Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Exacerbated by the cuts in development cooperation (DC), many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) are currently facing severe financial constraints. Against this backdrop, higher domestic revenue is a desirable goal for most countries. Greater attention is being devoted to enhancing domestic revenue in the international development policy discourse too – across the entire political spectrum. For some, the goal is to extend the decision-making scope of government and enhance the development focus of public action, while others hope to relieve the burden of transfers on industrialised nations of the Global North and end the recipient countries’ “addiction” to DC payments. Yet what options are actually available to LMICs to generate more domestic revenue? The present policy brief shows that taxing personal income and landed property in particular could offer opportunities for additional revenue. Another important area is the rationalisation of tax expenditures, which often lead to substantially less revenue without providing any evident benefit. At the same time, however, it is also important to recognise the systemic – and eminently political – nature of tax reforms. Above and beyond the issue of technical and administrative feasibility, the political achievability of reforms must also be taken into
account. Short-term tax increases – for example through higher consumer taxes or tariffs – are often not very sustainable in their own right.
Instead, the aim must be to place the “fiscal contract” between taxpayers and the state on a broader and more stable base where better public services also play a role. One type of revenue (in this case DC) therefore cannot simply be replaced by another (taxes) – a fact that advocates of DC cuts often fail to mention. During the transition, DC must continue to provide contributions, despite declining overall funds.
International players, including the German Government and the EU, can support partner governments in a variety of ways. They are already doing so, for example by promoting the Addis Tax Initiative (ATI). In addition, Germany and the EU should make a determined effort to help strengthen multilateral approaches to cooperation. This particularly applies to the United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on International Tax Coopera-tion currently being negotiated.

Exacerbated by the cuts in development cooperation (DC), many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) are currently facing severe financial constraints. Against this backdrop, higher domestic revenue is a desirable goal for most countries. Greater attention is being devoted to enhancing domestic revenue in the international development policy discourse too – across the entire political spectrum. For some, the goal is to extend the decision-making scope of government and enhance the development focus of public action, while others hope to relieve the burden of transfers on industrialised nations of the Global North and end the recipient countries’ “addiction” to DC payments. Yet what options are actually available to LMICs to generate more domestic revenue? The present policy brief shows that taxing personal income and landed property in particular could offer opportunities for additional revenue. Another important area is the rationalisation of tax expenditures, which often lead to substantially less revenue without providing any evident benefit. At the same time, however, it is also important to recognise the systemic – and eminently political – nature of tax reforms. Above and beyond the issue of technical and administrative feasibility, the political achievability of reforms must also be taken into
account. Short-term tax increases – for example through higher consumer taxes or tariffs – are often not very sustainable in their own right.
Instead, the aim must be to place the “fiscal contract” between taxpayers and the state on a broader and more stable base where better public services also play a role. One type of revenue (in this case DC) therefore cannot simply be replaced by another (taxes) – a fact that advocates of DC cuts often fail to mention. During the transition, DC must continue to provide contributions, despite declining overall funds.
International players, including the German Government and the EU, can support partner governments in a variety of ways. They are already doing so, for example by promoting the Addis Tax Initiative (ATI). In addition, Germany and the EU should make a determined effort to help strengthen multilateral approaches to cooperation. This particularly applies to the United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on International Tax Coopera-tion currently being negotiated.

Exacerbated by the cuts in development cooperation (DC), many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) are currently facing severe financial constraints. Against this backdrop, higher domestic revenue is a desirable goal for most countries. Greater attention is being devoted to enhancing domestic revenue in the international development policy discourse too – across the entire political spectrum. For some, the goal is to extend the decision-making scope of government and enhance the development focus of public action, while others hope to relieve the burden of transfers on industrialised nations of the Global North and end the recipient countries’ “addiction” to DC payments. Yet what options are actually available to LMICs to generate more domestic revenue? The present policy brief shows that taxing personal income and landed property in particular could offer opportunities for additional revenue. Another important area is the rationalisation of tax expenditures, which often lead to substantially less revenue without providing any evident benefit. At the same time, however, it is also important to recognise the systemic – and eminently political – nature of tax reforms. Above and beyond the issue of technical and administrative feasibility, the political achievability of reforms must also be taken into
account. Short-term tax increases – for example through higher consumer taxes or tariffs – are often not very sustainable in their own right.
Instead, the aim must be to place the “fiscal contract” between taxpayers and the state on a broader and more stable base where better public services also play a role. One type of revenue (in this case DC) therefore cannot simply be replaced by another (taxes) – a fact that advocates of DC cuts often fail to mention. During the transition, DC must continue to provide contributions, despite declining overall funds.
International players, including the German Government and the EU, can support partner governments in a variety of ways. They are already doing so, for example by promoting the Addis Tax Initiative (ATI). In addition, Germany and the EU should make a determined effort to help strengthen multilateral approaches to cooperation. This particularly applies to the United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on International Tax Coopera-tion currently being negotiated.

Vor genau einem Jahr stellte der Internationale Gerichtshof in Den Haag in einem Rechtsgutachten fest: Staaten sind völkerrechtlich verpflichtet, das Klima zu schützen und erhebliche Schäden zu verhindern. Der Klimaspruch kann ein Instrument der internationalen Klimadiplomatie sein, diese aber nicht ersetzen.

Vor genau einem Jahr stellte der Internationale Gerichtshof in Den Haag in einem Rechtsgutachten fest: Staaten sind völkerrechtlich verpflichtet, das Klima zu schützen und erhebliche Schäden zu verhindern. Der Klimaspruch kann ein Instrument der internationalen Klimadiplomatie sein, diese aber nicht ersetzen.

Vor genau einem Jahr stellte der Internationale Gerichtshof in Den Haag in einem Rechtsgutachten fest: Staaten sind völkerrechtlich verpflichtet, das Klima zu schützen und erhebliche Schäden zu verhindern. Der Klimaspruch kann ein Instrument der internationalen Klimadiplomatie sein, diese aber nicht ersetzen.

Zusammenfassung:

24. Juli 2026 – Im September 2026 wählt Sachsen-Anhalt einen neuen Landtag. Die AfD hat gute Chancen, stärkste Kraft zu werden. Doch was würden weniger Europa, weniger Zuwanderung und geringere öffentliche Investitionen für die Menschen bedeuten? Diese Kurzstudie belegt ein AfD-Paradox: Regionen, die überproportional stark für die AfD stimmen, leiden deutlich stärker unter einer AfD-Politik als andere. Obwohl vieles an der Unzufriedenheit der Menschen in starken AfD-Regionen verständlich ist, würden sie sich mit der Wahl der AfD selbst am meisten schaden. Das gilt nirgendwo mehr als in Sachsen-Anhalt. Durch die von der AfD geforderte Politik – den Austritt aus Euro und EU, Abschottung und einen Stopp der Zuwanderung sowie massive staatliche Kürzungen – würden Menschen dort im Durchschnitt jährlich rund 1.600 Euro pro Kopf an Einkommen verlieren; zudem könnten rund 10.000 Arbeitsplätze verloren gehen. Die Einkommensverluste durch eine AfD-Politik könnten in Sachsen-Anhalt bis zu doppelt so hoch ausfallen wie im Bundesdurchschnitt. Die Gefahr einer Abwärtsspirale ist groß. Unzufriedenheit treibt die Unterstützung für die AfD, was wiederum die Lebenssituation weiter verschlechtert. Eine hoffnungsvolle Perspektive: Gelingt es, neue Zukunftschancen zu schaffen, kann aus der Abwärts- eine Aufwärtsspirale werden. Denn diese Kurzstudie zeigt auch, dass AfD-Wähler*innen, gerade im Osten, auf Veränderungen reagieren. Die deutsche Geschichte belegt es: Die 1990er und 2000er Jahre waren gerade in den ostdeutschen Ländern Jahrzehnte der Stärkung der Demokratie, des wachsenden Wohlstands und sozialer Teilhabe.

The majority of the people displaced by the armed conflict in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado Province live in host communities. Our research shows that many Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) live with family/friends. Less than half live in displacement camps. As in many other internal displacement contexts, the government of Mozambique, develop­ment partners and humanitarian organisations use the terms IDPs and host communities to distinguish between the people who fled the conflict and those who welcomed them, respectively. This is a necessary distinction because IDPs are in a particularly precarious situation, having lost homes, family members and means of livelihoods, which renders material and psychosocial support to them indispensable. However, this policy brief identifies two issues that are pertinent to this distinction and the provision of material support to IDPs. First, while the categories of IDPs and host communities may provide clarity for interventions, they do not always reflect the broader history of local communities and how people identify and relate to each other. Second, in contexts where economically vulnerable host communities share their meagre resources with IDPs prior to the arrival of external humanitarian support, humanitarian organisations need to be sensitive to the material circumstances of host communities so that these do not see such support as discriminatory, leading to conflict. When the material support that humanitarian organisations provide to IDPs is beyond the means of their hosts, the latter can become resentful and withdraw their own support from the IDPs. This is a common problem, and the policy brief shows some ways to address it. Governments, development partners, and humanitarian organisations that adopt simplistic distinctions between IDPs and host communities without locating them in the specific socio-economic context risk missing local acts of solidarity and mutual identification as channels of inclusion that are central to maintaining social cohesion. 

Key policy messages:

• Contextualise displacement. In contexts where displacement occurs within a broader history of regional migration, IDPs are not always seen as outsiders in their host communities because many have prior personal connections to host com­munities. The government of Mozambique, develop­ment partners and humanitarian actors need to embed and understand the current displacement within the long history of migration, ethnolinguistic identification and displacement which shapes relations and contributes to social cohesion. 
• Integrate local ethos of solidarity. In the absence of external humanitarian support or prior to the arrival of emergency aid, host communities mobilise themselves through an ethos of solidarity, care and hospitality to help displaced people. External interventions coming into such situations need to be sensitive to this ethos and build on existing inclusive social support mechanisms and locally led initiatives so that they do not disrupt positive relations.
• Build on locally led integration. Locally led efforts are integral to local ownership of the integration of IDPs and its sustainability. When external support builds on local initiatives, this reduces unintended consequences such as resentment and conflicts between IDPs and host communities.

The majority of the people displaced by the armed conflict in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado Province live in host communities. Our research shows that many Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) live with family/friends. Less than half live in displacement camps. As in many other internal displacement contexts, the government of Mozambique, develop­ment partners and humanitarian organisations use the terms IDPs and host communities to distinguish between the people who fled the conflict and those who welcomed them, respectively. This is a necessary distinction because IDPs are in a particularly precarious situation, having lost homes, family members and means of livelihoods, which renders material and psychosocial support to them indispensable. However, this policy brief identifies two issues that are pertinent to this distinction and the provision of material support to IDPs. First, while the categories of IDPs and host communities may provide clarity for interventions, they do not always reflect the broader history of local communities and how people identify and relate to each other. Second, in contexts where economically vulnerable host communities share their meagre resources with IDPs prior to the arrival of external humanitarian support, humanitarian organisations need to be sensitive to the material circumstances of host communities so that these do not see such support as discriminatory, leading to conflict. When the material support that humanitarian organisations provide to IDPs is beyond the means of their hosts, the latter can become resentful and withdraw their own support from the IDPs. This is a common problem, and the policy brief shows some ways to address it. Governments, development partners, and humanitarian organisations that adopt simplistic distinctions between IDPs and host communities without locating them in the specific socio-economic context risk missing local acts of solidarity and mutual identification as channels of inclusion that are central to maintaining social cohesion. 

Key policy messages:

• Contextualise displacement. In contexts where displacement occurs within a broader history of regional migration, IDPs are not always seen as outsiders in their host communities because many have prior personal connections to host com­munities. The government of Mozambique, develop­ment partners and humanitarian actors need to embed and understand the current displacement within the long history of migration, ethnolinguistic identification and displacement which shapes relations and contributes to social cohesion. 
• Integrate local ethos of solidarity. In the absence of external humanitarian support or prior to the arrival of emergency aid, host communities mobilise themselves through an ethos of solidarity, care and hospitality to help displaced people. External interventions coming into such situations need to be sensitive to this ethos and build on existing inclusive social support mechanisms and locally led initiatives so that they do not disrupt positive relations.
• Build on locally led integration. Locally led efforts are integral to local ownership of the integration of IDPs and its sustainability. When external support builds on local initiatives, this reduces unintended consequences such as resentment and conflicts between IDPs and host communities.

The majority of the people displaced by the armed conflict in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado Province live in host communities. Our research shows that many Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) live with family/friends. Less than half live in displacement camps. As in many other internal displacement contexts, the government of Mozambique, develop­ment partners and humanitarian organisations use the terms IDPs and host communities to distinguish between the people who fled the conflict and those who welcomed them, respectively. This is a necessary distinction because IDPs are in a particularly precarious situation, having lost homes, family members and means of livelihoods, which renders material and psychosocial support to them indispensable. However, this policy brief identifies two issues that are pertinent to this distinction and the provision of material support to IDPs. First, while the categories of IDPs and host communities may provide clarity for interventions, they do not always reflect the broader history of local communities and how people identify and relate to each other. Second, in contexts where economically vulnerable host communities share their meagre resources with IDPs prior to the arrival of external humanitarian support, humanitarian organisations need to be sensitive to the material circumstances of host communities so that these do not see such support as discriminatory, leading to conflict. When the material support that humanitarian organisations provide to IDPs is beyond the means of their hosts, the latter can become resentful and withdraw their own support from the IDPs. This is a common problem, and the policy brief shows some ways to address it. Governments, development partners, and humanitarian organisations that adopt simplistic distinctions between IDPs and host communities without locating them in the specific socio-economic context risk missing local acts of solidarity and mutual identification as channels of inclusion that are central to maintaining social cohesion. 

Key policy messages:

• Contextualise displacement. In contexts where displacement occurs within a broader history of regional migration, IDPs are not always seen as outsiders in their host communities because many have prior personal connections to host com­munities. The government of Mozambique, develop­ment partners and humanitarian actors need to embed and understand the current displacement within the long history of migration, ethnolinguistic identification and displacement which shapes relations and contributes to social cohesion. 
• Integrate local ethos of solidarity. In the absence of external humanitarian support or prior to the arrival of emergency aid, host communities mobilise themselves through an ethos of solidarity, care and hospitality to help displaced people. External interventions coming into such situations need to be sensitive to this ethos and build on existing inclusive social support mechanisms and locally led initiatives so that they do not disrupt positive relations.
• Build on locally led integration. Locally led efforts are integral to local ownership of the integration of IDPs and its sustainability. When external support builds on local initiatives, this reduces unintended consequences such as resentment and conflicts between IDPs and host communities.

The following paper was awarded first prize in the policy paper competition organized by ELIAMEP’s Turkey Programme, focusing on Turkey’s domestic developments, foreign relations, and socio-political dynamics.

The policy paper examines the systematic erosion of press freedom and digital rights in Turkey, focusing particularly on events following the arrest of Istanbul Metropolitan Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu on March 19, 2025. The Saraçhane protests that erupted in response revealed the full dimensions of the Turkish government’s digital censorship apparatus: bandwidth throttling, mass social media account suspensions, and the systematic suppression of citizen journalism. Through an analysis of recent policy developments, legal frameworks, and the relationship between the Erdoğan regime and Big Tech companies, this report documents how authoritarian governments leverage digital platforms to silence dissent.

The analysis shows that with 90% of traditional media under state control, journalists have migrated to YouTube and social media platforms only to face expensive licensing requirements, threats of arrest, and platform-level censorship. The report argues that İmamoğlu’s case represents a dangerous precedent: his social media accounts remain suspended, despite his legal case maintaining the presumption of innocence, which effectively prevents him from campaigning as a presidential candidate. This systematic destruction of information infrastructure has implications not only for Turkey, but for democratic movements worldwide.

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by Ezgi Daryurek, Master’s Program in Media and Migration Flows, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens.

In dieser Folge geht es weiter mit dem Reizthema Dunkelflauten, über das wir einmal mehr unaufgeregt sprechen wollen. Zu Gast ist ein weiteres Mal Martin Kittel. In der letzten Folge haben wir mit ihm schon ausführlich darüber gesprochen, was Dunkelflauten eigentlich sind und wie man sie misst – wir ...

Climate mitigation and adaptation require substantial investment to advance sustainable development. In low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), mobilising such finance is particularly challenging for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) due to persistent market failures, including limited financial disclosure and weak credit-risk information. High upfront costs, uncertain returns and weak regulatory frameworks further constrain adoption of low-carbon technologies. While fiscal constraints and the capital-intensive trans­ition underscore the need for private capital, traditional bank financing is restricted by long project horizons, high risk and macroeconomic instability. Blended finance and guarantees are key instruments for mobilising private investment in LMICs. Blended finance combines concessional public resources with private or additional public capital to mitigate profitability risks, while guarantees reduce perceived risk by covering partial losses, particularly for non-commercial risks. This policy brief assesses their role in scaling SME climate finance, alongside their limitations and context-specific applicability. Evidence suggests that leverage effects, especially for blended finance, are more modest than often assumed and are context dependent; nonetheless, these instruments remain relevant for de-risking SME finance, contingent on improved design and implementation. The policy brief advances the following recommendations:

- Financial intermediaries should prioritise SMEs facing binding financing constraints that prevent projects with clear socio-economic and environ­mental benefits. Project selection should integrate financial and climate vulnerability, though assess­ment remains difficult in low-income countries (LICs). De-risking instruments should target specific constraints, with guarantees mitigating risks and blended finance supporting projects with insufficient risk-adjusted returns to attract private capital. Multilateral development banks (MDBs) and development finance institutions (DFIs) should ensure additionality, minimise concessionality and strengthen monitoring and transparency.
- MDBs and DFIs should better align donor incen­tives with effective risk-sharing and flexible finan­cing structures. Concessional senior loans dominate blended finance but have limited loss absorption, reducing effectiveness in high-risk environments. A more balanced mix, including subordinated debt, equity and guarantees, can improve risk allocation and crowd in private investors. Greater use of special purpose vehicles and off-balance-sheet structures can further expand financing capacity in fragile contexts.
- MDBs and DFIs should strengthen coordination, standardisation and local engagement. Frag­menta­tion in blended finance and guarantees increases complexity and transaction costs and deters institutional investors. Greater harmoni­sation across MDBs, DFIs and private investors would improve capital allocation and comple­mentarity, while standardised procedures and contracts would streamline project preparation and scaling in LMICs.
 Governments in LMICs should address structural constraints, with MDBs and DFIs providing com­plementary de-risking and capacity-building support. Weak investment climates, shallow finan­cial markets, poor project pipelines and weak credit information systems reduce the effective­ness of blended finance and guarantees, particu­larly in LICs. Governments should strengthen investment climates, deepen financial markets and improve SME capabilities, while MDBs and DFIs support local intermediaries and broader reforms.

Climate mitigation and adaptation require substantial investment to advance sustainable development. In low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), mobilising such finance is particularly challenging for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) due to persistent market failures, including limited financial disclosure and weak credit-risk information. High upfront costs, uncertain returns and weak regulatory frameworks further constrain adoption of low-carbon technologies. While fiscal constraints and the capital-intensive trans­ition underscore the need for private capital, traditional bank financing is restricted by long project horizons, high risk and macroeconomic instability. Blended finance and guarantees are key instruments for mobilising private investment in LMICs. Blended finance combines concessional public resources with private or additional public capital to mitigate profitability risks, while guarantees reduce perceived risk by covering partial losses, particularly for non-commercial risks. This policy brief assesses their role in scaling SME climate finance, alongside their limitations and context-specific applicability. Evidence suggests that leverage effects, especially for blended finance, are more modest than often assumed and are context dependent; nonetheless, these instruments remain relevant for de-risking SME finance, contingent on improved design and implementation. The policy brief advances the following recommendations:

- Financial intermediaries should prioritise SMEs facing binding financing constraints that prevent projects with clear socio-economic and environ­mental benefits. Project selection should integrate financial and climate vulnerability, though assess­ment remains difficult in low-income countries (LICs). De-risking instruments should target specific constraints, with guarantees mitigating risks and blended finance supporting projects with insufficient risk-adjusted returns to attract private capital. Multilateral development banks (MDBs) and development finance institutions (DFIs) should ensure additionality, minimise concessionality and strengthen monitoring and transparency.
- MDBs and DFIs should better align donor incen­tives with effective risk-sharing and flexible finan­cing structures. Concessional senior loans dominate blended finance but have limited loss absorption, reducing effectiveness in high-risk environments. A more balanced mix, including subordinated debt, equity and guarantees, can improve risk allocation and crowd in private investors. Greater use of special purpose vehicles and off-balance-sheet structures can further expand financing capacity in fragile contexts.
- MDBs and DFIs should strengthen coordination, standardisation and local engagement. Frag­menta­tion in blended finance and guarantees increases complexity and transaction costs and deters institutional investors. Greater harmoni­sation across MDBs, DFIs and private investors would improve capital allocation and comple­mentarity, while standardised procedures and contracts would streamline project preparation and scaling in LMICs.
 Governments in LMICs should address structural constraints, with MDBs and DFIs providing com­plementary de-risking and capacity-building support. Weak investment climates, shallow finan­cial markets, poor project pipelines and weak credit information systems reduce the effective­ness of blended finance and guarantees, particu­larly in LICs. Governments should strengthen investment climates, deepen financial markets and improve SME capabilities, while MDBs and DFIs support local intermediaries and broader reforms.

Climate mitigation and adaptation require substantial investment to advance sustainable development. In low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), mobilising such finance is particularly challenging for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) due to persistent market failures, including limited financial disclosure and weak credit-risk information. High upfront costs, uncertain returns and weak regulatory frameworks further constrain adoption of low-carbon technologies. While fiscal constraints and the capital-intensive trans­ition underscore the need for private capital, traditional bank financing is restricted by long project horizons, high risk and macroeconomic instability. Blended finance and guarantees are key instruments for mobilising private investment in LMICs. Blended finance combines concessional public resources with private or additional public capital to mitigate profitability risks, while guarantees reduce perceived risk by covering partial losses, particularly for non-commercial risks. This policy brief assesses their role in scaling SME climate finance, alongside their limitations and context-specific applicability. Evidence suggests that leverage effects, especially for blended finance, are more modest than often assumed and are context dependent; nonetheless, these instruments remain relevant for de-risking SME finance, contingent on improved design and implementation. The policy brief advances the following recommendations:

- Financial intermediaries should prioritise SMEs facing binding financing constraints that prevent projects with clear socio-economic and environ­mental benefits. Project selection should integrate financial and climate vulnerability, though assess­ment remains difficult in low-income countries (LICs). De-risking instruments should target specific constraints, with guarantees mitigating risks and blended finance supporting projects with insufficient risk-adjusted returns to attract private capital. Multilateral development banks (MDBs) and development finance institutions (DFIs) should ensure additionality, minimise concessionality and strengthen monitoring and transparency.
- MDBs and DFIs should better align donor incen­tives with effective risk-sharing and flexible finan­cing structures. Concessional senior loans dominate blended finance but have limited loss absorption, reducing effectiveness in high-risk environments. A more balanced mix, including subordinated debt, equity and guarantees, can improve risk allocation and crowd in private investors. Greater use of special purpose vehicles and off-balance-sheet structures can further expand financing capacity in fragile contexts.
- MDBs and DFIs should strengthen coordination, standardisation and local engagement. Frag­menta­tion in blended finance and guarantees increases complexity and transaction costs and deters institutional investors. Greater harmoni­sation across MDBs, DFIs and private investors would improve capital allocation and comple­mentarity, while standardised procedures and contracts would streamline project preparation and scaling in LMICs.
 Governments in LMICs should address structural constraints, with MDBs and DFIs providing com­plementary de-risking and capacity-building support. Weak investment climates, shallow finan­cial markets, poor project pipelines and weak credit information systems reduce the effective­ness of blended finance and guarantees, particu­larly in LICs. Governments should strengthen investment climates, deepen financial markets and improve SME capabilities, while MDBs and DFIs support local intermediaries and broader reforms.

DIW Energiewende-Monitor: Photovoltaik fällt hinter steigende Ausbauvorgaben zurück – Wärmepumpen und Elektrofahrzeuge gewinnen Marktanteile, kommen aber zu langsam voran – Strompreise zeigen wachsenden Flexibilitätsbedarf – Großbatterien wachsen Die Energiewende in Deutschland kommt weiter voran, ...

Africa’s presence within BRICS has expanded significantly. South Africa, Egypt, and Ethiopia are now full members, while Nigeria and Uganda participate as partner countries. Yet despite this growing representation, there is no mechanism for African states to coordinate their positions within the grouping, raising questions about whether a larger footprint has translated into greater collective influence.

This issue brief examines how African states are engaging BRICS as part of broader strategies of diversification rather than alignment. It explores the distinct priorities driving South Africa, Egypt, and Ethiopia’s participation, the relationship between BRICS and other multilateral forums such as the African Union and G20, and the opportunities and constraints for developing a more coordinated African voice within the bloc.

The brief argues that while African states share an interest in advancing reforms to global governance and international finance, coordination within BRICS remains limited by differing national priorities and the absence of institutional mechanisms. Rather than viewing BRICS as a standalone platform, it suggests that African governments may derive greater value by integrating BRICS into a broader multilateral strategy while strengthening cooperation where interests converge.

Download

The post Diversification without Coordination: The Scope for a Collective African Voice in BRICS appeared first on International Peace Institute.