benefits and be less susceptible to the fluctuations of daily political tensions. This “low politics with a high impact” can help revitalize pro-cooperation constituencies in both Turkey and the EU, particularly among younger generations, tech entrepreneurs, and public officials directly involved in implementation.

Finally, the strategic logic of digital cooperation is based on a dense network of existing sectoral and institutional connections. Turkish universities, research centers, municipalities, and business associations have gained experience managing EU-funded digital projects and collaborating with European counterparts through Horizon Europe, Erasmus+, and IPA-supported initiatives. The DEP builds upon these networks and amplifies them, offering a more targeted framework focused on deployment and capacity- building, rather than solely on research. If effectively utilized, this cumulative experience can reduce administrative and political transaction costs, making digital cooperation one of the most realistic and scalable areas for future engagement between the EU and Turkey.

At the same time, the strategic importance of digital technologies implies that cooperation is not without risks. Issues such as the adequacy of the data protection regime, trust in cyber threat intelligence sharing, dependence on critical infrastructure, and differing interpretations of digital sovereignty can quickly politicize what initially appears to be a technocratic agenda.

Fault Lines in the Digital Partnership

Despite a solid strategic rationale, EU– Turkey digital cooperation is developing amid structural barriers and diverging political priorities. These fault lines do not negate the partnership’s potential, but they do define its terms and depth. Understanding them is essential, if the digital agenda is not to be burdened with expectations it cannot meet, as well as making it easier to identify where well-designed tools like the DEP can or cannot contribute to collaborations and alignment between the EU and Turkey.

A first source of friction concerns the differing narratives about digital sovereignty and strategic autonomy.[12] For the EU, digital sovereignty increasingly means the ability to regulate global platforms, protect fundamental rights online, and reduce critical technological dependencies in areas such as cloud computing, semiconductors, and cybersecurity services. A dense EU legal and institutional framework anchors this agenda, presenting it as compatible with an open and rules-based international order. In Turkey, debates about digital sovereignty are closely intertwined with national security concerns, industrial upgrading goals, and a multi-vector foreign policy that keeps channels open to diverse, and often competing, technology providers and partners. This can lead to divergent risk assessments across areas such as 5G, surveillance technologies, data localization, and digital supply chain security, making it more difficult to build compatible, digitally integrated environments in fields such as cross-border data flows and cybersecurity cooperation.

Secondly, regulatory commitments in the digital sphere, from data protection to freedom of expression, are tightly bound up with the EU’s acquis. In Turkey, ongoing debates about internet and social media legislation such as platform liability have raised questions in Brussels about how digital regulatory tools intersect with broader governance priorities. Furthermore, while Turkey has increasingly consolidated its institutional framework, particularly through the establishment of the Cybersecurity Directorate, the European Commission’s 2025 Enlargement Report calls for further alignment with EU initiatives, notably the NIS2 Directive and the 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox. These concerns do not necessarily block technical projects under the DEP or other instruments, but they may limit Turkey’s engagement with more advanced agreements in the long run.

A further fault line concerns differences in digital governance and their implications for regulatory trust. The European digital acquis is not solely a technical rulebook, as instruments such as the GDPR, the Digital Services Act, and the AI Act combine regulatory requirements with safeguards concerning fundamental rights, oversight, transparency, and proportionality. Meaningful convergence therefore requires not only the formal approximation of legislation but also compatible administrative practices.

In the case of Turkey, cooperation is complicated by differences in content moderation, data governance, and institutional oversight. Requirements concerning local representation, platform compliance, content removal, and restrictions on access have generated recurring debates. These debates do not preclude cooperation, but they increase the importance of confidence-building, regulatory dialogue, and clearer procedural safeguards. This is particularly relevant in areas such as platform governance and AI oversight, where legal alignment alone may be insufficient without mutual confidence in how rules are interpreted and applied.

At the same time, Turkey has taken part in the DEP as an associated country since 2023, and a draft AI law reflecting the principles of the EU AI Act is currently under parliamentary consideration.[13] These signals of openness coexist, however, with a strong official emphasis on digital and data sovereignty. The willingness to converge on European norms has thus been articulated more clearly at the level of principle than demonstrated in the governance of the cyber and data domains, where the practical divergence remains greatest, and it is precisely there that declared intent will need to be matched by verifiable practice.

A persistent lack of mutual trust in the most security-sensitive domains constitutes a third point of contention.[14] Cybersecurity cooperation requires sharing information on vulnerabilities, incidents, and potential threats—areas that overlap with intelligence practices and military planning. Past crises in EU–Turkey relations have reinforced the perception that sensitive data can be instrumentalized within the framework of a broader geopolitical standoff. In this context, initiating joint cybersecurity exercises or shared situational awareness platforms can be challenging, especially in the absence of clear governance structures. The result is a tendency to confine cooperation to relatively low-sensitivity areas, limiting the transformative potential of the partnership. It remains indicative that, within the six DEP Clusters, the only one that was never formally activated by the EU, and from which Turkey officially withdrew, is the Cybersecurity and Trust Cluster (Table 1).

Table 1. DEP Clusters & Turkish Participation

DEP Cluster Turkish Participation Notes HPC ✓ Strong alignment AI ✓ Sandbox possibilities Cybersecurity ✗ (withdrawn) Political sensitivity

Institutional fragmentation and variation due to the rapid pace of the technological change and emerging security challenges pose an additional challenge. For instance, in Turkey, agencies designated to coordinate national cybersecurity efforts have changed rapidly in recent years. The frequent reorganizations, overlapping competencies, and high staff turnover in some institutions make a coherent national position difficult for external actors to discern. Meanwhile, European cyber policy is also complex, with various institutional bodies tasked with coordination. While a vibrant cooperation necessitates predictability and sustainable efforts on both sides, this challenge can be mitigated; indeed, Turkey has consolidated its cybersecurity policymaking under the recently established Cybersecurity Directorate, while the EU is increasingly shifting toward a more robust and integrated cyber policy landscape.

Similarly, both sides tend to approach digital cooperation in a short-term manner rather than as part of a long-term strategic framework. Geopolitical pressures from the outside further complicate the situation, forcing both actors to prioritize short-term arrangements over longer-term strategic planning. On the EU side, engagement with Turkey is often channeled through temporary funding windows and ad hoc calls for proposals, which can incentivize competition among Turkish stakeholders without providing a stable vision for the future of the digital partnership. On the Turkish side, political attention dedicated to the European digital agenda oscillates between intensifying digital cooperation with the EU and benefiting from regulatory know-how. This combination of short-term pragmatism and a lack of binding long-term commitments can create a cycle of inflated expectations followed by disappointments, progressively eroding the sustainability of the digital partnership.

Finally, there are significant asymmetries in the EU–Turkey digital interdependence. The EU sets the rules for the Single Market, which Turkish digital operators largely have to comply with to remain competitive, while Turkey has a more limited scope to influence these rules from the outside. This structural imbalance can reinforce the perception in Turkey that digital cooperation simply extends the scope of European regulation without adequately reflecting Turkish perspectives. While countries such as China have introduced specialised visa schemes for science and technology talent, visa-related constraints continue to feature as a persistent issue in the EU–Turkey context. On the other hand, Turkey’s recent commitment to digital sovereignty, combined with its increasingly centralized digital governance structure, enables rapid policy action that may outpace the EU’s comparatively slower regulatory processes. Managing these asymmetries requires carefully designed governance mechanisms capable of balancing flexibility and predictability and integrating political dialogue on contentious issues. Indeed, while the perception of digital cooperation as a solely technical environment has fostered genuine dialogue and rapid understanding between Brussels and Ankara, the lack of a political entente to accompany it risks undermining a necessary and lasting collaboration, despite the promising starting points.

Overall, the path toward a meaningful digital partnership between the EU and Turkey is constrained by a complex interplay of regulatory, political, institutional, and geopolitical fault lines. Digital cooperation between the EU and Turkey should therefore transcend specific sectors or international crisis moments, and be accompanied by a political mechanism and mutual understanding framework to secure the continuity and resilience of the partnership, leaving no room for ambiguity. Acknowledging this does not mean questioning the cooperation; on the contrary, it is a prerequisite for identifying realistic entry points and for designing tools capable of withstanding political turbulence. Below, we outline three policy visions, exploring concrete pathways through which programs like the DEP, along with complementary policy initiatives, can contribute to translating strategic intent into a future-proof digital cooperation framework.

 Pathways towards a Future-Proof Digital Partnership

A future EU–Turkey digital partnership must rest on a set of pragmatic frameworks for cooperation visions that balance strategic ambition with political and institutional realism. We therefore propose three pathways, each of which relies on a different strategic focus; the pathways are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

The first pathway is market- and, more specifically, supply-chain- driven cooperation. As both sides seek to secure their position in increasingly fragile digital value chains, joint efforts in areas such as the development of trusted cloud infrastructure, secure data flows, semiconductor-adjacent manufacturing, and digital services certification can strengthen mutual resilience. In recent years, Turkish stakeholders have shown a strong interest in attracting European companies seeking to relocate their activities and supply chains to Turkey through nearshoring,[15] particularly in response to emerging geopolitical fault lines. In this context, digital nearshoring would enable both sides to collaborate in critical digital industries, delivering scale and speed advantages without necessarily undermining strategic autonomy considerations. Turkey’s large digital market, entrepreneurial ecosystem, and emerging regulatory alignment provide a natural complement to the EU’s need for diversified, proximate, and standards-compatible partners. Strengthening digital supply-chain security can thus create tangible interdependence without requiring deeper political alignment.

A second pathway follows innovation-driven and human- skills-centric collaboration. The EU’s structural innovation gap and severe digital skills shortage contrast with Turkey’s young talent pool, dynamic start-up environment, and growing interest in AI, cybersecurity, and advanced computing. Joint testbeds for trustworthy AI, high-performance computing access schemes, cross-border digital skills academies, and sandbox environments for SMEs represent low-cost, high-impact cooperation mechanisms. Human-centric cooperation has the added advantage of generating visible social returns, digital inclusion, enhanced employability, and local innovation capacity, which makes it less vulnerable to political turbulence and more likely to mobilize constituencies that favor stable relations.

The third pathway, accelerated technical cooperation, offers a realistic foundation for long-term convergence, particularly from the regulatory point of view. Turkey’s ongoing efforts to reform data protection, align its AI governance with the EU’s risk-based approach and AI Act, and in tention to align with the CRA provide fertile ground for deeper regulatory and technical synchronization. Furthermore, alignment with CRA-like instruments has generated positive spillover effects within Turkey’s domestic digital ecosystem, as the Ministry of Industry and Technology is currently introducing mandatory cybersecurity standards for the design, development, production, and market placement of digital and industrial products. Beyond these practices, cooperation between municipalities, research and innovation institutions, and public administrations, particularly through DEP clusters, can further incrementally internalize European practices. Overall, horizontal standards on data governance, interoperability, and secure digital services constitute areas where alignment is both feasible and mutually beneficial.

These three frameworks for cooperation operate within clear boundaries, however. Political volatility, normative divergence, and potential mistrust in sensitive domains such as cybersecurity limit how far and how fast this functional cooperation can advance. Furthermore, the predominance of short-term pragmatism on both sides further constrains strategic depth. A future-proof digital partnership therefore requires not only technical tools but also a governance framework capable of managing asymmetries, buffering political shocks, and sustaining long-term commitment. Within such a calibrated architecture, programs like the DEP or regulatory rapprochement can serve as both catalyst and stabilizer, allowing EU–Turkey digital cooperation to progress incrementally while preserving strategic flexibility for both parties.

Finally, the cooperation frameworks outlined in this article should also address the institutional and rights-related dimensions. In practice, cooperation instruments and any structured cyber dialogue could provide space for discussion on data-protection oversight, proportionality, transparency, and relevant legal safeguards. The purpose would not be to introduce additional political conditionality, but rather to bolster mutual confidence to the level required for cooperation in sensitive areas. Greater clarity regarding how security objectives, regulatory powers, and fundamental rights are balanced would support the development of trusted infrastructures and closer coordination on AI and platform governance. Framed in this way, the political dimension of digital cooperation becomes a building block for a more predictable, resilient, and mutually credible EU–Turkey digital partnership.

Conclusion

In the current geopolitical landscape of increasingly polarized technological competition between the United States and China, EU–Turkey digital cooperation should be understood as a form of functional integration. Thus, while it does not replace structural political nodes, it can produce measurable benefits even when “high-level” channels remain constrained. The resumption and multiplication of sectoral dialogues in 2024–2025 confirms that there is mutual interest in maintaining spaces for collaboration on innovative and high-impact dossiers, even while the relationship between the EU and Turkey remains selective and being restrictive to certain areas.[16]

 

Table 2. Drivers – Fault Lines – Pathways

Drivers Fault Lines Pathways Digital sovereignty Normative clashes Market-driven cooperation Data governance convergence Lack of trust Innovation-driven Shared competitiveness Institutional fragmentation Technical-driven

 

Ultimately, EU–Turkey digital cooperation should be seen not as a political shortcut, but as a practical framework for strengthening digital capabilities, reducing critical technological dependencies, and advancing regulatory interoperability through three complementary pathways: market-driven, innovation-driven, and technical cooperation. From this perspective, the goal is not a “total” and immediate convergence, but rather a modular path that builds interoperability and capacity through incentives, standards, and verifiable policy outcomes.

 

The first driver, digital sovereignty, is pushing both sides to reduce critical dependencies and maintain options in supply chains and standards. The main disagreement lies in normative clashes: while the EU tends to connect digital trust and predictability with accountability and guarantees, Turkey links digital sovereignty with security concerns and industrial development. To prevent this divergence from disrupting the agenda, the most effective short-term approach lies in market-driven cooperation: shared standards, reliability requirements for services and infrastructure, and risk management across supply chains. This need is made more urgent by the decision cycle on networks: Turkey held a 5G tender for mid-October 2025, and commercial services were launched on 1 April 2026. Additionally, the presence of both European and Chinese vendors in the network market shows that, without a more unified interoperability and assurance framework, industrial choices could lead to hard-to-reverse technological lock-in.

The second driver, the convergence of data governance, is vital for reducing compliance costs and enabling cooperation on AI and digital services. The main obstacle is the lack of trust, which limits the most ambitious efforts where high level guarantees and regulatory stability are needed. The most practical approach in this area is innovation-driven cooperation that builds trust through results: testbeds, sandboxes, and programs focused on skills and deployment. EU initiatives like the DEP are key because they provide a structured and relatively “depoliticized” channel for collaboration on capabilities and implementation. At the same time, the way participation is structured highlights the selectivity of trust: Turkey is involved in the DEP with regard to objectives 1, 2, 4, and 5; it is not involved with regard to objective 3, which focuses on Cybersecurity & Trust. However, the expansion of the European Digital Innovation Hubs network to include enlargement countries, including hubs in Turkey starting January 1, 2025, has enhanced technology transfer and deployment capacity—a necessary step for turning regulatory convergence into real-world administrative and industrial practices.

The third driver, shared competitiveness, reflects a structural fact: neither the EU nor Turkey can replicate the scale of large tech hubs on their own, but they can both gain resilience and negotiating power if they converge on standards, interoperability, and skills. The main fault line is institutional fragmentation, which tends to produce misalignments between strategic objectives and implementation. Hence the importance of the third pathway: technical- driven cooperation between administrations, regulators, innovation ecosystems, and deployment actors to reduce coordination costs and make convergence “executable” over time.

All of this remains constrained by the macroeconomic context, which necessitates pragmatic instrument selection. In the EU, forecasts indicate moderate growth in 2025–2026 and a policy framework where the selectivity of public investment becomes stricter. In parallel, increasing spending needs (particularly on defense) continue to exacerbate budget trade-offs, making scalable interventions in skills, standards, and deployment more credible than in highly capital-intensive infrastructure. In Turkey, the disinflation and macro adjustment path is underway but remains exposed to financial constraints and a high cost of capital—factors that make capacity building and applied innovation-oriented instruments more politically and economically sustainable.

Ultimately, EU–Turkey digital cooperation should be seen not as a political shortcut, but as a governance framework capable of supporting a “third way” of standards, rules, and capabilities between dominant models via three related pathways focused respectively on the market (supply chain and interoperability), innovation (DEP and deployment), and technical expertise (regulations, education, training, and implementation consistency). The key to the partnership’s long-term viability lies in mutual benefits: for the EU, expanding digital trust toward an interconnected partner; for Turkey, translating European engagement into tangible strategic advantages (access to capabilities, development of local industry, lower compliance costs, and integration into more diverse supply chains). It is this mutuality, more than mere declarative convergence, that can turn digital cooperation into a stable, innovative channel that is less vulnerable to the ups and downs of daily politics.

References

Ayhan Gücüyener Evren and Jacopo Franceschini, “Between Sovereignty and Solidarity: EU–Türkiye Cybersecurity Relations in Turbulent Times,” in Türkiye, the EU, and the Double-Edged Sword of Security Discourses and Populism: Turbulence and Ties, ed. Veli Özdemir and Fatmanur Kaçar Aşcı (Routledge, forthcoming 2026).

Bradford, Anu. 2020. The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Delegation of the European Union to Türkiye. “EU and Türkiye Deepen Cooperation in Industrial Decarbonisation and Innovation Policy.” European External Action Service, November 27, 2025. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/turkiye/eu-and-turkiye-deepen-cooperation-industrial-decarbonisation-and-innovation-policy_en?s=230.

Dunn Cavelty, Myriam. 2008. Cyber-Security and Threat Politics: US Efforts to Secure the Information Age. London: Routledge.

European Commission. 2020. Shaping Europe’s Digital Future. Brussels: European Commission.

Eurostat. “EU High-Tech Trade: Exports Up in 2023.” European Commission. October 4, 2024. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20241004-1.

Farrell, Henry, and Abraham L. Newman. 2019. “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion.” International Security 44 (1): 42–79. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00351

Floridi, Luciano, Josh Cowls, Monica Beltrametti, Raja Chatila, Patrice Chazerand, Virginia Dignum, Christoph Luetge, et al. 2018. “AI4People—An Ethical Framework for a Good AI Society.” Minds and Machines 28 (4): 689–707. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-018-9482-5

Kennedy, Andrew B., and Darren J. Lim. “The Innovation Imperative: Technology and US–China Rivalry in the Twenty-First Century.” International Affairs 94, no. 3 (May 2018): 553–572. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiy044

Pohle, Julia, and Thorsten Thiel. “Digital sovereignty.” Internet Policy Review 9, no. 4 (2020). https://doi.org/10.14763/2020.4.1532

Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Industry and Technology. “HIT-30 High Tech Türkiye.” Accessed January 16, 2026. https://hit30.sanayi.gov.tr.

Yaşar Aydın, “Turkey’s Industrial and Supply Chain Policy Goals and Prospects for German-Turkish Economic Cooperation and Bilateral Relations”, SWP. (2025). Turkey’s Industrial and Supply Chain Policy – Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik

[1] Andrew B. Kennedy and Darren J. Lim, “The Innovation Imperative: Technology and US–China Rivalry in the Twenty-First Century,” International Affairs 94, no. 3 (May 2018): 553–572.

[2] Andrew B. Kennedy and Darren J. Lim, “The Innovation Imperative: Technology and US–China Rivalry in the Twenty-First Century,” International Affairs 94, no. 3 (May 2018): 553–572.

[3] Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion,” International Security 44, no. 1 (2019): 42–79.launching programmes such as HIT-30

[4] Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion,” International Security 44, no. 1 (2019): 42–79.

[5] European Commission, Shaping Europe’s Digital Future (Brussels: European Commission, 2020).

[6] Ayhan Gücüyener Evren and Jacopo Franceschini, “Between Sovereignty and Solidarity: EU–Türkiye Cybersecurity Relations in Turbulent Times,” in Türkiye, the EU, and the Double-Edged Sword of Security Discourses and Populism: Turbulence and Ties, ed. Veli Özdemir and Fatmanur Kaçar Aşcı (Routledge, forthcoming 2026).

[7] Delegation of the European Union to Türkiye, “EU and Türkiye Deepen Cooperation in Industrial Decarbonisation and Innovation Policy,” European External Action Service, November 27, 2025, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/turkiye/eu-and-turkiye-deepen-cooperation-industrial-decarbonisation-and-innovation-policy_en?s=230.

[8] Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Industry and Technology, “HIT-30 High Tech Türkiye,” accessed January 16, 2026, https://hit30.sanayi.gov.tr.

[9] Luciano Floridi et al., “AI4People—An Ethical Framework for a Good AI Society,” Minds and Machines 28, no. 4 (2018): 689–707.

[10] Eurostat, “EU High-Tech Trade: Exports Up in 2023,” European Commission, October 4, 2024, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20241004-1.

[11] Claudia Emilie Aanonsen., “The power of standards in European Union digital governance”. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). (2025),  https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep76862.

[12] Julia Pohle and Thorsten Thiel, “Digital sovereignty,” Internet Policy Review 9, no. 4 (2020), https://doi.org/10.14763/2020.4.1532.

[13] Republic of Türkiye, Directorate for EU Affairs, “Digital Europe Programme,” https://www.ab.gov.tr/dijital-avrupa-programi-digital-europe-_53088.html. Turkey has participated in the programme as an associated country since 2023, but does not take part in its cybersecurity component owing to security restrictions. On the draft artificial intelligence law reflecting the principles of the EU AI Act, see the Law of Tomorrow policy tracker (status as of mid-2026); its legislative status should be re-confirmed at publication.

[14] Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Cyber-Security and Threat Politics: US Efforts to Secure the Information Age (London: Routledge, 2008).

[15] Yaşar Aydın, “Turkey’s Industrial and Supply Chain Policy Goals and Prospects for German-Turkish Economic Cooperation and Bilateral Relations”, SWP. (2025). https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/turkeys-industrial-and-supply-chain-policy#:~:text=Turkey%E2%80%99s%20geopolitically%20motivated%20industrial%20and%20supply%20chain%20policy,and%20establish%20a%20green%20high-tech%20and%20services%20economy.

[16] Delegation of the European Union to Türkiye, “EU and Türkiye Deepen Cooperation in Industrial Decarbonisation and Innovation Policy,” European External Action Service, November 27, 2025, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/turkiye/eu-and-turkiye-deepen-cooperation-industrial-decarbonisation-and-innovation-policy_en?s=230.